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This thesis examines a little studied aspect of the Soviet Union’s history, namely the 
activities of the mass membership of the Communist Party during the interwar period, 
specifically 1926-1941. Based on extensive research in central and regional party 
archives, it revisits a number of specialised scholarly debates by offering an account 
of key processes and events of the period, including rapid industrialisation and mass 
repression, from the viewpoint of rank-and-file communists, the group of people who 
had chosen to profess active support for the regime without however acquiring 
positions of political power. The account provided is in the form of an in-depth case 
study of the party organisation of the Red Putilov – later Kirov – machine-building 
plant in the city of Leningrad, followed by a shorter study of communist activism in 
another major Leningrad institution, the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet. It is shown that all 
major political initiatives of the leadership generated intense political activity at the 
bottom levels of the party hierarchy, as the thousands of rank-and-file members 
interpreted and acted on central directives in ways that were consistently in line with 
their and their colleagues’ interests. As these interests were hardly ever in harmony 
with those of the corresponding level of the administrative state apparatus, the result 
was a nearly permanent state of tension between the executive and political branches 
of the Soviet party-state at the grassroots level. The main argument offered is that 
ultimately, the rank-and-file organisations of the communist party were an extremely 
important but contradictory element of the Soviet Union’s political system, being a 
reliable constituency of grassroots support for the regime while at the same time 
placing significant limits on the ability of state organs to actually implement policy. 
This thesis therefore challenges interpretations of Soviet state-society relations based 
on binary narratives of repression from above and resistance from below. It identifies 
instead an element of the Soviet system where the line between society and the state 
became blurred, and grassroots agency became possible on the basis of a minimum 
level of active support for the regime. It is further argued that the ability of the mass 
membership to influence the outcome of leadership initiatives was predicated on the 
Marxist-Leninist ideological underpinnings of most major policies. In this way, this 
thesis also contributes to the recent literature on the role of ideology in the Soviet 
system. The concluding chapter considers the value of the overall findings of this thesis 






















                   Мы и кухарку  
каждую 
       выучим 
              управлять государством!  
 
 











The completion of this doctoral project has been made possible by the intellectual and 
personal support provided by a number of people and institutions. My supervisors Dr 
Iain Lauchlan and Dr Julius Ruiz provided helpful comments and corrections to my 
work while never objecting to my long absences from Edinburgh. The School of 
History, Classics and Archaeology and the Consortium of Russian Central and East-
European Studies provided financial support for travel and training. Without the 
friendly introduction to the Russian archives provided by Dr Polly Jones and Dr 
Alexander Titov through the Russian Archives Training Scheme, primary research for 
this project would have been a much less pleasant experience. During the advanced 
stages of writing-up, I had the privilege of being hosted as a visiting student at the 
Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki. I am especially indebted to Anna 
Korhonen, Eeva Korteniemi and Professor Markku Kangaspuro for having been so 
keenly welcoming and helpful. 
Dina Veriutina, Liana Mukhamedzyanova and Sasha Skorobogatova provided not 
only accommodation, but also the company necessary to prevent me from losing all 
touch with the 21st century during the most immersive phase of my archival work in 
Saint-Petersburg. Michał Palacz, Chelsea Sambells and Victor Cazares Lira went 
through the trials of doctoral training at the same time as I did and provided collegial 
and friendly support without which it would have been much harder to complete this 
project. Caterina Bellinetti, Panas Karampampas, Pritt Franco, Scott Smith and Misha 
Vodopyanov became friends when, at an advanced stage of writing up, I decided that 
the best way to take my mind off the thesis was to learn Chinese. It was the right call. 
The ideas underlying my work have been formed over many years in friendly 
conversations with Andrew Weir, Phil McGuinness, Euan Oliphant, Keir Lawson, Jon 
Black and Neil Bennet. It is a privilege to have friends that do not regard my interest 
in the Soviet Union as a peculiarity. On a similar note, there are few people I share 
more views with than Alexis Synodinos. Our conversations have always been a 
pleasure.  
I have left the best for last. My parents have been a source of infinite support 





thesis, nor many other things would have been possible without their love and trust. 
Finally, no contribution to the completion of this project deserves to be acknowledged 
more than that of Alkistis Elliott-Graves. Her support and constant encouragement 





Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 9 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... 11 
List of abbreviations and Russian terms ................................................................................ 13 
Introduction: The Communist Party in Leninist theory, Soviet practice and historical 
scholarship ............................................................................................................................. 15 
Historiographical sketch: Soviet state-society relations before and after the archival 
revolution ........................................................................................................................... 16 
Methodological Leninism: Studying the communist rank-and-file .................................... 28 
1. Bolshevik bargaining: the party rank-and-file and the formation of Soviet industrial 
relations ................................................................................................................................. 43 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 43 
1.2 From Regime of Economy to Spetseedstvo ................................................................. 49 
1.3 The First Five Year Plan ................................................................................................ 60 
1.4 Edinonachalie and bacchanalian counter-planning ..................................................... 62 
1.5 Abortive Stabilisation: Stakhanovism and the Second Five Year Plan, 1933-1937 ...... 74 
1.6 Chaos to discipline? 1938-1941 ................................................................................... 86 
1.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 95 
2. Conflict, Purges and Administration: Politics on the factory floor .................................... 99 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 99 
2.2 Return to the mainstream ......................................................................................... 101 
2.3 No Right Deviation ..................................................................................................... 121 
2.4 Another purge ............................................................................................................ 131 
2.5 Vigilance, repression, revival ..................................................................................... 137 
2.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 151 
3. Marxism and clean canteens: party activism and a new socialist culture ....................... 153 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 153 
3.2 An attempt at Cultural Revolution, 1926-1931.......................................................... 155 
3.3 Not so great a retreat, 1932-1941 ............................................................................. 168 
3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 181 
4. Communists in Uniform: The Party on the Baltic Fleet.................................................... 185 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 185 





4.3 From activism to repression ....................................................................................... 195 
4.4 On course to war ........................................................................................................ 206 
4.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 212 
Conclusion: the vanguard concept as a promising category for historical research ........... 217 









List of abbreviations and Russian terms 
 
agitprop: agitation and propaganda  
aktiv: activist group 
artel’: traditional Russian work-crew 
CC: Central Committee of the Communist Party 
edinonachalie: one-person management principle 
gorkom: city committee of the Communist Party 
gubkom: region (guberniia) committee of the Communist Party 
komsostav: military officers 
KP: Krasnii Putilovets, Red Putilovite works in Leningrad 
kul’tprop: culture and propaganda, department and head of 
obkom: region (oblast’) committee of the Communist Party 
partkom: party committee 
partorg: party organiser 
partorg TsK: party organiser assigned directly by the CC 
partsec: party secretary 
politruk: political instructor in the military 
politsostav: political officers of the armed forces, commissars and instructors 
PUBalt: Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet 
rabkor: workers’ correspondent 





RGASPI: Russian State Archive of Social and Political History 
RGAVMF: Russian State Archive of the Navy 
spetseedstvo: specialist-baiting 
stroi: structure, analogous to social system 
TsGAIPD: Central State Archive of Historical-Political Documents, Saint-Petersburg 
VKP (b): All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), the Communist Party  
voenkom: political commissar in the military 
zavkom: factory committee  





Introduction: The Communist Party in Leninist theory, Soviet 
practice and historical scholarship 
 
The Soviet Union claimed to be a state founded on a class alliance of workers and 
peasants engaged in the world-historical task of building a communist society. 1 
Workers were explicitly recognised as the senior members of this partnership, leading 
the way in historical progress by means of their political hegemony over the state, 
exercised through the monopoly in power of the Communist Party. The party, as the 
“highest form of [the proletariat’s] class organisation”, united in its ranks the most 
advanced elements of the working class in the struggle for the “victory of socialism”.2 
It was, in Lenin’s expression, the vanguard of the proletariat.3 The validity of these 
claims has been disputed in countless ways and it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
examine the myriad theoretical and empirical objections that can be raised against the 
self-representation of the USSR. Instead, it will offer an account of the implications of 
the institutional reflection of these claims for social life in the interwar Soviet Union. 
It will seek, in short, to answer the question: what did the vanguard party actually do? 
One of the most influential social historians of the Soviet Union described party 
activism as a paradox, pointing out that the many thousands of communist rank-and-
filers were representatives of political authority but their activities brought them to 
conflict with functionaries of the state everywhere.4 This dual nature of the grassroots 
party membership as the promoter of state policy and supervisor of its implementation 
                                                 
1 The first article of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR stated: “The Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants”. A similar idea was expressed by the lengthier 
introduction to the 1924 Constitution which declared that the formation of the USSR had divided the 
world into socialist and capitalist camps. Iu. S. Kukushkin and O. I. Chistiakov, Ocherk Istorii 
Sovetskoi Konstitutsii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), pp. 264, 285.  
2 Thus it was stated in the preamble to the 1934 Rules (Ustav) of the All Union Communist Party 
(bolsheviks). All subsequent references to the Ustav shall be given in the form Ustav (date): 
(part).(article). These will refer to the text as it appears in the documentary collection 
Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s’ezdov, konferentsii i 
Plenumov TsK, 1898-1988, vols. 1-16 (Moscow, 1983-1990). Hereafter the terms party, communist 
party and the acronym VKP (b) will be used interchangeably.  
3 V. I. Lenin, “Tezisi ko II-mu Kongressu Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala”, in V. I. Lenin, 
Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 5th edition, vol. 41 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1974): 
160-212, p. 166. 
4 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 





is the main theme of the chapters that follow, where it will be argued that instead of a 
paradox communist activism is best viewed as a central feature of interwar Soviet 
state-society relations. Rank-and-file activism was inseparable from the policy 
implementation process, with the party leadership and government unleashing 
successive waves of political mobilisation to generate support for their policy 
initiatives.5 Reliant as it was on the input of non-professional activists, this mode of 
governance gave the latter significant opportunities to pursue their own interests, thus 
also giving them a stake in the system. Before however expanding further on the 
content of this thesis, a review of the relevant historiography should help to clarify its 
motivation; why study the communist rank-and-file?  
 
Historiographical sketch: Soviet state-society relations before and after the 
archival revolution6 
Emerging at the outset of the Cold War, the field of Sovietology became rapidly 
dominated by the conceptual framework of totalitarianism. Purportedly applicable to 
both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, this theoretical model postulated a political 
system of absolute control whereby the state ruled over a society of atomised 
individuals, entirely in thrall to its power. Totalitarian states were defined by the 
                                                 
5 The concept of political mobilisation will be discussed below. For an early use in the Soviet context, 
see Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
6 The scholarly study of the Soviet Union has a long history that in many ways reflects that of its 
subject country and its relations with the world. What follows is only a brief sketch of the field’s post-
war and post-Soviet evolution aiming to provide a framework for the arguments developed in the 
chapters below. It is therefore by no means complete or exhaustive. There are a number of highly 
informative review essays and volumes covering recent and older developments and at least one 
original monograph on the field’s history and one edited collection on the work of one of its 
prominent representatives. Stephen Kotkin, “1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual 
Categories, Analytical Frameworks,” The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 2 (1998): 384–425; John 
L. H. Keep and Alter L. Litvin, Stalinism: Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millenium 
(London: Routledge, 2004); Sheila Fitzpatrick, “The Soviet Union in the Twenty-First Century,” 
Journal of European Studies 37, no. 1 (2007): 51–71; Catriona Kelly, “What Was Soviet Studies and 
What Came Next?,” The Journal of Modern History 85, no. 1 (2013): 109–49; David C. Engerman, 
Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Golfo Alexopoulos, Julie Hessler, and Kiril Tomoff, eds., Writing the Stalin Era: Sheila 
Fitzpatrick and Soviet Historiography (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Lenart Samuelson, 
"Interpretations of Stalinism: Historiographical Patterns since the 1930s and the Role of the 'Archival 
Revolution' in the 1990s", in Markku Kangaspuro and Vessa Oittinen (eds.), Discussing Stalinism: 
problems and approaches (Aleksanteri Institute: Helsinki, 2015). See also the doctoral thesis of 
Ariane Galy, prepared at this university. Ariane Galy, “Creating the Stalinist Other: Anglo-American 





presence of a number of specific traits, including single party rule, a guiding ideology 
and a system of terror.7 Although a product of 1950s political science, the totalitarian 
paradigm had a lasting impact on historiography as its main premises were implicitly 
adopted by an influential tradition of historians who have approached various events 
and aspects of the Soviet interwar years with reference to the intentions, ideological 
concerns and personalities of the Soviet political leadership, especially Stalin.8 With 
the significant exception of Merle Fainsod’s Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, scholars 
working within the totalitarian paradigm did not draw their empirical material from 
archival collections, relying instead on published sources and the accounts of Soviet 
emigrants to support their arguments. 9  This left their interpretations open to the 
challenge raised by a younger generation of more empirically inclined researchers, 
who suggested that developments in Soviet history were best explained with reference 
to existing cleavages present in Soviet society, rather than from theoretically derived 
formal models of interpretation such as totalitarianism.10 Albeit by no means united 
                                                 
7 The classic formulation of the concept is to be found in Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. 
Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1956). Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works: 
Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956) is a 
more nuanced approach, specific to the Soviet Union, which draws on material from the Harvard 
Interview Project with post-war Soviet emigrants. See also Aryeh Unger, The Totalitarian Party: 
Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001[1974]); Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) examines the history of the concept throughout the 20th century (see 
ch. 7 for its impact on American Sovietology). For an earlier conceptual examination of 
totalitarianism, see Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Peterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism”, American Historical Review 
75, no. 4 (1970): 1046-1064. 
8 Indicatively: Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties (London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1968). Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (London: 
Routledge, 1970); Adam Ulam, Stalin: The Man and his Era (London: IB Tauris, 2007[1973]); Robert 
C. Tucker, “The Dictator and Totalitarianism”, World Politics 17, no. 4 (1965): 555-583; idem, Stalin 
in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941. (New York: W W Norton & Co Inc, 1990) Martin 
Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 
1995). The militant anticommunism of the Cold War is most readily reflected in the works of Richard 
Pipes. For a selection, see Richard Pipes, Russia Observed: Collected Essays on Russian and Soviet 
History (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989). 
9 Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (London: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1989[1958]). Fainsod’s 
study of the Smolensk region applied the totalitarian model to material drawn from the Smolensk 
Communist Party Archive. This archive was captured by German forces in the early phases of their 
advance into the Soviet Union and subsequently by the US army which transported it to the USA after 
the war. For years it was the only archival collection available to Western non-communist researchers, 
yet it was inexplicably not put into any use by scholars until the late 1980s, when its material was 
employed by J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: the Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 
1933-1938 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
10 To be sure, a number of – mostly British-based – empirically-minded historians who had been 





either in their theoretical assumptions or their conclusive arguments, the scholars of 
what came to be known as the revisionist school did share a commitment to social-
historical approaches and a willingness to expand the spectrum of relevant historical 
actors beyond the higher echelons of the Communist Party to include the broad mass 
of Soviet society. 11  Revisionist historiography focused on the broader historical 
processes that had formed the Soviet Union and its state institutions, asking questions 
about the roles played therein by the different classes or strata of people that 
constituted Soviet society.12 The revisionist turn had a lasting impact on the field, 
                                                 
conceptual framework and value system. No pre-archival work has marshalled more sources than E. 
H. Carr’s fourteen-volume A History of Soviet Russia, vols. 1-14 (London: Macmillan, 1950-1973). R. 
W. Davies, who co-authored the last five volumes of Carr’s History, also during that period produced 
pioneering work on the Soviet economy, as did of course Alec Nove and Eugene Zaleski. R. W. 
Davies, The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929-1930 (London: Macmillan, 1980); Alec Nove, Was Stalin 
Really Necessary? Some Problems of Soviet Economic Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011[1964]); 
idem, An Economic History of the USSR (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972); Eugene Zaleski, Stalinist 
Planning For Economic Growth (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). Jerry Hough 
was an exception amongst American-based social scientists in highlighting administrative problems 
and institutional weaknesses in the Soviet system as evidence of state control being far from total. 
Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision Making (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). See also the works of the Marxist political writer Isaac 
Deutscher. Isaac Deutscher and Tamara Deutscher (ed.) Marxism, Wars and Revolutions: essays from 
four decades (London: Tamara Deutscher and Verso, 1984). The work of these scholars had in many 
ways foreshadowed the emergence of revisionism. 
11 Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a political biography, 1888-1938 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980[1973]); idem, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History 
since 1917 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social 
Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1932 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); idem, 
“Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939,” Slavic Review 38, no. 3 (1979): 377-402; Moshe 
Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia. (New York: 
Pantheon, 1985); Donald A. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of 
Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London: Pluto, 1986); Lewis H. Fpeplbaum, 
Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); Robert W. Thurston, “Fear and Belief in the USSR’s ‘Great Terror’: 
Response to Arrest, 1935-1939,” Slavic Review 45, no. 2 (1986): 213–34;  Lynne Viola, The Best Sons 
of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); Gábor Tamás Rittersporn, Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social 
Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933-1953 (Reading: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1991). See also J. Arch Getty, Origins. For a historiographical account of the revisionist movement by 
one of its most illustrious participants, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Revisionism in Soviet History”, 
History and Theory 46, no. 4 (2007): 77-91.  
12 The revival of interest in the historical origins of the Soviet system was both informed and fed into 
a parallel development of revisionism in the historiography of the Russian Revolution. Alexander 
Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd (Norton, 1976); 
Smith, S. A., Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Diane P. Koenker et al., Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War: 





setting its agenda for several years while also drawing acrimonious attacks from some 
of the more militant scholars belonging to the totalitarian school.13 
However, as the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the decline of the world 
communist movement appeared to make Cold War categories redundant, the heat 
generated by these debates gradually died down. The opening of the previously 
inaccessible archival collections of the former Soviet states revolutionised the field by 
massively expanding its primary source base. The vast volume of material that became 
available enabled scholars to produce a large number of detailed empirical studies, 
while, perhaps understandably bringing about a decline in more theoretically oriented 
work. In Russia, the demise of state-sponsored Marxism-Leninism after the end of 
Communist rule led to a flowering of almost in principle non-theoretical work, with 
scholars assembling and publishing large volumes of archival documents with little if 
any commentary.14 By one estimate, the number of archival document source volumes 
published in Russia since the opening of the archives exceeds 1,200.15 Nevertheless, 
the familiar issues of political violence and repression, including the personal role of 
Stalin in the events, received special attention in Russian scholarship of the 1990s, 
with totalitarianism finding a new home in some quarters of the new Russian 
academe.16 This tendency was eventually matched by a renewal of interest in what had 
been outside of Russia the traditionally “revisionist” subjects of social and economic 
history.17 
                                                 
13 Responding to J. Arch Getty’s review of his book The Harvest of Sorrow, Robert Conquest wrote in 
a letter to the London Review of Books that “Getty belongs to a gaggle of ‘revisionists’ who have 
achieved, like David Irving in another sphere, a certain notoriety.” London Review of Books, Vol. 9 
No. 9 (1987), online at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v09/n09/letters#letter1, accessed on 20 May 2013. 
14 For a bibliography of documentary collections published in Russia, see Peter A. Blitstein, “Selected 
Bibliography of Recent Published Document Collections on Soviet History,” Cahiers Du Monde 
Russe 40, no. 40/1–2 (1999): 307–326. 
15 Samuelson, Discussing Stalinism, p. 25 
16 Oleg Khlevniuk, 1937-ii: Stalin, NKVD i sovetskoe obshchestvo (Moscow: Respublika, 1992); 
Aleksandr V. Bakunin, Sovetskii totalitarizm: genesis, evoliutsia i krushenie (Ekaterinburg: Institut 
istorii i arkehologii UrO RAN, 1993); Irina Pavlova, Stalinizm: Mekhanizm stanovleniia vlasti 
(Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1993); Ivan S. Kuznetsov, Sovetskii Totalitarizm: Ocherk 
Psikhoistorii (Novosibirsk: Izdatel’stvo NGU, 1995). 
17 The work of Elena Osokina deserves special mention here. Elena Osokina, Ierarkhiia Potrebleniia: 
o zhizhni liudei v usloviiakh stalinskogo snabzheniia (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo MGOU, 1993), idem, Za 
Fasadom “stalinskogo izobiliia”: Raspredelenie i rinok v snabzhenii naseleniia v godi 
industrializatsii, 1927-1941 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008); idem, Zoloto dlia industrializatsii: 
“TORGSIN” (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009). Indicatively, see also Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova and Pavel 





Amongst students of Soviet history outside of Russia, the archival revolution 
similarly ushered into an explosion of highly empirical work which allowed both sides 
of the totalitarian/revisionist debate to claim victory by relying on different aspects of 
the newly available source material. Thus, revisionists were able to produce firm 
figures on the scale of repression from the end of the Civil War to Stalin’s death, 
revising even conservative estimates of the number of victims downwards by a 
significant margin.18 Archival research was also able to refute one of the fundamental 
tenets of totalitarian theory, namely the notion of an atomised society at the mercy of 
the state.19 Interest groups, pockets of resistance and enthusiastic supporters of socialist 
construction, long speculated on by revisionists, emerged as key actors in post-1991 
archival scholarship.20 Surveys of popular opinion demonstrated that state control over 
the media did not prevent people from holding critical views about the party leadership 
and its performance in running the country. 21  The newly available evidence also 
                                                 
(Moscow: Variant, 2007); Sergei Esikov, Rossiiskaia Dervenia v godi NEPa: k voprosu ob 
al’ternativakh stalinskoi kollektivizatsii (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010); Lyubov’ Suvorova, Nepovskaia 
Mnogoukladnaya Ekonomika: Mezhdu Gosudarstvom i Rinkom (Moscow: AIRO, 2013). 
18 J. Arch Getty, Gábor T. Rittersporn, and Viktor N. Zemskov, “Victims of the Soviet Penal System 
in the Pre-War Years: A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence,” The American Historical 
Review 98, no. 4 (1993): 1017–1049, p. 1022 for previous estimates; Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “Victims 
of Stalinism and the Soviet Secret Police: The Comparability and Reliability of the Archival Data. Not 
the Last Word,” Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 2 (1999): 315–345. Robert Conquest once again 
responded with typical, albeit slightly moderated invective, shifting from his comparison of revisionist 
scholarship to the Nazi-apologia of David Irving to a slightly less offensive similitude with scholars of 
the Dead Sea Scrolls. “Communications”, The American Historical Review 99, no. 5 (1994): 1821-
1829, p. 1821. 
19 Historians of Nazi Germany were at the same time also moving away from the totalitarian model. 
Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Introduction: After Totalitarianism Stalinism and Nazism 
Compared,” in idem (eds.), Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008): 1-40. 
20 James Hughes, Stalinism in a Russian Province: A Study of Collectivization and Dekulakization in 
Siberia (Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); Sheila Fitzpatrick, “How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from 
the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces,” Russian Review 52, no. 3 (July 1993): 299–320; 
idem, “Signals from Below: Soviet Letters of Denunciation of the 1930s,” The Journal of Modern 
History 68, no. 4 (1996): 831–66; Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Marshall Poe (eds.), The 
Resistance Debate in Russian and Soviet History (Bloomington: Slavica Publications, 2003); Matthew 
E. Lenoe, Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers (Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social 
Dynamics of Repression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); idem, Inventing the Enemy: 
Denunciation and Terror in Stalin's Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Tracy 
McDonald, “The Process of Collectivisation Violence,” Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 9 (2013): 1827–
1847.  
21 Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997); D’Ann R. Penner, “Ports of Access into the Mental and Social 
Worlds of Don Villagers in the 1920s and 1930s,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe. Russie - Empire Russe - 
Union Soviétique et États Indépendants 40, no. 40/1-2 (1999): 171–98; Lesley A. Rimmel, “Svodki 





demonstrated that state repression unfolded alongside every-day life, without ever 
becoming the dominant concern of most ordinary people.22 In general, the archival 
revelations were favourable to the revisionists, transforming their main insights into 
part of the field’s conventional wisdom and inspiring a new generation of historians to 
pursue projects in Soviet social and cultural history.23  
However, it became clear that at the same time that some of the assumptions that 
had guided the work of scholars in the totalitarian school had in fact been correct, their 
flawed conceptual framework notwithstanding. Thus, Stalin’s personal power was 
shown to have been a major force shaping political outcomes in the USSR, including 
the initiation and reining in of repression drives.24 The notion of repression as a process 
primarily affecting the Soviet elite was also shown to have been incorrect, with the 
majority of the victims of state violence having been swept up in mass operations by 
the NKVD targeting people that were far from the levers of power.25 
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The opening of the archives has also allowed scholars to access the individual 
collections of party leaders, spurring a renewed interest in biographical research. This 
has yielded a significant number of illuminative sketches of the lives of Soviet leaders, 
offering insight into the evolution of both their interpersonal relationships and 
crucially, their intellectual outlook.26 Attendant upon this historiographical trend has 
been a renewed interest in the ideological motivations of party policy, which has been 
greatly facilitated by the publication of earlier inaccessible transcripts of politburo 
meetings, as well as the correspondence of the party leadership.27 The picture that has 
emerged from this work is one of a party leadership for whom the ideas of Marxism-
Leninism matter, and where factional struggles and personal clashes were rooted in 
programmatic differences. Some researchers have described this lack of contrast 
between the public professions and private beliefs of the leadership as being amongst 
the most significant revelations to have come out of the archives.28 A corollary of this 
has been a growing appreciation of the role of ideology and the institutions producing 
it in shaping the development of Soviet history.29 
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This appreciation of the importance of personalities and ideology in Soviet 
historical development alongside the recognition that social reality remained 
irreducible to the conceptual schemes of party leaders and their Western watchers 
represents the closest thing to a scholarly consensus in the post-archival field. Modest 
as it is, this cross-fertilisation of perspectives has given rise to an influential departure 
in the literature that has sought to frame the Soviet project of socialist construction 
within the broader framework of modernisation. The modernity thesis, for lack of a 
better term, traced the origins of Marxism-Leninism in the intellectual tradition of the 
Enlightenment as an attempt to use reason and technological progress in order to 
improve human life, both materially and culturally.30 Scholars working within that 
framework often included a strong comparative dimension in their investigations, 
drawing attention to the commonalities of modern state practices in terms of 
propaganda, surveillance, welfare and violence.31 The specificity of the Soviet Union 
lay in the particular historical legacy of the Russian Empire, combined with the 
explicitly non-capitalist path of development prescribed by Marxism-Leninism. A 
quest to overcome the backwardness of old Russia by revolutionary means and at any 
cost was the essential element of what a prominent contributor to the modernisation 
literature termed “Stalinism as a civilization”.32 
Its impact on the field hard to overstate, the modernity thesis has generated 
highly innovative responses by both proponents and critics. Among the former, Igal 
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Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck in particular have sought to go beyond methodological 
acceptance of the Bolsheviks’ intention to create a new Soviet person, into actually 
investigating the extent of the psychological transformation experienced by the Soviet 
subject during socialist construction.33 By contrast, other scholars took issue with the 
concept of modernity as a descriptor of Soviet realities, arguing that whatever the 
intellectual lineage of Marxism-Leninism, the party’s transformative project was 
thwarted by the weight of Russian history. On their views, the persistence or re-
emergence of informal power networks, authoritarian rule and ethnic particularism 
among other things, betrayed the nature of the USSR as a neo-traditional or neo-
patrimonial state.34 
After this brief sketch of the past six decades of scholarship, the question posed 
at the start can be reformulated thus: what can a study of the communist rank-and-file 
add to our understanding of the USSR as an ideologically motivated state seeking, with 
mixed results, to modernise a recalcitrant and hardly helpless society? The premise of 
this thesis is that the explosion of empirical work after the opening of the archives, 
welcome and fruitful as it has been, has resulted into the obfuscation of a 
fundamentally conceptual problem that lay at the heart of the original totalitarian-
revisionist debate. This was the issue of the relationship between state and society. 
Totalitarianists argued that the power of the state over society was for analytical 
purposes boundless and consequently framed their scholarship around the intentions 
of state actors. By contrast, revisionists sought to demonstrate that social realities 
constrained the power of the state and even forced policy changes, even if ultimately 
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policy initiatives came from above. The debate was to a large extent one about 
primacy.35 
The problem with this was pointed out by one of the leading revisionists at the 
high point of the debate, prior to the archival revolution. Commenting on the 
controversy, Getty pointed out that in the Soviet Union, as in revolutionary societies 
more generally, there were no obvious boundaries between state and society. “An 
internally divided, improvised, inexperienced, and constantly renovating officialdom 
shaded almost imperceptibly into a dynamic, mobile, dramatically changing society”.36 
Getty warned that given this, research in Soviet history would have to proceed for 
years at a very slow pace dictated by the sources, seeking to shed light on the many 
facets of the historical context of Soviet social and political developments rather than 
work out a theory of the Stalinist state, desirable as that might be in the long run.37 
Getty’s prediction has been borne out by events, with post-1991 research having 
been more remarkable for the immense progress made in empirical knowledge about 
Soviet history rather than any major innovations with respect to its conceptualisation. 
The problem with this is that the failure to produce a specific theory of state-society 
relations has tended to reproduce their analytical distinction and implicitly, the search 
for first causes, the very problems Getty had sought to remedy by recommending 
careful empirical research. Greater knowledge of the views and habits of leaders 
cannot account for either the reception or outcome of party policies and can therefore 
treat ideology only as their motivator, rather than as a dimension of their concrete 
implementation. This complicates the task of taking ideology seriously as a component 
part of Soviet historical development.38 Similarly the expanding volume of social-
historical work on everyday life, as well as resistance to and collaboration with the 
authorities, has tended to treat the ideological dimension of policy as something 
external to its process of implementation. Marxism-Leninism is seen as a discourse 
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emanating from above, which was then mastered by people in order to deal with the 
effects of policy on their lives, in a process described as “speaking Bolshevik” in 
Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain. 39  The way in which Marxism-Leninism 
provided the institutional structures through which people encountered government 
policy – that is the ways in which people acted Bolshevik – is left unexamined and the 
extent to which such involvement was a constituent part of policy conception, 
implementation and outcome is thus obscured.  
We seem to be left with much the same picture as before the archival revolution, 
whereby the state tried to shape society according to its revolutionary vision and 
society responded in ways that yielded unexpected outcomes, modern or neo-
traditional. The picture is now much more detailed, perhaps high-definition to risk 
stretching the analogy, but its contours remain much the same. None of this is meant 
as a criticism of any of the works cited here. The argument is instead that we are 
missing a way to put together all of the insight gained by access to the archives into a 
clearer account of state-society relations than was the case before. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to propose anything as ambitious as a new 
theory of state-society relations in Soviet history. Instead, it will show that studying a 
particular feature of the institutional structure of the USSR points the way to a better 
understanding of the nature of this relationship. That feature is the rank-and-file of the 
communist party, the mass membership whose party status did not translate into 
executive positions in the state apparatus. The dual status of party rank-and-filers as 
ipso facto supporters and functionaries of the Soviet system on the one hand and as 
regular factory, office or other workers on the other renders the state-society 
distinction null in their case. The party grassroots were both functionally and by design 
the locus in the Soviet structure (stroi) where state and society overlapped. This thesis 
will examine the implications of this overlap for our understanding of the history of 
the Soviet interwar period. Against Kotkin, it will argue that Bolshevism was not a 
language but a political practice engendering a specific kind of state-society relations 
that relied heavily on political activism. It will show that the ideological underpinnings 
of the Soviet system had a concrete institutional reflection in the communist party, 
                                                 





with profound effects on the way the Soviet state was governed. Ultimately, it will 
demonstrate that the party’s mass membership was a reliable, loyal source of 
grassroots support for the regime, while at the same time severely complicating and 
occasionally derailing the policy implementation process.40  
In terms of the historiographical sketch offered here, the argument developed in 
this thesis relies on the insights of both major schools discussed above but ultimately 
arrives at a different position. Marxist-Leninist ideology figures prominently in the 
chapters that follow, both as causal factor and, more importantly, as the boundary of 
possibility and desirability with respect to policy for all actors involved. On the view 
offered here, there is little reason to doubt that all major policy initiatives had their 
origins at the top and were motivated by ideology. What is more the main object of 
this study, the party organisation, was itself a product of Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
rather than a deep structure of Russian history. 41 Nevertheless, the producers and 
ultimate arbiters of Marxism-Leninism, the party leadership, will make rare and short 
appearances.  
Instead, the rank-and-file communists who are the protagonists of this account, 
being in their majority workers and low-ranking administrators, are more similar to 
the social-historical subjects familiar from the work of revisionists. In similar manner, 
this thesis will also highlight the extent to which realities on the ground could diverge 
from what was foreseen or prescribed by central directives. It will be shown that more 
often than not, these immediate concerns ranked much higher in the priorities of the 
party grassroots than the ambitious goals of socialist construction, even though the 
latter rarely ceased to function as the terms in which the former were framed. This too 
is familiar revisionist territory. 
Such similarities notwithstanding, it is not the aim of this thesis to stake out a 
half-way position between revisionism and totalitarianism which, as argued earlier, is 
in any case the nearest thing to a consensus view in the field. The contribution to the 
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literature made by this study consists in that it demonstrates that the search for primacy 
in the state-society relationship that animated earlier debates can be fruitfully replaced 
by an analytical focus on the function of the Soviet institution designed to negotiate 
this relationship, that is the Communist Party. This is because the primacy question 
emerged as problem of policy for the Bolsheviks well before it became a problem of 
research for historians. The Leninist concept of the vanguard party was an attempt to 
provide a solution to the problem of how the state apparatus would remain under the 
control of a specific part of society – the proletariat – while at the same time pursuing 
a consistent political project, the historical transition to communism. In the chapters 
that follow, it will be shown that rank-and-file communists were as much Marxist-
Leninist advocates and executors of government policy, that is parts of the state, as 
they were workers and functionaries concerned with their immediate environment, that 
is members of society. Neither dissidents nor state goons, but both militantly 
communist and fiercely protective of their workplace interests, these people took an 
active part in all the cataclysmic transformations of the Soviet interwar period, from 
industrialisation to mass repression. Their activity was a fundamental element of the 
Soviet political system, one that renders the contours of the imperceptible shading of 
the state into society described by Getty much more discernible to the historian. For 
the state, the party rank-and-file was a section of society that could be relied upon to 
promote its policies. For the large majority of people who had little influence over state 
power, it was a part of the Soviet system that could make sure these policies were 
implemented in a way consistent with their needs. This thesis will examine how 
communist activists mediate state-society relations in the Soviet interwar period. The 
remainder of this introduction will outline how. 
 
Methodological Leninism: Studying the communist rank-and-file 
Due in large part to the persistence of the state-society binary, the communist party as 
a distinct political institution with specific traits deriving from its vanguard mission 
has received very little attention in post-1991 scholarship. Because the USSR was a 
single party state, research on the Soviet political process has tended to treat the party 





was not a political organisation in any meaningful sense of the term. 42  However, 
although administrative tasks did make up a significant share of the party’s workload, 
there are strong reasons to reject the view of the party as an all-Union staffing agency. 
Not only has research on ideology demonstrated its close connection to policy 
formulation, but the only recent budgetary study of VKP (b) has shown that “the 
party’s most significant expenditure item was for ideology”.43 The same study also 
showed that the party was financially independent of the state, relying increasingly on 
membership dues and publishing revenues, and concluded that it was an autonomous 
actor within the Soviet system.44 
If the party can be shown to have been both institutionally distinct from the state 
and primarily concerned about ideology-related activities, it follows that a study of the 
party must take into account the tasks it set for itself on the basis of its ideological 
principles. For the purposes of this thesis, it is therefore necessary to set out the 
implications of the vanguard concept for the way the party functioned.  
Some cultural histories of the Soviet interwar period have described the 
vanguard status of the party as being predicated on a claim of possession of esoteric 
knowledge in the form of Marxism-Leninism.45 This is incorrect because although the 
precepts of Marxism-Leninism did acquire a dogma-like status of unquestionability, 
there was nothing esoteric about them. Whatever its epistemic value, Marxism-
Leninism had the cultural status of a scientific discipline and was therefore in principle 
accessible to any interested and literate person. Members of the non-party public were 
encouraged to acquaint themselves with Marxism-Leninism, as with science in 
general, as part of their general education through books, periodicals and activities 
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organised by party members. Acquiring and disseminating knowledge of Marxism-
Leninism as the science of revolution was a core aspect of a communist’s vanguard 
mission, but possessing this knowledge was not what vanguard status consisted in. 
Being part of the vanguard was instead a matter of commitment. The distinctive 
feature of Bolshevism lay in the fact that it ascribed crucial ideological importance to 
certain organisational principles, central amongst which were discipline, centralism 
and active participation of members in all activities.46 These were initially conceived 
as means to defend the party from repression by the tsarist state while also training and 
socialising increasing numbers of working class militants in the ways of revolutionary 
activity. When after revolution and civil war the Bolsheviks successfully established 
their authority over what would become the USSR, the party’s main task became the 
implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This consisted of the twin tasks 
of preventing capitalist restoration by any means necessary and involving the greatest 
part possible of the country’s working population in the implementation of the party’s 
programme of socialist transformation and cultural enlightenment.47 Institutionally, 
this translated on the one hand into the familiar mirroring of the state by the party 
apparatus in a supervisory capacity. On the other, it meant that the broad ranks of the 
membership were expected to actively promote party policy and become involved in 
the day-to-day running of their workplace, in order to ensure that things were being 
done in the spirit of policy and ideology. 
To better ground the discussion that follows in the chapters below, it is worth 
devoting some space to examining the Bolsheviks’ ideas about the place of their party 
in a post-revolutionary society in more detail. The nature of the transformation of the 
Bolshevik party from an instrument of revolution to one of government was to a large 
extent determined by their understanding of the nature of state power in the transition 
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from capitalism to communism.48 Before the October revolution, Lenin had followed 
Marx and Engels in regarding the state as an evil of class society that would gradually 
become unnecessary as more and more people became involved in public 
administration to run the common affairs of society. To be sure, some sort of coercion 
would have to exist, but its character would be more akin to the intervention of 
concerned citizens to prevent a crime, rather than an organised apparatus of repression.  
Within months of October, with the Russian economy collapsing under the strain 
of Civil War, Lenin was forced to signal a retreat from the principles of the commune-
state. In the years that followed, the Bolsheviks proceeded to build a monopoly on 
political power buttressed by extensive use of state violence against their opponents. 
By the time the Red Army had emerged victorious in the Civil War, some of the party’s 
prominent members were beginning to wonder about the increasingly authoritarian 
direction the nascent Soviet state was taking, as well as about the effects this was 
having on the party itself. Although never openly challenging the party’s monopoly on 
power, the Democratic Centralist and Workers’ Opposition factional groups argued 
forcefully that the lack of separation between state and party was threatening to 
depoliticise the latter by transforming it into a mere appendage of the administrative 
apparatus. According to the oppositionists, communists should avoid relating to the 
broader masses by administrative channels, seeking instead to educate them and attract 
them to the Soviet state-building project by sharing their concerns and seeking to 
address their needs in practice. Their insistence on separating the party from the state 
ultimately condemned these groups to defeat and led to their disbandment. 
Nevertheless, their idea of the communist as a sort of people’s tribune was not 
necessarily at odds with the emerging consensus of the party as the force that would 
guide society in a process of maturation which could some time make it possible to 
build a commune-state. In the following years, the party rank-and-file would be called 
on to play the role of tribune as well as leader. 
Despite the ban on factions in 1921, organisational matters and their political 
implications remained a staple of official discussions throughout the NEP years, with 
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the nature of the party’s mission continuing to act as a flashpoint in the debates taking 
place within the context of the factional struggle that followed the death of Lenin. 
Increasingly pessimistic about the prospect of building a withering away commune-
state and having resolved to substitute this goal with party control over the state, the 
Bolshevik leadership began to take initiatives to adapt the party to its new tasks. 
Although later denounced by the Trotsky-led Left Opposition as an attempt to swamp 
the party with new members, the mass recruitment campaign initiated by the 13th Party 
Conference in early 1924 is best seen in the light of the party’s needs for a significantly 
expanded membership to perform its new role.49  
An enlarged party membership however was not itself sufficient to guarantee the 
creation of the proletarian vanguard expected to guide Soviet society in its journey to 
communism. Fresh recruits would first have to be transformed into true Bolsheviks. 
Given the central political importance attached to organisational principles in Leninist 
theory, it is hardly surprising that this process of assimilation would start with a party-
wide discussion on a new CC statement on the place of primary party organisations, 
or cells, in the emerging Soviet political system. The draft statement was published in 
Pravda in October 1924 and was prefaced by a short article penned by Lazar 
Kaganovich, stating that establishing the mode work of party organisations on the 
correct basis was amongst the most fundamental tasks faced by the party.50 The text of 
the draft statement is indicative of the role that central leadership envisioned for the 
cells. The CC statement argued that the Russian Communist Party was unique amongst 
all political organisations in that it had made the party cell the foundation of its 
organisational structure. According to the text, the cell was the fundamental element 
of the ‘party organism’ through which the party ‘connected to the masses’, making the 
‘strengthening and improvement of its work’ a task of the highest importance.51 
The CC intended the activity of primary organisations to be directed towards 
three main areas of work. These were: “work amongst their members”, to raise their 
                                                 
49 For a discussion of the campaign, subsequently known as the Lenin levy, as well as the surrounding 
political and historiographical arguments, see John B. Hatch, “The ‘Lenin Levy’ and the Social 
Origins of Stalinism: Workers and the Communist Party in Moscow, 1921-1928,” Slavic Review 48, 
no. 4 (1989): 558–77..  






level of political awareness and involve them actively in party affairs; “work amongst 
the masses”, in order to increase the party’s influence amongst them and gain a clearer 
understanding of their needs and demands; participation in the task of building a 
socialist state and running the economy.52 In subsequent years, the party leadership 
would periodically revisit these themes following significant events like the 
completion of the 1st FYP.53 Nevertheless, the understanding of the function of the 
primary party organisation in the Soviet system reflected in the 1924 draft statement 
would not substantially change. Thus, for the entirety of the period covered in this 
thesis, the vanguard’s task would consist in becoming actively involved in economic 
administration and promoting party policy amongst non-members while also making 
sure the party became aware of their concerns. To do so, its members would have to 
make sure to maintain their standards of cultural sophistication and political astuteness 
at an appropriate level. 
There is much in this that is similar to what has been called the politics of 
mobilisation.54 What differentiates the Leninist concept of the vanguard from agents 
of political mobilisation more broadly is that activity of the party was intended to 
achieve more than a mere enhancement the state’s instrumental capacity of policy 
implementation. The vanguard party was conceived of as the means by which the 
communist content of policy would be safeguarded, ensuring the successful transition 
of the USSR to communism at some future point. For this, the active involvement of 
the rank-and-file in the everyday running of industry, agriculture, the military and 
everything else was as important as the leadership’s control of government and the 
formulation of policy. This was despite the fact that the existence of a purely technical 
dimension of administration was recognised by Lenin and the acquisition of technical 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 For example, in the run up to the 17th Party Congress in 1934, Pravda published a lengthy report 
presented to the politburo by Lazar Kaganovich on organisational questions in the new conditions 
created following the completion of the 1st FYP. Pravda, 31 December 1933. 
54 An extensive sociological discussion of the concept of mobilisation is Birgitta Nedelmann, 
“Individuals and Parties—changes in Processes of Political Mobilization,” European Sociological 
Review 3, no. 3 (1987): 181–202. For examples of the use of the concept in historical research, see 
Stefano Bartolini, The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980: The Class Cleavage 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or 
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competence by the state apparatus would regularly emerge as a desideratum in policy 
pronouncements throughout the interwar period.55 Getting the state to do what it was 
told to do was not enough for the Bolsheviks. It had to do things the right way and in 
the right direction. It was in this manner that the process of policy implementation 
acquired an ideological dimension. 
This is crucial for the account offered in this thesis, because the vanguard 
principle transformed the party rank-and-file into an ineluctable aspect of the system 
of government in the USSR. For as long as the party leadership remained committed 
to Marxism-Leninism – and the emerging consensus is that this was the case – it was 
compelled by its worldview to insist that its policies were implemented by means of 
activism as well as administration. As will be shown in the following chapters, this 
was so even when it became clear that activism was getting in the way of 
implementation. Significantly, because ideology was more ambiguous than policy, the 
involvement of the party rank-and-file with the implementation process almost 
invariably took the form of party activists taking advantage of their supervisory status 
to address their myriad concerns as workers and non-elite members of Soviet society 
more broadly. This, it will be argued, should not be viewed as a cynical attempt to 
manipulate public discourse. Instead, the ability of the rank-and-filers to influence the 
implementation process was implied in the vanguard party concept. These people were 
doing what they were expected to do, even if particular outcomes left much to be 
desired from the perspective of the leadership. The paradox in this, if any, is that the 
party grassroots moved politically closer to the leadership the more they disorganised 
policy implementation by getting involved in it. 
The points outlined above will be illustrated by means of a study of party 
activism in Leningrad in the period 1926-1941. This periodisation has been selected 
in order to cover the development of rank-and-file activism as an element of the Soviet 
system throughout the interwar period, while excluding the power-struggles that 
followed immediately after the death of Lenin in order to focus on activism as means 
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the contradiction between the imperatives of technical competence and activist involvement in 
Marxist-Leninist theory in detail, arguing that its origins lay in the uneasy balance between romantic 






of governance rather than factional struggle. Thus, the final defeat of Zinoviev’s 
Leningrad-based opposition and subsequent reintegration of the northern capital into 
the political mainstream in early 1926 is taken as the chronological starting point of 
this study. The year of the German invasion of the USSR has been selected as the end 
point of the account offered here, on the assumption that the commencement of the 
Great Patriotic War transformed the relationship between party, state and society to a 
significant extent and that as a consequence, the study of party activism in war 
conditions would constitute a different research project. 
Leningrad has been selected as the geographical focus for this study because of 
its interesting political history, its solid industrial economic base and the quality of its 
party records. The purpose of this thesis is not to suggest that Leningrad party life was 
representative of that of the rest of the country. Instead, the focus on Leningrad is 
intended to frame this study within the conditions best suited to an examination of the 
practical implications of the Leninist concept of the vanguard party. These include 
high party density in a highly urbanised environment and also, a series of important 
political convulsions such as the fall of Zinoviev, the assassination of Sergei Kirov and 
the front-line status of the city in the run up to the Second World War, all of which 
required and elicited different responses from the “most advanced elements” of 
Leningrad’s working class.  
The content of this thesis is organised in four thematic chapters, each covering a 
different aspect of party activity over the whole of the period examined. The first three 
chapters constitute a micro-historical study of the primary party organisation of 
Leningrad’s Red Putilovite (Krasnii Putilovets, KP), later Kirov, machine building 
plant. It is based on the stenographic records of the organisation’s general assemblies 
– later conferences – and the protocols (minutes) of various other activities organised 
by the factory’s communists. The first chapter examines the role played by the 
organisation in the factory’s industrial relations from the late NEP period, through the 
period of rapid industrialisation and beyond. The second chapter examines the 
involvement of the organisation in the succession of political campaigns of the 
interwar period, including the early party purges and the Yezhovshchina. Finally, the 
third chapter considers the involvement of rank-and-filers in the party’s mission to 





drawn from the KP/Kirov PPO archival collection held at the Central State Archive of 
Historical-Political Documents of Saint-Petersburg (TsGAIPD).  
The value of this source material lies in that it affords us a unique close-up view 
into the workings of the party organisation. Stenographic records of conferences 
preserve a large volume of rich and often entertaining detail, including heckling from 
the floor and the occasional joke, providing rare texture to the world of factory political 
activism. The often handwritten protocols of lower-level gatherings similarly offer rare 
insight into the way that even the most mundane aspects of the production process 
could become entangled with ideological affairs in the highly politicised world of 
Soviet industry.  
Equally important is the information that can be gleaned from the more 
formalised features of these records, like the notes on attendance, participation and of 
course the meetings’ agendas. Thus, the fact that conference attendance rarely fell 
below the 1,000 mark gives us an indication of both the sheer scale of these events and 
the size of the audience reached by the discussions held therein. Similarly, that even 
small groups of communists in the shop cells could and did hold structured meetings 
on often seemingly obscure party affairs is testament to the influence of Bolshevik 
political culture down to the very bottom of the apparatus. Furthermore, protocol and 
stenographic records often include a large volume of question notes (zapiski) that 
reached speakers from the floor. Usually anonymous, zapiski contained in their 
majority topical questions, but could often be simple statements of opinion or 
(perceived) fact. Their value as sources lies in that their anonymity gave their authors 
the opportunity to express views that were beyond the boundaries of political 
acceptability.56 Deploying them alongside the transcripts of speeches made at party 
gatherings makes it possible to compare what it was possible to say in the context of a 
party meeting to what was of actual concern to the rank-and-filers. It is amongst the 
most interesting and surprising incidental findings of this thesis that, barring few 
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exceptions, the contents of the zapiski differed little from what contributors from the 
floor openly said at the meetings.  
The KP/Kirov party archive is thus a rich collection of primary sources offering 
valuable insight into a hitherto understudied element of the Soviet political system. 
Nevertheless, the limitations of this source base should also be borne in mind. First, 
the organisation’s archive tells the story of party activists as it was recorded by party 
members for the benefit of the party itself. It can only therefore offer limited insight 
into the views of KP/Kirov workers who, whether due to conviction or lack of interest, 
chose to keep their distance from the party. Thus, although the following chapters will 
refer to the stated opinions of several different people, it should be borne in mind that 
all of them were publicly committed supporters of the Soviet state. In no way then is 
this thesis a study of general public opinion, and no claims made here about the views 
and activities of communist party members should be taken to apply beyond its ranks. 
Crucially, this caveat also applies to the range of possible views held by KP/Kirov 
workers about their communist workmates and their proclaimed vanguard role.  
Second, the wealth and completeness of the organisation’s archive may give an 
impression of the PPO as a self-contained political entity. This would however be a 
misleading picture. Hierarchical centralism was amongst the core organisational 
principles of Bolshevism and neither KP/Kirov nor any other PPO were autonomous 
entities. Instead, they were attached to a clearly defined hierarchy of party organs 
ranging from the district committee (raikom) to the leading Central Committee of VKP 
(b). The control of these higher organs over the PPO was exercised both in the form 
of periodic reports required of their secretaries and by means of direct interventions 
that rendered the intentions of the centre clearer to the grassroots. The prominence of 
KP/Kirov meant that higher party officials often took an interest in its PPO and in the 
following chapters we will often come across visits from district, regional and central 
officials.  
A fuller examination of the relationship of the PPO with the upper echelons of 
the party hierarchy would require further research into district and regional archival 
holdings than was possible during the course of this doctoral project. Similarly, 





use of a range of other social-historical sources to address a different set of research 
questions. Nevertheless, the purpose of this thesis is not to offer an account of PPO-
centre, or PPO-public relations but rather, to examine the internal workings of the PPO 
and demonstrate the extent to which it remained an active institution even when it was 
not mobilised for particular political missions by higher authorities. For this task, the 
KP/Kirov party archive is perfectly adequate.  
In order however to partially remedy the narrow view afforded by the PPO 
archive, I have relied on published party sources to highlight the central policy 
background against which the organisation’s activity took place. Where necessary, 
references are also made to resolutions of the regional party leadership.57 To further 
clarify the connexion of KP/Kirov PPO case study to broader historiographical 
debates, each thematic chapter is preceded by an introduction discussing the main 
debates in the relevant literature and framing the argument developed in this thesis 
within them.  
The KP/Kirov case study takes its methodological cue from Lenin’s insistence 
on the centrality of the organisational form of the party for its vanguard mission. As 
the primary party organisation was the “foundation of the party”, a study of party 
activism is best conducted by means of a detailed investigation of such an 
organisation. 58  A micro-historical study of a specific organisation provides the 
opportunity to examine the activity of the party rank-and-file in a sustained manner 
through time, in order to appreciate both the continuities and disruptions in the 
reception of policy initiatives by the mass membership. Again, the selection criterion 
has not been typicality. The giant KP/Kirov plant was far from typical, having an 
illustrious revolutionary history and being at the cutting edge of Soviet industrial 
technology, pioneering the country’s tractor and later tank production processes. The 
factory’s engineers visited and hosted their American counterparts, while famous 
                                                 
57 These are based on the copies of minutes of the party’s Leningrad Regional Committee (Gubkom, 
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Department collection of the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI). 
58 Ustav 1936, VIII: 48. The Ustav of 1926 referred to the same level of organisation as “cell” 
(iacheika). Ustav 1926, X: 57. For the sake of clarity, I have used the term “primary party 
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included sublevels of organisation known as “shop-cells” (tsekhiatseiki), operating in the enterprise’s 






foreign communists like Ernst Thälmann and Clara Zetkin addressed the enterprise’s 
workers on several occasions, as did esteemed Soviet dignitaries like Maksim Gorkii.59 
Its immense organisation was one of seventeen out of 1,814 in the city of Leningrad 
to be made up of over 1,000 members. 60  Party saturation at KP/Kirov was also 
particularly high, floating around the 14% mark throughout the whole of the period 
studied while the city average never exceeded a brief highpoint of 8% in 1933 and was 
usually just over 5%.61 
The KP/Kirov Primary Party Organisation was thus a special party group in an 
exceptional enterprise. The purpose of this case study is therefore not to produce a 
readily generalizable picture of Soviet interwar party activism but rather, to provide a 
detailed account of this aspect of the Soviet political system in what were near ideal 
conditions for its operation. If the party were to lead the working class to the “victory 
of socialism”, there were few places better to do that than a factory where more than 
one in ten workers were communists. It should go without saying that this caveat 
applies even more strongly with regard to the vast swathes of Soviet territory that were 
neither urban nor industrial. Although rapidly declining, the rural population of the 
Soviet countryside still outnumbered city-dwellers by a significant margin for the 
duration of the period studied in this thesis.62 Amongst these junior partners of the 
worker-peasant class alliance, the party maintained a much weaker presence reflected 
in a considerably less developed network of PPOs in rural areas.63  
                                                 
59 For a discussion of the fame and special status of KP, see the introduction in Clayton Black, 
“Manufacturing communists: ‘Krasnyi Putilovets’ and the Politics of Soviet Industrialization, 1923-
1932” (Indiana University, 1996). 
60 Leningradskaia Organizatsia KPSS v Tsifrakh, 1917-1973 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), p. 135. 
Roughly two thirds, or 1,254 organisations had between three and forty nine members. There were 
also 258 PPOs numbering between 50 and 100 members and 285 between 101 and 1,000. 
61 KP/Kirov party saturation is given on the basis of statistical reports available at TsGAIPD, f. 1012, 
op. 1, d. 480; op. 2, d. 1012; d. 1478, ll. 7, 14. The city-wide figure has been derived from the total 
membership numbers given in Leningradskaia Organizatsia, pp. 69-70 and the population estimates 
provided in I. I. Eliseeva and E. I. Gribovaia (eds.), Sankt-Peterburg, 1703-2003: Iubileiinii 
statisticheskii sbornik (Saint-Petersburg: Sudostroenie, 2003), pp. 16-17. 
62 According to the 1939 population census, out of a total population of 170,557,093 urban dwellers 
accounted for only 56,534,386 or less than half. Chislennost’ Naseleneiia SSSR Na 17 Ianvaria 1939 
Goda. Po Raionam, Raionnim Tsentram, Gorodam, Rabochim Poselkam i Krupnim Sel’skim 
Naselennim Punktam. (Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1941), p. 6. 
63 In 1941, there were 5,708 active PPOs in the entire Leningrad region, of which 1,967 operated in 
industrial, communications, transport and construction enterprises. At the same time, kolkhoz and 





  The matter is further complicated if we consider the significant variation in 
social organisation that existed within the distinct parts of the Soviet population 
grouped together as ‘rural’. One should be conscious about transposing the insights 
gained from the account offered in this thesis onto social contexts where the class 
categories of Marxism-Leninism bore little relevance to everyday life.64 Nevertheless, 
maintaining awareness of the favourable environment in which the KP/Kirov PPO 
operated makes it possible to appreciate the ways in which its activities may have been 
similar or different to that of other organisations in both process and outcomes.65  
In the fourth chapter of this thesis, a first attempt is made to provide some context 
to the KP/Kirov case study by leaving the factory floor to examine party activity in the 
considerably different environment of the Baltic Fleet. It does not focus on any single 
PPO, but reviews party activism throughout the Fleet’s ships and land forces on the 
basis of party meeting minutes and activity reports available at the collection of the 
Fleet’s Political Directorate in the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGAVMF).  
Finally, the concluding chapter offers some remarks on the implications of this 
study of the communist rank-and-file for the broader question of the nature of state-
society relations in the Soviet Union, as well as 20th century communism in power 
more broadly.
                                                 
64 The Bolsheviks themselves also had to confront this problem in designing and implementing policy 
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Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) pp. 187–264. 
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1. Bolshevik bargaining: the party rank-and-file and the formation 
of Soviet industrial relations 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In examining the activity of the rank-and-file membership of the Communist Party 
within the context of the transformation of Soviet labour relations during the interwar 
years, it is perhaps best to start with a discussion of the different historiographical 
approaches to this transformation and their corollary conceptualisations of the specific 
character of the relations of production it created. With respect to process, this account 
follows Kenneth Straus’s categorisation of the literature into accounts of negative, 
positive and parallel integration of the working class into the nexus of production 
relations developed prior to WWII. This distinction is made on the basis of whether a 
particular account considers the Soviet working class to have pursued its interests in 
opposition to, in line with or with relative autonomy from the objectives of the regime.1 
Regarding outcomes, I will simply divide the literature into accounts of exploitative 
and social contractual labour relations. Studies focusing on how the regime managed 
to get what it wanted out of workers, as well as how workers failed to prevent it from 
doing so, are understood to belong to the first category. Conversely, the second 
category will comprise studies of what the regime offered workers and the reasons it 
did so, as well as how workers themselves managed to claim and increase what was 
on offer.2  
This discussion will begin by considering accounts of negative integration into 
a system of exploitative labour relations. The oldest and longest surviving approach to 
                                                 
1 Kenneth M. Straus, Factory and Community in Stalin’s Russia: The Making of an Industrial 
Working Class (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), p. 7 and passim. The term ‘social integration’ is 
borrowed by Straus from the classical sociology of Emile Durkheim. My use of it here is restricted to 
the classification of the historiography stated above. 
2 This is primarily a question of emphasis, as scholars arguing that the regime formed some kind of 
social contract with industrial workers do not necessarily suggest that this was not exploitative or 
disadvantageous for the latter. Straus for example repeatedly describes worker-regime relations as an 
‘ersatz social contract’. Ibid, passim. Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap between accounts of 
negative social integration and exploitative labour relations on the one hand and accounts of positive 
or parallel social integration and social-contractual labour relations on the other. Any important 






the subject, this may be called the standard or classical view on Soviet labour relations, 
having survived several conceptual developments and generation shifts in the field. 
Theories and accounts of Soviet socialism as a new exploitative mode of production 
were first offered by the Bolsheviks’ socialist opponents, primarily former Mensheviks 
working in exile in the West. The most scholarly accomplished of these was Solomon 
Schwarz’s Labor in the Soviet Union, which went on to become a foundational work 
in Soviet labour studies.3 The main argument put forward in this work was that the 
abandonment of the NEP and the establishment of a command economy effectively 
abolished the labour market and replaced it by a system of direct labour allocation by 
the state. This was purportedly achieved by a succession of increasingly harsher labour 
laws meant to tie workers to their enterprises while also reducing their control over the 
labour process, culminating in the law of 20 June 1940 which formally abolished the 
right to quit one’s job.4 The outcome of this process was the complete subordination 
of the working-class to the dictates of the regime, as workers gradually lost all ability 
to oppose state directives and collective forms of resistance gave way to individual 
survival tactics.  
Schwarz’s account of a mighty state towering over an atomised and powerless 
workforce fit in very well with the then prevalent totalitarian school of Soviet studies 
and remained definitive until totalitarianism came under heavy fire by the revisionist 
school.5 Nevertheless, the broad contours of Schwarz’s argument have been defended 
by some labour historians of later generations who have formulated accounts of 
negative integration on the basis of the latest available evidence. Writing in the heyday 
of revisionism, Donald Filtzer attempted to provide some empirical grounding to this 
story of working-class defeat by means of a close comparative reading of the Soviet 
and émigré socialist press. Soviet industrialisation, Filtzer argued, was a gamble 
undertaken by the bureaucratic elite that had formed during the NEP years. Towards 
the 1920s, the argument goes, the contradictions of the Soviet system presented the 
elite with a seemingly insoluble dilemma: it would either have to restore capitalism 
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and therefore be subsumed by international capital, or attempt to modernise the 
economy by means of democratic, participatory planning thus ceding much of its 
influence and privileges to the country’s proletariat. As neither of these options were 
particularly attractive, the elite decided to square the circle by embarking on a course 
of centralised bureaucratic planning.6 Workers initially resisted the attacks on their 
living standards inherent in the industrialisation drive, but their resolve was eventually 
broken between increasing political repression and economic hardship. The result was 
a social system built on the exploitation by a managerial elite of a quiescent working 
class with little sense of its collective interests but also indifferent to the fate of the 
system itself.7 Since the opening of the archives, this line of argument has been further 
developed by scholars who have produced specific case studies of resistance and 
repression in industry during the 1930s. 8  Still others extended the scope of 
investigation to the NEP years when the formation of the aforementioned bureaucratic 
elite took place.9  
Despite the valuable empirical contributions made by scholars working within 
the negative integration framework, their general narrative of the development of 
Soviet labour relations in the interwar period seems rather forced and is not particularly 
convincing. Their copious documentation of instances of workers’ resistance of regime 
initiatives cannot in itself support the view that labour relations in the Soviet Union 
were inherently exploitative or antagonistic, especially given the fact that labour unrest 
was, in entirely different terms, documented by both the contemporary Soviet press 
                                                 
6 Filtzer, Soviet Workers, pp. 32-33. 
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and subsequent historiography.10 What is more, by focusing on instances of conflict, 
the negative integration framework failed to account for and occasionally even 
consider the many ways in which workers joined and supported regime initiatives.11  
Partly in response to these weaknesses, a different view of Soviet labour relations 
began to be developed by some researchers who focused their inquiries on the extent 
of social support or tolerance for the regime. These scholars observed that Soviet 
workers could and did make use of officially sanctioned and informal channels to voice 
their grievances, attack their bosses and exert control over the labour process.12 These 
included participating in production conferences, requesting the intervention of trade 
unions, bringing cases to court, writing to the press or major political figures and 
informal haggling over rates with foremen and managers, all within the context of an 
extreme labour shortage which made factory directors very keen to satisfy workers’ 
demands in order to hold on to their workforce.13 According to this view, despite the 
extreme demands it made on workers during the industrialisation drive the regime still 
provided them with a range of options for pursuing their interests, all of which were a 
                                                 
10 Press reports were central primary sources for some of the pre-archival studies discussed above, 
especially Filtzer, Soviet Workers. The standard Soviet view of strikes, slow-downs etc. was that they 
were the product of the low class-consciousness of some ‘backward’ elements amongst workers, 
primarily former peasants but also entrenched labour aristocracies who sought to defend their 
privileges vis-à-vis younger workers and women during the early stages of industrialisation. Zh. P. 
Depretto, “Ofitsial’nie Kontseptsii Rabochego Klassa v SSSR (1920-1930-e gg.),” Sotsial’naia 
Istoria. Ezhegodnik, 2004., 72–90. 
11 Partly because of this, the framework failed to account for the decline of labour unrest towards the 
end of the 1920s. The assumption that it was the result of increasing repression has been recently 
challenged from within the negative integration camp. Kevin Murphy, ‘Strikes During the Early 
Soviet Period, 1922 to 1932: From Working-Class Militancy to Working-Class Passivity?’ in Donald 
Filtzer et al., eds., A Dream Deferred: New Studies in Russian and Soviet Labour History (Bern; New 
York: Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2008).  
12 William Chase, Workers, Society and the Soviet State: Labor and Life in Moscow, 1918-29 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987); Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism; Hiroaki Kuromiya, 
Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1931, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); idem, “The Crisis of Proletarian Identity in the Soviet Factory, 1928-1929,” Slavic 
Review 44, no. 2 (1985): 280–97; Straus, Factory. See also Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, chapter 5 and 
White, ed., New Directions, Part III.  
13 Straus’s is the lengthiest and perhaps the strongest account of the labour shortage as a factor 
strengthening the hand of workers in the Soviet economy. He explicitly argues against Schwartz that 
the labour market was never effectively suppressed and shows that the introduction of harsh labour 
legislation followed spikes in labour turnover, suggesting that laws were introduced as increasingly 
desperate attempts to respond to trends in the labour market. Straus, Factory, pp. 90-93. Curiously, 
although Filtzer recognised the importance of the labour shortage as a feature of the Soviet economy, 





lot more effective and far less dangerous than direct opposition.14 Understanding the 
practical operation of such formal channels and informal practices became thus a far 
more important task for scholarly research into Soviet interwar labour relations than 
documenting instances of purportedly resistant activity.15 
   As indicated earlier, scholars working within this social-contractual paradigm 
had different ideas about what the availability of these opportunities implied about the 
place of workers in the Soviet system of labour relations. Those who were more 
interested in the place of the Soviet factory in the totality of Soviet social relations 
tended to view these channels of influence as a powerful force for positive 
integration.16 Those who were more interested in the nature of Soviet labour relations 
as such tended to provide more nuanced accounts. The common theme in the latter 
was that the various opportunities to criticise and participate in decision making 
available to Soviet workers did not so much contribute to them identifying their own 
interests with regime objectives, as provide them with the means to defend their 
interests against the state.17 This produced a situation whereby the state’s attempts to 
extract ever more surplus out of labour were continuously thwarted by workers making 
use of all non-confrontational means at their disposal, often with the collusion of 
factory managers. The result was a system of labour relations which, although 
inefficient, provided the regime with a basic level of social support and prevented 
                                                 
14 Within the context of a rapidly expanding economy, these options included multiple opportunities 
for promotion, as demonstrated by one of the pioneering works of revisionism. Fitzpatrick, Education. 
I am putting this issue aside here as promotion is strictly speaking a change, rather than an 
improvement of one’s position in production. In other words, the sceptical supporter of the negative 
integration thesis can object that workers promoted to managerial posts were no longer members of 
the working class but of the bureaucratic elite or ruling class. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
Filtzer recognised that there was a ‘paradox’ in the existence of an exploitative ruling class recruiting 
its members almost entirely from those it exploited. Filtzer, Soviet Workers, p. 8. A full treatment of 
this question would require an extensive engagement with sociological theories of class and 
exploitation, something best avoided here.  
15 A more detailed overview of the historiography on Soviet labour is provided in Lewis H. 
Siegelbaum, “The Late Romance of the Soviet Worker in Western Historiography,” International 
Review of Social History 51, no. 3 (2006): 463–481.  
16 For example, Kotkin, in his examination of the work process as part of ‘Stalinist civilization’, 
concluded that the new social identity created in the Soviet factory allowed the state to ‘appropriate 
much of the basis of social solidarity and render opposition impossible.’ Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 
p. 236. Soviet historiography on the subject naturally took a similarly positive integrationist view. See 
for instance V.M. Kulagina, Leningradskie Kommunisty v Bor’be Za Osvoenie Novoi Tekhniki 
(Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1962). 
17 Straus, Factory, pp. 137-38, 245. Robert Thurston, ‘Reassessing the History of Soviet Workers: 
Opportunities to Criticize and Participate in Decision-Making 1935-1941’, in White, ed., New 





economic collapse by moderating in practice some of the more fantastical government 
directives.18  
Although providing a useful corrective to accounts of negative integration, the 
two versions of the social contract view outlined above came with their own 
weaknesses. On one hand, accounts of positive integration often overstretched their 
arguments, smoothing over the many conflicts in the Soviet workplace and drawing 
an unrealistic picture of Soviet society where the state successfully managed to 
incorporate and neutralise all or at least most social tensions. On the other, the more 
convincing arguments of parallel integration could not provide an adequate account of 
how the complex process of negotiation they posited between workers, management 
and state agencies was kept in motion.19  
The rest of this chapter will provide an account of the activities of the Primary 
Party Organisation of the KP/Kirov factory between 1926 and 1941 with a view to 
addressing some of the weaknesses of the social contract narrative, as well as 
conceptually unifying/integrating its two variants. It will show that the Party 
organisation provided the political space within which the many conflicts of the Soviet 
factory were played out and contained. Alongside Straus, it argues that Soviet workers 
did indeed operate in relative autonomy from the state. However, according to the 
account that follows, this autonomy was predicated on active support for the state and 
the taking on of specific tasks in its service, via one’s membership of the communist 
party. This was not therefore the autonomy that is gained by carving out a niche, but 
that inherent in the delegation of certain powers from an authority to its subordinates. 
                                                 
18 Straus, Factory, p. 155 and passim.  
19 Straus is an exception, in that he credits Red Directors as the driving force behind the development 
of Soviet industrial relations.  Straus, Factory, ch. 9. Nevertheless, although Straus makes a 
compelling case for placing Red Directors Stepanov and Likhachev at the centre of developments at 
the Serp i Molot and ZiS factories in Moscow, it is not obvious that his analysis should be extended to 
the whole of Soviet industry. During the fifteen-year period examined in this thesis, the KP/Kirov 
factory saw no less than five directors. Straus acknowledges that such long tenures were atypical, but 
does not seem to recognise the problems this creates for his argument. Given such turnover, the 
emphasis Straus places on the personal skill of directors in bridging the gaps between the conflicting 
factions of white and blue collar, skilled and unskilled, male and female, hereditary proletarian and 
peasant new recruits, seems slightly misplaced. If this delicate balance were dependent on the 
directors’ personal influence, we would expect their removal to cause serious disruption. This 
suggests that whatever stability was achieved in the Soviet factory was more due to the broader 





The following pages will show that the PPO was the channel through which Soviet 
workers exercised their loyal autonomy.  
1.2 From Regime of Economy to Spetseedstvo 
By the middle of the 1920s, the NEP had succeeded in partially remedying the 
economic dislocation brought about by seven years of war and restored the Soviet 
economy to respectable levels of growth. Nevertheless, Soviet industry continued to 
be beset by chronic deficiencies that cast doubt on the country’s long-term prospects 
of industrialisation, including shortages of capital and a persistently low productivity 
of labour.20 In response to these problems, the April 1926 CC plenum of the Party 
formulated a new economic initiative known as the Regime of Economy.21 Unlike 
previous attempts to save resources by putting pressure on wages, the CC resolution 
that introduced the Regime of Economy explicitly stated that the current level of 
workers’ earnings was not to be affected. 22 Instead of this, measures were to be taken 
to improve labour productivity, including strengthening labour discipline and 
rationalisation of the working day. At the same time, the resolution pointed at other 
aspects of the production process that could benefit from greater frugality, like 
administrative expenditures.23 Feeding into already tense relations between workers 
and management, the question of where the most economising was to be made and, 
consequently, who was to bear most of the burden, quickly became a matter of dispute 
at KP PPO meetings. 
                                                 
20 The importance attached to the issue of labour productivity by the Party leadership is reflected in 
the many speeches of Felix Dzerzhinskii in his capacity as head of the VSNKh. For example, in his 
conclusive remarks on his report on the state of the metal industry to the XIV Party Conference given 
on 29 April 1925, Dzerzhinskii stated that output per single worker had to be increased ‘whatever it 
may take’ (‘vo chto by to ni stalo’). Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinski, Izbrannie Proizvedenia v 2-Kh 
Tomakh, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1967), p. 135.  
21 KPSS v resoliutsiiakh, vol. 4, pp. 8-17. 
22 The August 1924 CC plenum passed a resolution ‘On the Policy of Wages’ (O Politike Zarabotnoi 
Plate) which sought to address the growing disparity between wages and labour productivity. Ibid, 
vol. 3, pp. 293-296. Some of the measures proposed were effectively measures of labour 
intensification, leading to a spike in labour unrest the following year. See on this Svetlana Ul’ianova, 
“Rabochie v Massovikh Khoziaistvenno-Politicheskikh Kampaniiakh 1920-Kh Gg.,” in 
Predprinimateli i Rabochie Rossii v Usloviiakh Transformatsii Obshchestva I Gosudarstva v XX 
Stoletii. Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi Nauchnoi Knferentsii, Posviashchennoi Pamiati Professora  Iu. I. 
Kir’ianova, ed. A. M. Belov, 2003, 83–93. 





Workplace tensions dominated the expanded meeting of the organisation’s 
bureau which took place on 9 February 1926.24 Although the meeting was called to 
discuss the revival of party discipline after the political crisis25 of the previous month, 
the discussion was soon derailed into a comprehensive attack on factory administration 
from members of the zavkom (trade-union committee) and communists from various 
shops, as well as an exchange of accusations between the latter two groups over who 
was to blame the most for not containing the labour unrest caused by bad management. 
Zavkom member Kir’yanov spoke of conflicts in several shops and accused managers 
of withholding pay for stoppages (prostoi). At the same time, he attacked party 
members for not bringing the problem to the attention of the zavkom early enough, 
which would have prevented things from escalating.26 Glushkov, a communist from 
the iron-rolling shop responded that Kir’yanov had in fact been informed a week in 
advance but chose to do nothing.27 Zadvinskii, from the steam-boiler shop blamed the 
factory administration for the problem of truancy also, claiming that workers had not 
been provided with warm clothes and reiterating the problem of unpaid stoppages.28  
Grachev, the factory director, attempted to provide some cover for his white-collar 
staff, saying that while there certainly were some who were damaging factory work, it 
was not fair to say that all the administration was worthless (negodniaia). 29  The 
meeting ended without reaching any specific conclusions, with the party secretary Ivan 
Gaza issuing a generic call for greater discipline all-around.30 
These tensions were aired before a larger audience when, on 22 April, the new 
Leningrad gubkom secretary Sergei Kirov visited the factory to inform the Party 
collective of the results of the CC plenum that had taken place a few days before.31 
Addressing the meeting of about 1,000 members and sympathisers, Kirov stressed the 
importance of the Regime of Economy for the development of Soviet industry, arguing 
                                                 
24 In addition to bureau members, this meeting was attended by communist foremen, organisers of 
shop and sub-shop level bureaus and communist trade-unionists for a total of 306 attendees. 
TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 268, l. 10. 
25 The recently defeated Zinoviev opposition had been particularly strong at KP. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
26 Ibid. First names and patronymics are not usually given in minutes and stenographic records. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. l. 11. 
30 Ibid. 





that the lack of hard currency and the inability of the Soviet government to obtain 
foreign loans meant that the USSR would have to rely primarily on its internal 
resources for development. Every kopeck had to be seen as ‘one’s own sweat and 
blood’.32 Nevertheless, Kirov’s speech was not a one-sided call for belt-tightening. The 
discipline of the regime of economy was not to be imposed on labour alone, but also 
on the administrative apparatus. ‘Every plan – Kirov stated – goes through twenty 
revisions before being implemented. The state apparatus must be brought to order’.33 
At the end of Kirov’s speech, the floor was opened to contributions from the 
floor. These are remarkable for the consistency with which they attacked 
administrative staff as the main culprit of excessive expenses. Pavlov stated that while 
wage-rates bureaus were necessary, ‘proletarians can’t afford bureaus of 20-25 
members’.34 Artamonov complained that the main store of the factory employed five 
inspectors (kontroleri) who were paid 90 roubles per month to ‘do nothing’.35 Isakov 
hinted at corruption, alleging that storemen were paid 60 roubles per month, had 
families of four or five members, but could be seen out on drinking binges ten evenings 
a month.36 Only Grachev spoke in defence of the factory’s administrative staff and 
made an attempt to shift the focus of the conversation on questions of labour discipline. 
Amongst the last to take the floor, he stated that white-collar employees 
(sluzhaschchie) made up only 12% of factory staff and that any discussion on the 
regime of economy should start with the problem of truancy (progulki) as well as the 
disorderly state of shop-floors.37 
A similar mood can be glimpsed from the notes (zapiski) passed to Kirov from 
the floor. Although most notes contained questions about the CC plenum and technical 
suggestions regarding aspects of the production process, some of them revisited the 
theme of administrative wastefulness with increased belligerence. In order to give a 
better picture of the terms in which the issue was framed, it is worth quoting some of 
them at full length: 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 








How does the Regime of Economy agree with the administration receiving 200-
300 roubles plus bonuses?  
There is too much administration in the factory. We should economise a bit. 
If we do not put a stop to the squandering (rastrati) and embezzlement 
(khishchenie) of our property (dostoiania), we will never get the masses involved 
in our community. My suggestion is to expose the squanderers publicly, send them 
back to the workers where they came from and we will try them in our own way 
(svoim sudom). 
Measures must be taken against squandering, up to and including capital 
punishment.38  
 
In his concluding remarks, Kirov attempted to bridge the gap between workers 
and the administration by suggesting that the Regime of Economy was the concern of 
both. He argued that the decline of labour productivity was primarily the result of the 
wearing out of equipment and the inability of administrative staff to effectively deploy 
the workforce at its disposal but that truancy was also a major contributing factor.39 
The implementation of the Regime of Economy reappeared as a major theme in 
the organisation’s general assembly that convened on 27 May 1926.40 Kudrianov, the 
chair, opened the proceedings by announcing the order of the day which consisted of 
the bureau report followed by a report by the review commission and bureau elections. 
Following a successful motion from the floor suggesting that the reporters’ timeslot be 
cut from one hour to forty minutes, Ivan Gaza took the floor to present the main report.  
Gaza noted that there had been a significant decline in the productivity of labour 
at the second quarter of 1926 compared to the previous year, but attributed the fall 
primarily to intra-party discussion that had taken up much of February.41 He went on 
to say that stoppages and truancy were the other main causes of falling labour 
                                                 
38 Ibid, ll. 45-47. 
39 Ibid, l. 43. 
40 Ibid, l. 57. This was a closed (members only) meeting. The minutes do not note the number of those 
present. 
41 Ibid. l. 58. The figures given were 501 roubles per w in 1926 compared to 633 in 1925. Gaza also 
noted that wages had risen steadily over the same period, from a low-point of 66.30 to 84.77 roubles 
per month at the time of the report. By ‘intra-party discussion’ Gaza meant of course the aftermath of 





productivity, stressing that the latter was the fault of workers alone, having reached an 
alarming rate of 13.55% in April.42 
The need to address such problems of labour discipline was a major theme of 
Gaza’s report, but some of the comments he made with respect to the attitude of rank-
and-file communists towards these issues are of particular interest here. Speaking of a 
series of slow-downs (volinki) that had taken place in the factory in connexion with 
some disputes with management, the party secretary claimed that rank-and-file 
communists had often been found to be the main leaders, wryly commenting that 
‘having learned at the Party school that communists are the vanguard of the proletariat, 
it appears that they think that if workers want to kick up a row (buzit’) they have to 
step in and do it for them’.43 Gaza urged party members to promote the correct line 
amongst workers and rounded off his speech with an assessment of the organisation’s 
work as politically correct but often weak in practice.44 
The discussion after the report followed a pattern similar to that of the previous 
meeting. The perceived large numbers of highly paid administrative staff were 
attacked by rank-and-file members like Ukkonen who stated that the only 
redundancies that had taken place had been of employees on the third and fourth 
brackets (razriadi) of the skill-based pay scale. ‘Start cutting from the top’, he advised, 
‘and the party will grow to new heights’.45 Another member, Chervinskii, complained 
that admin staff had in fact increased in the tractor department where he worked. 
Chervinskii also criticised the weak development of shop-floor organisations, 
bemoaning the bureau’s neglect of this key task.46 Smirnov, a former oppositionist, 
attacked the new leadership for making a series of mistakes in matters of party 
                                                 
42 Ibid. l. 59.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. ll 59-63. 
45 Ibid. l. 65. Soviet wage policy went through a large number of reviews and overhauls throughout 
the interwar period, all of which created new sources of confusion and conflicts. In 1926, there was a 
seventeen-bracket scale in all-union use, but there were variations according to industry and enterprise 
with respect to norm-setting and the use of piece-rates. See on this Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Soviet 
Norm Determination in Theory and Practice, 1917–1941,” Soviet Studies 36, no. 1 (1984): 45–68, pp. 
47-52; L. I. Borodkin and E. I. Safonova, “Gosudarstvo I Problemi Motivatsii Truda v Rossiiskoi 
Promishlennosti XX v.,” in Ekonomicheskaiia Istoriia: Obozrenie, 5 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
Moskovskogo Universiteta, 2000); E. I. Safonova, “Moskovskie Tekstil’shchiki v Godi Nepa: 
Kvalifikatsiia I Differentsiatsiia v Oplate Truda,” in Ekonomicheskaiia Istoriia. Ezhegodnik (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 2001), 389–419.  





development and economic administration, claiming that the factory was in fact losing 
more workers than admin staff.47 Zapiski to Gaza from the floor reiterated these points 
but also inquired about the state of production conferences (proizvoditel’nie 
soveshchania), which the secretary conceded had very low attendance.48  
It was again left to the director, Grachev, to provide some defence for the 
factory’s white-collar personnel. Grachev argued that management had already made 
significant staff reductions amongst the white-collars, having closed the commercial 
sub-department whose head had been enjoying a monthly salary of 300 roubles.49 He 
added that administrative staff were also labourers and that the factory could not be 
run without them, warning that their continued marginalisation might lead to their 
political alienation.50 Grachev finished his contribution by saying that the Regime of 
Economy would be successful only if all 2000 members of the organisation worked to 
put into practice.51 
After a few more short speeches, the floor was taken by Podol’skii, an instructor 
from the raikom present at the meeting. Podol’skii warned that the inexperienced, 
newly expanded activist base of the organisation could fall into the trap of tailing, 
rather than leading the non-party mass.52 He then encouraged party activists to tell their 
fellow workers the truth about the inescapable difficulties of industrial development 
                                                 
47 Ibid. Smirnov claimed that only 4 admin staff had been laid off at the wagon department, compared 
to some 80 workers. 
48 The total number of workers participating in conferences was 1428 – out of who 530 were party 
members – from a total workforce of over 10000. According to Gaza however this was just on paper, 
attendance being even more disappointing in reality. Ibid. l 69. An institutional innovation of the 
NEP-era, production conferences were gatherings of workers at all levels of the production process 
which discussed technical and organisational solutions to problems of factory life. The party 
leadership devoted considerable attention to the development of conferences both as a source of 
legitimacy for the regime and as part of its economic policy. Low attendance was a persistent problem 
in the first few years of the conferences’ operation, to a large extent because managers ignored their 
recommendations. For a full account, see Svetlana Ul’ianova, “‘Leningradskii Pochin’: 
Proizvodstvennie Soveshchaniia v Sisteme Motivatsii i Stimulirovaniia Truda v 1920-E gg.,” in Rinok 
Truda v Sankt-Peterburge: Problemy i Perspektivy, ed. B.V. Korneychuk (Saint-Petersburg: Nestor, 
2003); Chase, Workers, Society and the Soviet State, ch. 7.  
49 TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 266, l. 66. 
50 Ibid. ‘We mustn’t treat them as a foreign body. Perhaps this is why only 100 showed up at the May 
Day celebrations’. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. l. 68. Podol’skii was referring to the effects of the Lenin enrolment (Leninskii prizyv). In 
Leningrad, 23,575 new members joined the party during the 1924 and 1925 recruitment drives, raising 
the total percentage of working class members from 61.2% to 72.7%. Leningradskaia Organizatsiia 
KPSS, p. 25. In KP 50% of party members in 1926 had joined in 1925. TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 





and admonished the rank-and-file to cease the unacceptable practice of putting forward 
demands that are impossible to fulfil.53 
The tensions expressed at the meeting were reflected in the resolution produced 
at its end. Very much a compromise document, it stipulated that labour productivity 
was to be raised primarily by rationalising production and renewing equipment. The 
text also declared the development of shop-floor organisations a priority area of work 
and made regular meetings and reports obligatory for their organisers while the 
administration was instructed to attach technical staff to production conferences, in 
order to assist workers in the formulation of workable suggestions. At the same time, 
the resolution instructed communists to be model workers and declared the promotion 
of labour discipline to be a priority issue for the organisation.54  
The following year saw Party meetings play out along much the same lines with 
Grachev defending the record of the factory administration, rank-and-file communists 
protesting bureaucratic mismanagement and demanding more powers for the 
institutions that strengthened their position in the factory while higher party 
functionaries attempted to strike some balance by restraining the activists but also 
offering some recognition of their concerns.55  
A slight shift of the scales can however be observed in the general assembly of 
June 1927.56 By that time, the Regime of Economy had been succeeded by a new 
industrial campaign, the Rationalisation of Production (Ratsionalizatsiia 
Proizvodstva). Unlike its predecessor, Rationalisation was meant to be achieved on the 
basis of technical and organisational measures, such as mechanisation of particular 
tasks, reorganisation of the workplace and training of new cadres. Socialist 
rationalisation, it was argued, could not proceed at the expense of the country’s 
                                                 
53 Ibid. l. 68. 
54 Ibid. ll.73-76. 
55 Representatives of the state apparatus tended to be less concerned about the latter as is demonstrated 
by the visit of Mikhailovskii, a member of the executive of the Machine Building Trust of which KP 
was part. Addressing the organisation on 26 May 1927, Mikhailovskii gave a detailed report of the 
economic priorities of the trust and their relation to the Regime of Economy, including price 
comparisons with major industrial economies. During the course of his report, Mikhailovskii stated 
that the factory had 1000 excess (lishnie) workers, which incensed the rank-and-filer Saltikov, 
provoking him to denounce managerial incompetence in his contribution. TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 
418, ll. 39, 47. 





working class as was the case in the capitalist world. It should instead contribute to the 
improvement of workers’ living standards and the expansion of the range of 
opportunities available to them.57 This political recalibration at the centre appears to 
have strengthened the hand of party militants on the shop-floor.  
Giving his annual report on the work of the organisation’s bureau, Gaza 
presented figures showing that overhead costs had fallen by 2.8% over the preceding 
year.58 He then reported approvingly that there had been no labour disturbances during 
the same period, attributing this achievement to improving relations between workers 
and management.59 Despite these positive developments, Gaza followed up with what 
seemed like an unprovoked attack on management, echoing many of the rank-and-file 
criticisms that had been levelled at the administration in previous meetings. The party 
organiser criticised management for its behaviour towards workers’ correspondents 
(rabkori), suggesting that they were, perhaps, seen as ‘too inquisitive’.60 Gaza stated 
that the bureau did not share this view and signalled further disapproval of 
administrative practice saying that ‘we differ with the administration on the question 
of the fight against bureaucratism. They say there isn’t such a problem. We disagree.’61 
The remainder of Gaza’s report revolved around the perennial problems of party 
building like meeting attendance and payment of dues, which Gaza noted had 
improved significantly along with the general level of the work of the aktiv. 62 
Predictably however, the ensuing discussion focused more on administrative failures 
than party achievements.  
Chervinskii stated that management was trying to suppress the rabkor 
movement, including its communist caucus. He then accused the factory 
administration of dragging its feet on bureaucratism, claiming that the tractor shop 
employed one administrator for every five workers. To applause from the floor, he 
                                                 
57 KPSS v rezoliutsiakh, vol. 4, pp. 161-167. 
58 TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 418, l. 104.  
59 Ibid. l. 106. 
60 Ibid. l. 109 Workers’ – and peasants’ correspondents – were grassroots volunteer journalists that 
reported on various aspects of everyday life for the local and national press. For a fuller discussion, 
see Jennifer Clibbon, The Soviet Press and Grass-Roots Organization: The Rabkor Movement, NEP to 
the First Five Year Plan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).  
61 TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 418, l. 109.  





added indignantly that the shop-level bureau had informed the administration of the 
problem but they had chosen to sit on their hands, producing token resolutions without 
ever putting them into practice.63 Grachev was then personally attacked by Ruzin for 
his ‘impermissible’ treatment of the rabkori.64 
The most comprehensive account of the problems facing the organisation and 
the factory was however given by Ter-Asaturov, the draughtsman of the tractor 
department. He argued that the low skill level of the membership was the 
organisation’s greatest handicap in its struggle to control the administration and called 
for the full communisation of the administrative apparatus.65 Ter-Asaturov went on to 
argue that persistent problems in political work, like the low-attendance of production 
conferences by party members and the sluggish rate of party saturation increase, were 
directly linked to the problem of bureaucratism. He contrasted the approachable 
manner of managers in ‘other factories’ with that of KP staff who could never find the 
time to speak to workers.66  Bureaucratism was finally condemned in the meeting’s 
final resolution as a symptom of the persistent predominance of old regime specialists 
in the factory’s white-collar staff.67 
By 1928, rank-and-file feeling towards the factory administration had turned 
unequivocally sour. The publication of the Shakhty affair in the Donbass on 10 March 
came shortly after the new bout of labour unrest that had taken place in connexion with 
the campaign for a new collective agreement.68  At the general meeting which met to 
discuss the results of the April CC plenum, Grachev was denounced as a demagogue 
by Sokolov who went on to ridicule the incompetence of the factory’s technical staff: 
                                                 
63 Ibid. l. 117. 
64 Ibid. l. 118. 
65 Ibid. l. 121. 
66 Ibid. ll. 122-123. Ter-Asaturov’s description of ‘other factories’’ upravliaushchie as having their 
‘doors open’ to workers was entirely in line with the popular image of the good red director. See on 
this Diane P. Koenker, “Factory Tales: Narratives of Industrial Relations in the Transition to NEP,” 
Russian Review 55, no. 3 (1996): 384–411. 
67 TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 418, ll. 131-132. 
68 Pravda, 10 March 1928. Strikes and slow-downs had taken place across the Soviet Union as groups 
of workers protested unfavourable terms of the collective agreement. They main point of contention, 
especially in heavy industry, appears to have been the reform of pay-rates and production norms 
which undermined the position of skilled workers. Sovershenno Sekretno, vol. 6, January and 
February reports. The terms of the collective agreement were attacked in the zapiski written during the 
report on the campaign at KP in April. TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 549, l. 3. For a detailed discussion 
of norm-setting during the NEP, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Soviet Norm Determination in Theory 





‘They are refitting the cranes in our workshop and all the workers are laughing. It’s 
obvious that they are doing it wrong, but the specialists won’t listen to us.’69 A worker 
from the tractor workshop, Kairov criticised the casual attitude specialists displayed 
towards their work but suggested Grachev was getting too much of the blame, 
proposing instead to have ‘the technical director give a report and grill (zharit’) him’.70 
The whole factory was declared a ‘small nest of sabotage’ by one of the zapiski given 
to the main speaker, because of the undue influence of the administration over the 
party organisation.71 The campaign of self-criticism (samokritika) launched in June 
only emboldened the militants.72  
To sum up, the closing period of the NEP saw the KP Party collective become 
dominated by moods that were increasingly hostile to the factory’s managerial 
personnel. The ever-expanding activist base of the organisation used its status to press 
the demands of workers in explicit opposition to those of the perceived bureaucrats 
that made up the enterprise’s administrative staff. To their superiors’ chagrin, 
communist activists did not refrain from leading their colleagues in industrial action 
in order to secure a better deal. But as hostility towards the NEP and the vested interests 
it engendered grew amongst the party’s top leadership, the gap between rank-and-file 
moods and the political mainstream narrowed.73 In attacking bureaucratism, rank-and-
file communists were not breaking party discipline but implementing party policy. 
Significantly, the activists were to a large extent anticipating, rather than responding 
to leadership initiatives. Communist workers saw the centre shift from a political line 
demanding tight labour discipline and favouring amicable relations between workers 
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management at the previous year’s Trust report. 
70 Ibid. l. 11. 
71 Ibid. l. 16. 
72 KPSS v resoliutsiiakh, vol. 4, pp. 338-342 
73 Apart from the familiar enemies of socialism like NEPmen, kulaks and the bourgeois specialists on 
whom Soviet industry still relied, the party leadership came to view the top, highly skilled layers of 
the proletariat with suspicion. They were seen as a labour aristocracy whose craft mentality made 
them hostile to industrialisation and open to all sorts of opportunist deviations. Depretto, “Ofitsial’nie 





and management, to one calling party members to battle against ‘wicked 
bureaucratism’ and ‘bureaucratic degeneration’.74  
Thus spetseedstvo, the anti-intellectualist practice of specialist-baiting that had 
been the scourge of many an engineer throughout the NEP period, became sanctioned 
by and institutionalised within the party collective, the very organisation charged with 
resolving social contradictions on the factory floor. At the same time, communist 
specialists like Ter-Asaturov joined the fray to propose what amounted to their 
promotion – the communisation of the apparatus – as the only solution to bureaucratic 
mismanagement. On the eve of the Great Break, the party collective of Leningrad’s 
Red Putilovite works provided the organisational and ideological framework for the 
formation of an alliance of militant workers and low-ranking technicians that would 
go on to become the protagonists of the First Five Year Plan. 
Despite their growing hostility to management however, communist activists did 
not transform the organisation into a mere forum for complaints. Throughout this 
period, the rank-and-file maintained a strong interest in the economic aspects of 
factory life as well as a reflective attitude on the organisation’s place within it. We 
have already seen that the communist workers of KP were able to frame their interests 
and concerns in the terms of the regime’s own economic policy and that they did so 
with considerable skill and confidence. This, however, is only part of the story. Party 
members spent a considerable amount of their time attempting to provide solutions to 
everyday problems of production, often in contexts where little political gain could be 
made by their efforts to do so. Communist workers were expected to and did take 
active part in production conferences not only to rail against the incompetence of 
managerial personnel – which they did at every opportunity – but also to highlight and 
troubleshoot technical and organisational issues in their shop.75 Similarly, workshop-
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whether the radical policies that succeeded the NEP were forced on the leadership ‘from below’ by 
ultra-militant activists, or whether the former needed convenient scapegoats against whom to mobilise 
the latter. The point is that the rank-and-file did not need to be induced to view ‘bureaucrats’ as an 
enemy. What is important for the argument made here is that, for whatever reason, official party 
policy converged with rank-and-file mood at a critical historical conjuncture. 
75 A production conference held on 24 March 1926 for example heard a report on intra-factory 
transport from Mileev, a communist worker of the factory’s railroad system. The report highlighted 
problems such as bad maintenance of cranes and wagons but was criticised by workers from other 





level party organisation meetings devoted significant amounts of time on the 
development and improvement of production conference work.76  
Discussion of problems of the productive process was not however confined to 
production conferences and shop-level meetings. As the decade drew to a close, 
technical issues such as fuel deliveries or the transport of materials became 
increasingly more prominent in the organisation’s general meetings and less distinct 
from the party’s own organisational affairs.77 By the time the First Five Year Plan was 
launched in late 1928, the alliance of workers and technicians that had taken shape 
within the organisation was not only hostile to managerial personnel but also confident 
in its ability to replace them. 
 
1.3 The First Five Year Plan 
The First Five Year Plan was a watershed in Soviet history. Its vast transformative 
effects on industry and society have been the subject of so much scholarly research 
that reviewing them here would be neither practicable nor particularly illuminating. It 
is, however, worth providing some detail on the specific effects of the Soviet 
industrialisation drive on Leningrad industry so as to better appreciate the conditions 
in which the KP party organisation had to operate in the years 1928-1932. 
The construction of new large enterprises and the renovation and expansion of 
those already in operation were the primary objectives of the plan. Rapid industrial 
expansion brought about a sharp increase in the numbers of the industrial workforce. 
This was particularly pronounced in Leningrad, where 133,000 workers entered 
industry in 1930 alone. Heavy industry grew most of all, with some 46% of all 
                                                 
prompt in their deliveries. The resolution produced by the conference contained admonishments to 
transporters but also technical proposals, such as the refitting of specific lengths of track were 
bottlenecks occurred. TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 312, ll. 17-19.  
76 A meeting of the wagon-carpentry workshop organisation on 14 May 1926 expressed concern about 
a perceived slow-down in conference activities and resolved the chair of the workshop’s conference 
should thereafter provide regular reports. A report by the chair was given the following week. 
TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1. d. 287, ll. 22-24. 
77 At the organisation’s first conference on 18 November 1928, Makarov from the open hearth furnace 
shop complained that furnace charge deliveries to the shop were both insufficient and unpunctual 
leading to unnecessary stoppages. At the same time, he made a number of comments and suggestions 
on how to improve the work of shop-floor organisations and better coordinate their activities with the 





Leningrad workers employed in the metal-electrical sector and machine-builders 
jumping from 23% to 31% of the total workforce in 1928-1932.78 The workforce of 
KP more than doubled, reaching a total of about 21,000 around 1931.79 New arrivals 
from the countryside accounted for much of this increase, with 55% of trade union 
members in 1931 being of peasant origin, compared to 9% in 1930.80 Women also 
entered industry en masse, making up 43.5% of the entire workforce by 1932 
compared to 37.1% in 1928; the relative increase was greater in the male-dominated 
metal industry, from 9.1% to 23.5%.81  
The transformation of Soviet industry only served to complicate the chronic 
confusion afflicting the system of remuneration. Leningrad’s 14 trade unions 
recognised 29 different 1st bracket wage rates, ranging from 16 to 39 kopecks per 
hour. 82  At the same time, the plan’s prioritisation of capital investment over the 
production of consumer goods exerted strong pressures on living standards and 
shortages in foodstuffs necessitated the introduction of rationing already in 1929, well 
before famine struck in 1933.83 The functioning of the rationing system was far from 
ideal and the shortages and quality of the food distributed led to considerable industrial 
unrest. 84  Although these side-effects of crash industrialisation were offset to a 
significant extent by the eradication of unemployment which reduced the number of 
dependents per household, the decline in workers’ living conditions was significant in 
terms of real wages.85 
Shortages in consumer goods and random variations in the system of 
remuneration combined to give rise to one of the main features of Soviet 
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80 Istoriia Rabochikh Leningrada, p. 213. 
81 Ibid. p. 216. 
82 Ibid. p. 218. 
83 Osokina, Za Fasadom, pp. 57-58. Although the all-union kartochnaia Sistema was not introduced 
until 1931, Leningrad was amongst the first places to be hit by the supply crisis and a gubkom plenum 
introduced bread rationing on 23 March 1929, setting the norm at 800g per day for workers and 400g 
for white collar staff and dependents. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 2694, l. 6. 
84 The textile dominated Ivanovo Industrial Region seems to have been especially prone to strike 
action. In 1932, a strike over declining rations developed into a public demonstration attracting at least 
a few thousand people, significant numbers of which engaged in rioting. Filtzer, Soviet Workers, pp. 
83-84 and Rossman, ‘The Teikovo Cotton Workers’ Strike’, pp. 48-52. 
85 L. I. Borodkin, “Zhizn’ v Gorode v Godi Pervoi Piatiletki: ‘uluchshenie Material’nogo Polozheniia’ 





industrialisation, the extremely high rates of labour turnover. 86  Along with the 
deskilling of the now much younger and less experienced working class, high turnover 
induced directors to over-hire in order to secure their enterprises against the labour 
shortage, thus exacerbating the problem and further increasing deskilling in individual 
enterprises.87 
Having spent the last NEP years as both relentless critics of management and 
troubleshooters of production, KP party activists now found themselves confronting 
rapidly changing realities. The technical process of production and the very physical 
space of their activity was about to change as the plan targeted the factory for full re-
equipment.88 The organisation would have to operate within and assimilate a much 
larger and younger workforce with little experience of factory life within the context 
of unprecedentedly demanding labour conditions. The initiatives undertaken by the 
central party leadership in response to the myriad of problems thrown up over the 
course of the first FYP served to further complicate an already confused situation. In 
industry, the most significant of these was the introduction of edinonachalie, or one-
person management. 
  
1.4 Edinonachalie and bacchanalian counter-planning 
The resolution introducing one-person management in Soviet industrial enterprises 
was adopted by the CC on 5 September 1929.89 Earlier scholarship regarded this as a 
pivotal moment in the consolidation of a centralised command economy, creating a 
class of industrial autocrats or ‘small Stalins’ under the control of the real, life-size 
Stalin living in the Kremlin. 90  More recent works have taken a different view, 
                                                 
86 Between May and August 1930, the 20 most important construction projects in the USSR recruited 
200,374 workers. Over the same period, 133,031 quit their jobs. Filtzer, Soviet Workers, p. 61. 
87 According to the KP administration, the factory was ‘making up its full complement of labour 
power by recruiting and taking on unskilled labour, who gradually settle in and assume the place of 
skilled workers’. Ibid. p. 58. In the 4th quarter of 1931 alone, the wage fund in Leningrad was 
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88 Piatiletnii Plan Narodno-Khoziaistvennogo Stroitel’stva SSSR, 3 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
“Planovoe Khoziaistvo,” 1930), vol. 2, pp. 158-159. 
89 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, vol. 4, pp. 556-562. 
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suggesting that edinonachalie was intended to establish proper accountability for the 
performance of industrial enterprises by clarifying the specific responsibilities and 
prerogatives of management vis-à-vis the party and trade-union organisations.91  
Events in KP seem to support the latter view. Party meetings at KP in 1929 did 
not display the same toxic attitudes towards the factory administration as those of the 
last NEP years. The mobilisation of party activists for the industrialisation drive, as 
well as the intra-party crisis over collectivisation, focused shop-floor politics on all-
union affairs. General assembly meetings in May and November gathered to discuss 
and condemn the views of the Right Opposition, thus temporarily displacing the party-
management conflict from the centre stage of factory politics.92  
As a result of the collectivisation drive however, KP became an enterprise of 
paramount importance, as the only tractor producing factory in the Soviet Union. This 
distinction made it possible for the factory’s own politics to become embedded in the 
political struggles taking place at much higher levels. The importance of KP’s output 
for the union-wide collectivisation campaign was not lost on party activists. Although 
the 1929 general meetings were not stenographed, the zapiski included in the protocol 
records can provide some insight into the way party activists viewed the situation. At 
the May meeting, one Rassudov bombarded the presidium with notes asking questions 
about the positions of specific leaders and stating his views on everything from the 
danger of kulak infiltration in rural soviets to the best way to exploit recently 
discovered ore deposits in the Nizhnevolzhkii territory. 93  In one of his written 
interventions, Rassudov assured the presidium that the peasantry had realised the 
importance of the FYP and did not fear collectivisation, but demanded ‘to be given all 
necessary agricultural machines, of which it has very little.’94  
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Although KP overfulfilled its 1928/1929 target of 3,000 tractors, the following 
year the factory’s beleaguered administration attracted the wrath of the authorities after 
the enterprise failed to meet a significantly raised target of 12,000. Throughout the 
first quarter of 1930, the Party organisation – itself partially responsible for the 
upwards revision – attacked the administration for failing to meet its monthly targets. 
In June 1930, KP’s technical director V.L. Sablin was arrested by the OGPU on 
charges of wrecking along with the director of the tractor department and a number of 
engineers. Though not charged with a crime, Grachev was relieved of his duties in 
September.95 
In order to better appreciate the extent to which the power of the party 
organisation undermined the authority edinonachalie was meant to confer upon the 
director, it would be useful to consider the first experience of a KP party conference 
of Karl Martovich Ots, the factory’s new red director.  
Ots presented the main report to the organisation’s 7th conference on 2 October 
1930, only a week after Grachev’s departure. Chairing the meeting, the party organiser 
Alekseev opened the session by informing those present that the plan had been fulfilled 
by only 92.1% and the organisation should use the storming quarter (udarnii kvartal) 
to overcome the persistent problems of truancy, faulty output (brak) and labour 
turnover, using the trusted weapon of samokritika.96 The new director then took the 
floor to present the factory’s production plan for the quarter. He began by stating that 
fulfilment up until then had in fact been 87% and declared that in order to fulfil the 
plan, the factory would have to produce 47% more items than in the previous quarter.97 
Ots conceded that factory output was constrained by the significant limiting factors 
that plagued Soviet industry as a whole, like labour shortage and skill depletion. 
Moreover, the factory’s rapid expansion had been disproportionate, with auxiliary 
shop capacity lagging significantly behind that of main processing shops.98  
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Having indirectly made the point that output could not be immediately increased 
by further expanding the available workforce, Ots drew the obvious conclusion that 
the storming quarter target would have to be met on account of an increase in labour 
productivity. In order to dispel any doubts as to whether this would involve labour 
intensification and a tightening of discipline, Ots spoke of the labour shortage as 
‘artificially created’, further explaining that he meant this ‘not in the literal sense, but 
in the sense that people do not want to work themselves too hard’.99 He went on to 
provide an example of how carelessness and a lax attitude to work were undermining 
plan fulfilment in the factory’s paramount shop: 
It must be said that even now, at a moment when the whole country has its eyes 
fixed on us…when everyone’s attention is on the tractor shop…not everyone’s 
attitude to their work is as it should be. There are of course bright examples, but 
not everyone is like that…I was there last night at midnight, during shift change, 
and for 40-50 minutes the place was in a complete mess. Some people were 
chatting, some benches were being cleaned, and some others weren’t.100  
 
From his perspective, the new director was making a perfectly reasonable 
assessment of the situation. He had limited time to rectify the situation that had cost 
his predecessor his job, so that the increase in productivity necessary to meet the tractor 
target would have to be achieved on the basis of existing capital and labour resources. 
Addressing the often chaotic conditions prevalent on the factory floor was an obvious 
place to start. Not surprisingly, the party members who took the floor after Ots were 
not of quite the same opinion. 
The director’s report was followed by the presentation of a counter-plan by the 
factory’s control commission (VKK). The reporter, Bolsunovskii, began his 
contribution on the familiar theme of managerial incompetence: 
It would seem that a counter-plan must be put forward in opposition to something 
(chemu-to na vstrechu), that is, the plan of the administration. But this is not the 
case because even today, the administration was unable to provide figures on this 
quarter’s plan because it doesn’t have them. The VKK was established on June 7 
to work out a plan for 1930-31. It was put together in time but as you can see 
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today, neither the administration nor the zavkom can present a plan for the whole 
year.101  
 
Bolsunovskii went on to present the counter-plan’s adjusted targets. Overall 
output was projected to be 38.5 million roubles, over the administration’s target of 36 
million. Labour productivity would rise by 27%, not 20% as forecast by the 
administration. Bolsunovskii argued that the counter-plan’s more ambitious target 
could be met by means of the elimination of truancy and brak. This, he argued, was 
possible if the party mobilised all of the factory’s public opinion for this goal. To this 
end, he demanded that the shock work movement (udarnichestvo) should be expanded 
to include more workers. By placing responsibility for the plan on the rank-and-file, 
Bolsunovskii argued, it would be possible to meet the new targets.102 
The call for higher targets was echoed by Marmel’ who argued that even the 
counter-plan’s revised target of 3,600 tractors in one quarter was pessimistic, as the 
factory could purportedly produce 1,500 per month on average. Marmel’, who worked 
at the old forge shop, argued that it was possible to increase the production of wagons 
from the 75 ordered by the administration to 90, provided that the shop was relieved 
from orders for smaller items from other shops which could produce them internally. 
In order for the required increase in productivity to take place, the administration 
would also need to address ‘some of the faults of the previous administration’, 
specifically the lack of concern about the shop’s aging equipment which was, 
according to the speaker, in danger of complete breakdown. Demonstrating 
considerable skill in Bolshevik rhetoric, Marmel’ drove the point home: ‘There have 
been considerable advances…but we have now come up against what must be called 
objective conditions. We must get rid of objective conditions comrades.’103 
Other speakers expressed similar views but were more scathing. Shimkovich 
admitted that truancy was an important issue but wondered whether management had 
taken any measures to assist the trade union in remedying the problem. His 
contribution is worth quoting at some length: 
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Ots told us the story of how he visited the tractor shop and beheld chaos; that 
people there weren’t working, were chatting etc. This will be so tomorrow too. 
What concrete measures has Ots proposed? None! 75% of absences are because 
of stoppages…There are stoppages because of the administration’s 
carelessness…Regarding planning, there isn’t such a thing. If you want talk about 
bringing the plan to the worker, then bring it first to the foreman, because he 
doesn’t have it…You start to work, then the foreman comes and says ‘change 
equipment, work on the engine block.’ In half an hour he comes again and says: 
‘take out the block, work on the cylinder head.’… If you are going to push the 
worker about like this, and he earns one and a half rouble per day, then he will 
say…‘I better leave, I’ll be a drifter (letun), but I’ll earn more.’ Workers get angry 
at the foreman, but the foreman can’t do anything if he doesn’t have a task…Bring 
the plan to the master and after that to the worker, because now…he doesn’t know 
how many and what kind of items to make.104  
 
In his concluding remarks, Ots responded to some of the points raised by the 
other speakers and answered questions put to him in zapiski. One of these asked 
whether the new director intended to manage the factory from his office, ‘like 
Grachev’, or on the factory floor, alongside the communist caucus of the shop. Ots 
answered that one is only a red director who spends at least four hours per day on the 
floor and promised to follow that rule. Bolsunovskii used his concluding timeslot to 
challenge Ots to fulfil the plan: “We have equipment and contracts, let’s fulfil the plan, 
if you please (izvol’te vypolniat’)”.105  
Whatever the original intent of the decree on edinonachalie might have been, 
Ots’s first contact with KP’s communist rank-and-file suggests that he had not been 
invested with the powers of an ‘industrial autocrat’ or ‘small-Stalin’, certainly not one 
for whom ‘rudeness [was] a virtue.’106 Instead, according to the stenographic record 
Ots comes across as a pragmatic administrator, who having realised that meeting 
production targets was only conceivable on the basis of unpopular measures of labour 
intensification was trying to secure the support of the institution charged with 
maintaining the good will of workers both within the factory and society at large. The 
KP party organisation however was not forthcoming with this support. The communist 
rank-and-file, ever suspicious of management, had not become more open to 
directorial initiatives since the removal of the previous administration. In fact, it would 
not be unreasonable to suggest that KP worker-communists experienced the removal 
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of those whom they had for years denounced as incompetent or even dangerous as a 
victory. In this case, the confidence of the rank-and-file in its political power would 
have been strengthened, as would the conviction that edinonachalie did not in any way 
entail an erosion of workers’ control as mediated by the party organisation.107 
This would account for the confidence with which speakers like Bolsunovskii 
and Marmel’ presented their own suggestions without any significant scale back of 
spetseedstvo. It does not, however, explain the specific content of these suggestions. 
For if in the late NEP-era communist activists were trying to defend against labour 
intensification by pointing to managerial incompetence as a greater cost to the 
economy than lax labour discipline, they were now attacking the administration by 
demanding what seemed conspicuously like greater intensification.108 
The negative integration conceptual scheme of Soviet labour relations could 
presumably explain this odd behaviour of party activists as a result of the subordination 
of the party organisation since the introduction of edinonachalie to the autocratic 
authority of the director. On this view, the counter-plan and interventions from the 
floor could be interpreted as providing political cover for the director, who was after 
all arguing for more modest goals. Such a reading of the activists’ behaviour is 
however difficult to sustain given the account of party-management relations in KP 
presented in this chapter, especially with regard to the fate of the Grachev-led 
administration.  
Instead, it would be more plausible to suggest that the root of this change in rank-
and-file attitudes lies in the shift of the boundaries of industrial politics that was 
effected by the launch of the first FYP. During the late NEP period, when the primary 
objectives of the party’s economic policy were to rationalise production and 
economise on added costs, communist workers had been able to point to the chaotic 
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state of the managerial apparatus as a more pressing problem than truancy or other 
labour discipline weaknesses. This was no longer possible by the time Ots took over 
from Grachev in 1930, as the imperatives of rapid industrialisation left little space for 
rationalising and economising practices. The industrialisation drive had also made 
labour intensification inevitable and opposition to it politically hopeless.  
At the same time however, the FYP had opened new possibilities for worker 
activists. Massive levels of investment made it possible to address long-time structural 
and organisational problems on the shop-floor. By speaking about their potential for 
greater output, party members like Marmel’ were effectively raising the profile of their 
workshops and attracting attention to real problems, like aging equipment in the case 
of the old forge. As well as being detrimental to plan fulfilment, such problems 
affected workers in more immediate ways. Old equipment was prone to stoppages, 
which could severely affect the income of workers on piece rates.109 The often chaotic 
and cluttered state of shop-floors could be and often was a cause of serious, sometimes 
lethal accidents.110 
Bolsunovskii’s call for an expansion of the shock-worker movement, echoed by 
other members in their contributions, can be interpreted in a similar manner. Although 
shock-work was in the last analysis a form of labour intensification, shock-workers 
were entitled to a range of perks and benefits like higher rations and priority access to 
the city’s limited housing stock.111 Thus, Bolsunovskii was able to call for higher 
targets on the basis of greater efforts on the part of workers, while at the same time 
effectively pushing for greater access to very scarce consumer goods. In doing so, he 
was entirely in line with party policy on the shock-work movement which demanded 
that it should eventually embrace all workers.112 
This is highly illuminative with regard to the way in which party organisations 
operated in industrial enterprises like KP. Although composed almost entirely of 
factory workers who as we have seen were very keen to defend their interests, the KP 
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party organisation was not a trade union. That is, it was not an organisation charged 
specifically with protecting the interests of its members in the workplace, as opposed 
to those of management. It was instead a component part of the All-Union Communist 
Party whose stated mission was to lead Soviet society in the transition to communism 
and its task was to oversee this process in the crucial setting of a major industrial 
enterprise. The organisation derived its authority within the factory from this. Its 
influence over management was due to the fact that it was embedded in a hierarchy 
parallel and at every level senior to the state. Furthermore, red directors like Ots owed 
their positions to their party membership and were thus beheld to the party as much as 
to the state economic administration. Because of this, it was essential for factory 
directors to maintain good relations with their party organisations in order to run their 
enterprises and keep their jobs, as demonstrated by the different fates of Grachev on 
the one hand and the directors of ZiS and SiM in Moscow on the other.  
The nature of this institutional arrangement meant that communist workers who 
wanted to exert influence in their workplace had to do so primarily in terms of party 
policy implementation, rather than material demands from management. Nevertheless, 
the specific character of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology of working class power 
ensured that some aspect of party policy could invariably be used by party activists to 
exert pressure on management. The ambiguity of the decree on edinonachalie, which 
sought to increase both managerial authority and responsiveness to workers’ initiatives 
is a case in point. Within the context of the massive industrial expansion of the first 
FYP, ‘bacchanalian planning’113 became an instrument of pressure in the hands of 
party activists who sought to secure better remuneration and working conditions by 
promising greater output.114  
If however the peculiar political ecology of Soviet enterprises placed significant 
constraints upon the power of management, it also set definite limits to the scope and 
nature of acceptable labour activism. For the corollary of politically mediated 
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influence in the workplace was that the very institution acting as the instrument of this 
influence was also responsible for promoting the unpopular aspects of party policy. In 
fact, it seems reasonable to suggest that the relative power of an industrial party 
organisation vis-à-vis the administration depended on the extent to which the 
organisation was successful in mobilising workers’ support for party policy as a 
whole.115 This placed the party’s rank-and-file membership in a rather contradictory 
position, whereby their role as defenders of their fellow workers’ interests was coupled 
with their task of promoting breakneck industrialisation. It was not always possible to 
successfully navigate the complexities of this situation. 
The tension between the demands of the industrialisation drive and the 
immediate interests of workers at the point of production put significant strain on the 
relationship between the party and its constituents. Throughout the First Five Year 
plan period, the KP party organisation faced significant difficulties both in mobilising 
the support of the factory’s workers and in maintaining discipline within its ranks. 
Apart from the perennial problems of labour discipline, party meetings at all levels 
expressed concern about the declining popularity of production conferences as well as 
mass campaigns like the subscription drive for the industrialisation bond. 116 
Complaints about falling wages became a recurring theme in the zapiski of the period 
and there were at least a few cases where the wisdom of rapid industrialisation was 
questioned. 117  Curiously, the evidence suggests that collectivisation attracted 
considerably more negative comments from KP workers than rapid industrialisation, 
reflecting perhaps the growing presence of former peasants amongst the work-force 
and the persistence of ties to the countryside even amongst the factory’s experienced 
workers. Reporting on the results of the CC plenum of November 1929, Sergei Kirov 
received a number of zapiski from the floor, some of which were sharply critical of the 
party’s agricultural policy. One asked if it was true that ‘they are taking every last bit 
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raikom and later gorkom leadership and following his death in 1933 was buried in one of very few 
personal graves in Leningrad’s Field of Mars. Smena, November 1940. 
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of bread from the peasant’ while another asked the regional secretary to explain what 
possible harm could come out of allowing peasants to develop their households.118  
Nevertheless, despite the resentment that the hardships of industrialisation no 
doubt generated amongst significant sections of the rank-and-file, the organisation 
managed to emerge out of this period relatively unscathed. With the exception of some 
relatively high profile episodes like for example an open letter of resignation from the 
party published by two experienced workers who denounced the party’s industrial 
policy, a significant weakening of the organisation’s rank-and-file core does not seem 
to have taken place.119 The purge of 1929, intended among other things to relieve the 
party of members who were not strongly committed to the goals of the socialist 
offensive, made a very small dent on the KP organisation. Of its membership of 3133 
only 143 or less than 5% were expelled. Of these 143, some 47 were automatic 
expulsions, consisting either of those who had consistently failed to attend party 
meetings or let their membership lapse by not paying the required dues. A further 13 
were expelled for drunkenness and 18 for concealing their class background. Even 
assuming then that the remaining 65 were all expelled for open and/or active 
opposition to party policy, they would still make up a mere 2% of the overall 
membership.120  
This small rate of attrition reflects the fact that workers who wished to exert 
influence in their workspace were in a far better position to do so from within the party 
organisation than from the outside. We have already seen how worker-communists 
called on party ideology to draw attention to their concerns and promote their interests 
within factory. Party membership did not however simply provide a rhetorical space 
from which to issue demands. At least since the NEP-era, rank-and-file activists had 
played a central role in resolving the numerous technical problems that came up in the 
production process. As bottlenecks, stoppages and breakdowns multiplied during the 
first FYP, so did the initiatives undertaken by workers in response to these. This period 
witnessed the mushrooming of specific work teams (brigadi) whose task was to 
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resolve such problems. The value of these tug-boating (buksirnie) and turnkey 
(skvoznie) brigades as they came to be known is demonstrated by their official 
incorporation into the shock-worker movement. Although party membership was not 
a requirement for participation in these teams, communists were expected to take a 
leading role in their activities. Very often, party membership came as a consequence 
of active engagement as shock-workers were targeted for recruitment by the party’s 
industrial organisations, sometimes en masse as in the case of KP’s 3rd mechanical 
shop.121 Thus, rank-and-file communists at the time had not only the opportunity to 
express their concerns in terms that were fully within the contours of government 
policy, but also the ability to exert a significant level of control over the labour process, 
by virtue of their role as troubleshooters and problem solvers. There was thus little 
incentive for workers to give up this position in order to pursue a strategy of open 
confrontation with the state. 
 As the FYP drew to a close, the rationalising functions of shock-work brigades 
became more pronounced than the target busting feats they had originally become 
famous for. As the ranks of udarniki expanded to include ever greater numbers of 
workers, the title came to be little more than a formality.122 Despite the authorities’ 
complaints about the phenomenon of pseudo-shock work (lzheudarnichestvo), 
whereby workers not exceeding or even missing their targets got the title of udarnik 
as well as the attendant benefits, the mass expansion of shock-work ended up having 
a positive long-term effect on the development of Soviet industry. As the movement 
grew, the shock-work brigade became synonymous with a stable unit of workers, 
replacing the multitude of forms of labour organisation that Soviet industry had 
inherited from the pre-revolutionary period such as the paternalistic artel’, as well as 
those thrown up during the 1st FYP, like production communes and collectives.123  
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The rationalisation of labour organisation, exertion and remuneration that was 
achieved as a result of the formation of the stable work unit in Soviet enterprises was 
described by one incisive study of Soviet labour relations as a victory for both workers 
and the regime.124 Rank-and-file party activists played a decisive role in making this 
victory possible. At a time of intense social upheaval, communist workers took the 
lead in organising shock-work brigades by recruiting actual or imagined norm-busters 
from their shops. Party members also seized every opportunity to argue that 
disappointing production results were not due to skivers or enemies amongst the 
workers but because of worn equipment, lack of materials and faulty planning, 
responsibility for which was invariably laid at the feet of management. Thus, 
throughout the period of the 1st FYP rank-and-file communists acted as a bridge 
between industrial workers and the state, preventing the opening of a major rift 
between the regime and its core social constituency. This they achieved by using the 
authority of their position to cushion the effects of the state’s policies on themselves 
and their co-workers. This authority derived from the fact that they were themselves 
part of the regime, not only as trusted troubleshooters in the production process, but 
also as the main ideological conduit between the party leadership and the broader 
population. As the main contours of party policy changed with the completion of the 
1st FYP, the nature of rank-and-file activism would also have to adapt. 
 
1.5 Abortive Stabilisation: Stakhanovism and the Second Five Year Plan, 1933-
1937 
If the aim of the 1st FYP had been nothing less than the complete transformation of the 
USSR’s productive base, the 2nd FYP faced the slightly less ambitious but still 
formidable task of bringing the products of the industrialisation drive to bear on 
production. The so called ‘good years’ of Soviet industrialisation saw a relative decline 
in the production of capital goods and armaments and a proportional increase in 
investment in the consumer goods sector. Aiming at the consolidation of the 
achievements of the expansionary development of the preceding period, the party’s 
industrial policy included plans for significant changes to work-place and labour 
                                                 





organisation in order to rationalise the production process. With respect to shop-floor 
level labour relations, the most significant aspect of the party’s industrial policy was 
its renewed emphasis on technical competence and organisational efficiency, which in 
turn implied greater managerial authority and responsibility (edinonachalie) as well as 
the side-lining of some of the more conflictual forms of shop-floor activism, like 
counter-planning, in favour of a tightening of labour discipline. This shift in outlook 
amongst the party leadership had already been signalled by Stalin in an important 
speech to industrial executives delivered in 1931. 125  November 1932 saw the 
introduction of stricter labour legislation, enabling management to dismiss workers for 
one day’s unjustified absence and transferring control of workers’ ration books from 
consumers’ cooperatives to enterprise administrations.126 The resolution passed by the 
CC Plenum of January 1933 formalised the new direction of industrial policy, 
declaring the 2nd FYP to be one of ‘mastering’ (osvoeniia) and ‘organised 
consolidation’ (organizatsionnogo ukrepleniia) of the new enterprises created by the 
previous FYP.127  
At the start of the 2nd FYP then, the party’s industrial policy was returning to the 
main principle of the pre-samokritika era, namely the pursuit of productive efficiency 
through discipline and clear delineation of responsibilities in the workplace. This 
political shift was reflected in the 11th conference of the KP party organisation which 
met on 26 March 1933 to discuss the progress of the factory’s production plan.  
Delivering the main report, the factory director Karl Ots spoke of the 
achievements of KP during the 1st FYP and making use of the new catchword of the 
time, he praised the factory’s tractor and turbine departments for the progress made in 
the ‘mastering’ of new technology. As might be expected however, there were a 
number of problems in production that demanded the organisation’s attention, 
including rising unit costs and the familiar problem of stoppages, which had amounted 
                                                 
125 This listed six new conditions within which Soviet industry was developing and an equal number 
of tasks that needed to be tackled. Amongst these were the limitation of labour turnover, the training 
of technical cadres from the ranks of the working class and importantly, a more conciliatory approach 
to old regime specialists who had demonstrated their loyalty to Soviet power. Pravda, 5 July 1931. 
126 The extent to which this latter provision was an integral part of labour policy or an improvised 
measure in response to the 1932-33 famine has been disputed Robert Beattie, “A ‘Great Turn’ That 
Never Happened: A Reconsideration of the Soviet Decree of Labor Discipline of November 1932,” 
Russian History 13, no. 1 (1986): 235–57, p. 250.  





to 2.9% of worktime for the reviewed period. He went on to single out the metallurgical 
and 1st Mechanical shops as facing particularly challenging tasks regarding the 
organisation of production in the coming period.128 
In contrast to the organisation’s 7th conference of 1931, party members from the 
shops did not attempt to deflect the director’s criticisms by means of a comprehensive 
attack on managerial incompetence. Instead, they focused on the achievements of their 
shops and attributed problems to factors beyond their control. Studenikin, from the old 
forge claimed that the shop had made great steps in combatting the extent of faulty 
output. This, he suggested, was achieved by means of campaigns by the Komsomol 
group of the shop which worked hard to promote orderliness in the workplace and the 
rationalisation of the working day. At the same, time, workers who were producing 
high amounts of brak were brought under the supervision of more experienced 
employees. As a result, it was claimed than in one case, a worker who produced 65kg 
of faulty forged pieces the previous month had since produced no brak.129 
Things in the steel-making shop were going less smoothly. Berlin, a delegate 
from the shop, deflected criticism about the pace of plan fulfilment by pointing out 
that the whole factory experienced supply problems. Stoppages at the shop were due 
to the fact that it was impossible to keep the furnace in constant operation without a 
reliable supply of magnesite. Berlin went on to criticise the bad state of account 
keeping in the factory which made it impossible to produce reliable inventories stating 
bluntly that the extent of useless paper-pushing at KP had become ridiculous (‘do 
smeshnogo dokhodit’). The steel shop representative ended his contribution by 
demanding that Ots make good on his promises to reduce white collar staff and 
warning that if such plans did not go through, it would not be possible to speak of 
victories at the next conference.130 
The morning session of the conference was concluded with a greeting from the 
4th Turkestan Division of the Red Army, delivered by Kasin, a communist KP worker 
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who was then serving at one of the division’s rifle regiments. He then praised the 
military hardware produced by KP and expressed his regret that it had not yet been 
tried in battle. Before leaving the platform, Kasin reminded conference delegates that 
red-soldiers around the country expected Putilovites to fulfil all CC resolutions 
regarding the mastery of technology and the elimination of brak.131  
The conference reconvened for its evening session a few hours after Kasin’s 
greeting. Titov from the turbine department took the floor to report on the progress 
made by the department and respond to some of the criticisms made in its direction by 
members of the administration. Titov claimed than in 1928 prices, productivity at the 
department had risen by 6% while unit costs per turbine had been decreased by 30%. 
In response to comments made by a member of the administration to the effect that the 
turbine department did not ‘pay enough attention’ to its set tasks, Titov returned the 
criticism: 
The leadership of our factory does not take into account the enormous importance 
of turbine production. If you are aware of the state of Leningrad industry … then 
you should know what kind of strain Leningrad’ power stations are currently 
under. You are aware that Moscow power stations were attacked by wreckers and 
this speaks volumes about the importance of our production... Comrade Ots 
suggests that the turbine department should take care of its instruments. But the 
departments is making its own instruments because of the lack of special 
equipment.132  
 
Meiulans, a delegate from the metallurgical department spoke along similar 
lines. Although he accepted that the department had been performing very badly and 
made up a significant part of the factory’s overall brak and losses, he questioned 
whether the factory administration paid enough attention to metallurgy: 
… I must tell comrade Ots, the government and Party have issued a declaration 
calling for a turn to metallurgy but, so far, the administration has not done so. … 
The supply of materials is unsystematic. We only get help from the administration, 
particularly Ots, only when the factory shuts down. Then Ots himself gets this or 
that material necessary for metallurgy.133  
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After a few more contributions and another guest speech by a military officer 
reminding Putilov workers of the significance of the factory for the USSR’s defence, 
Ots took the floor to deliver his conclusive remarks. The director responded personally 
to Titov stating that he protested too much. The turbine department, Ots went on, had 
enough support as demonstrated by its 400 hundred strong administrative apparatus 
and should ‘kindly work’ (izvol’te rabotat’). Responding to Meiulans’s complaints, 
Ots commented that if he turned his face to the metallurgical department, he would be 
turning his back on turbines. He would therefore not turn in any direction but get on 
with work as should every factory department.134  
The resolution passed at the conference was, in the habitual manner, a 
compromise document including references to all problems of factory life that had 
been highlighted during the discussion.135 In this respect, there was nothing particularly 
new about the organisation’s 11th conference. It is this absence of significant change 
however that is of particular interest here, as this grassroots-level continuity was being 
maintained within the context of a significant recalibration of industrial policy. At the 
same time as CC resolutions and the stricter labour legislation enacted by the 
government were signalling a shift towards a more productivist outlook on the part of 
the central leadership, the basic contours of factory-level party politics remained 
essentially the same as they had been since the beginning of the period examined here. 
The red director tried to get communist workers – nominally his comrades, but 
functionally his subordinates – to work harder and get their colleagues to do so too in 
order to meet the factory’s persistently elusive targets. As they had done consistently 
since at least 1926, communists from KP’s shops responded by pointing out that they 
were already working hard enough, accomplishing significant feats in production and 
that whatever problems there were in fulfilling the factory’s production plan were 
either due to economic factors beyond anyone’s control, like the high cost of raw 
materials, or due to managerial incompetence, like bad book-keeping. What had 
changed were the terms in which the rank-and-filers made their case, a process similar 
to that of five years earlier when the launch of the 1st FYP had closed off the possibility 
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of openly opposing labour intensification while at the same time enabling a frontal 
assault on managerial authority through the samokritika campaign. Now, the more 
technocratic orientation of the 2nd FYP period necessitated the moderation of anti-
managerial attitudes and specialist-baiting but also made possible a defence of shop 
interests articulated along the lines of a more business-like focus on achievements and 
possibilities of improvement in production in accordance with the demands of the plan.  
This suggests that regardless of the political winds prevalent at the top, the nature 
of the party organisation as a political space where the conflicting interests of labour 
and management confronted each other remained essentially unchanged. This is 
because this conflict was not predicated upon any of the centre’s political initiatives 
but on the economic realities of a rapid industrialisation drive which even at its most 
moderate pace, put extreme pressure on workers while also making huge demands of 
managerial personnel.136 What could, however, be affected by political initiatives was 
the relative intensity of this conflict on the factory floor. As the good will of the central 
leadership towards administrative staff was heavily dependent on economic 
performance, the truce between management and communist workers was as 
precarious as the sustenance of satisfactory output rates across Soviet industry.  
The remaining years of the 2nd FYP would place this truce under new stress. 
Although a number of economic indicators were improving in 1934, the breakthrough 
in labour productivity expected by the country’s leadership had yet to materialise.137 
The plan foresaw that over 40% of industrial growth for the 1932-37 period would be 
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due to an increase in output per worker, in sharp contrast to the investment-led growth 
of the 1st FYP.138 The persistence of the familiar problems of the Soviet production 
process however cast doubts on the feasibility of such ambitious improvements.139 
Combined with increased pressure from the industrial and defence commissariats for 
more investment, the unsatisfactory pace of labour productivity growth convinced the 
leadership to abandon the financial restraint of the original plan for a significantly 
larger investment budget for 1936.140  
The Stakhanovite movement of super-productive workers emerged within this 
context, less than two months after the politburo meeting on 28 July 1935 had 
approved the new investment plan for the following year. Although Stakhanovism had 
antecedents in the shock-work of the 1st FYP, the initiative for this specific form of 
labour activism seems to have belonged to Konstantin Petrov, the party organiser of 
the Central Irmino mine in the Donbass where Aleksandr Stakhanov performed his 
legendary shift on 2 September.141 The mobilising potential of Stakhanov’s feat was 
quickly grasped by the party leadership who made sure it received maximum publicity 
in the national and regional press. Stakhanovism grew rapidly over the next few 
months and by November 1935, the movement had gained such prestige that the First 
All-Union Conference of Stakhanovite Workers was attended by the full politburo and 
addressed by Stalin. 
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence that Stakhanovism met with at least 
some opposition from the country’s workforce. In his classic study of the movement, 
Lewis Siegelbaum has identified a number of sources for this opposition. Some of 
these, like the perception of Stakhanovites as rate-busters whose activities would end 
up in a general raising of norms, were similar to the causes of opposition to 1st FYP-
era shock-work movement. Unlike shock-work however Stakhanovism emphasised 
technical competence over physical exertion, making aspiring Stakhanovites more 
                                                 
138 Davies and Khlevniuk, ‘Stakhanovism and the Economy’, p. 876. 
139 At KP, the party organisation’s 14th conference held in March expressed concern at the factory’s 
failure to fulfil its plan for February and called all workers to ‘battle against brak’. TsGAIPD, f. 1012, 
op. 2, d. 939, ll. 103-5. 
140 Davies and Khlevniuk, ‘Stakhanovism and the Economy’, p. 874; Mark Harrison and R. W. 
Davies, “The Soviet Military-Economic Effort during the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937),” 
Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 3 (1997): 369–406.. 





dependent than the udarniki on external factors, like the provision of favourable 
working conditions by their superiors and perhaps more importantly, the competent 
performance of auxiliary tasks by their fellow workers. The significance of this is that 
it expanded the pool of potential opponents as auxiliary workers resented the prestige 
and benefits awarded to Stakhanovites for what they saw as a collective effort, while 
most foremen were probably not very keen to take on even more responsibilities in 
order to provide their subordinates with the opportunity to earn sometimes double their 
own salaries.142 This is reflected in the fact that some 50.8% of convictions for anti-
Stakhanovite offenses at regional (oblast’) courts were given to workers and a further 
20% to foremen or brigade leaders while 11% of all convicts were party members.143 
Anti-Stakhanovite offenses ranged from malicious slander to physical violence and 
murder, while potential penalties included anything from probation to capital 
punishment. The extremity of such cases and the fact that offenses against 
Stakhanovites were often driven by motivations irrelevant to Stakhanovism itself 
caution against extrapolating from figures on offenders about the overall reception of 
the movement.144 What is important for this inquiry is that there were good material 
reasons for many workers and foremen to be against Stakhanovism just as there were 
good reasons for many workers to aspire to Stakhanovite status. It was precisely this 
kind of conflict of interests that the presence of the party on the shop floor was meant 
to mediate. 
Indeed, Stakhanovism at the Kirov works does not seem to have become 
immediately popular amongst the party’s rank-and-file. The protocols of a number of 
shop-level party meetings held in the autumn of 1935 suggest that leading communist 
workers were frustrated by their comrades’ underperformance and general lack of 
interest in the movement. At a meeting of the cold-stamping shop organisation, the 
partsec reported that the leading Stakhanovite brigade was that of the kolesniki whose 
foreman was not a communist, while the shop’s trade-union representative complained 
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that some communists had even mocked Stakhanovism.145 The party group of the 2nd 
mechanical shop described the pace of the movement as extremely unsatisfactory and 
instructed its members to popularise Stakhanovism amongst workers by publishing the 
higher earnings of Stakhanovites and work with the shop’s administration to review 
the pay of auxiliary personnel and expand the progressive piece rate system.146 Similar 
concerns were raised at the metallurgical construction shop, with the superintendent 
Kulichkin admonishing communist activists to give Stakhanovism the attention it 
deserved.147 This view of the movement’s predicament was not one shared by all party 
activists. A number of communist workers attending these meetings objected to 
accusations of indifference arguing instead that whatever problems there were in the 
development of Stakhanovism in their shops was, predictably, the fault of their 
superiors. At metallic constructions, Alekseev argued that foremen bore prime 
responsibility for the obstacles faced by Stakhanovism such as the lack of clear pay 
rates and the existence of ‘boring forms’ which put workers off the movement. 
Alekseev further claimed that foremen avoided popularising the movement stating that 
he had been awarded a bonus of 25 roubles for rationalising his work-time but this was 
done ‘somehow secretly, without telling anyone about it’. Another participant at the 
meeting, Bobrov supported Alekseev citing the example of the smith Alekhanov, who 
was not listed as a Stakhanovite despite regularly exceeding production norms. 
Parfenov also expressed agreement with Alekseev arguing that foremen did not 
understand Stakhanovism and were holding it back for fear that if workers exceeded 
production norms, foremen would get fined for overspending their wage budgets.148 
Skokov, a worker of the shop’s second shift, expressed the argument implicit in his 
comrades’ contributions in a more succinct manner stating that ‘the essence of the 
Stakhanovite movement consists in raising the productivity of labour power[…] The 
system of labour remuneration in our department does not stimulate the raising of 
labour productivity’.149  
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Discussion sessions in other shops were conducted along very similar lines, with 
the timidity of foremen and issues of remuneration providing the common theme on 
which the speakers developed their contributions. 150  This peculiar form of buck-
passing is a familiar process that we have observed throughout the period examined so 
far in this chapter. It is worth noting however that this is here taking place at the very 
bottom of the party and factory hierarchies. This not a case of departmental 
representatives defending their shops’ particular interests vis-à-vis the factory 
administration, but of rank-and-file workers negotiating their terms of employment 
with their immediate superiors, a negotiation made possible because of the political 
imperative of supporting the development of Stakhanovism. Less than two months 
after the publication of Stakhanov’s record, party activists at Kirov were already 
warning about what we have already seen were amongst the main constraints on the 
growth of Stakhanovism, the opposition of foremen and auxiliary workers. 151 
Communist workers like Skokov were letting their superintendents know that unless 
they were provided with reasonable working conditions and attractive pay rates, they 
would not be able – or willing – to exceed their production norms and they would 
therefore not achieve Stakhanovite status. As every party member knew from 
experience, such a failure in policy implementation could draw the attention of their 
superiors, themselves reasonably worried about catching the eye of the authorities who 
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even during the most specialist-friendly phase of the 2nd FYP never quite stopped being 
on the lookout for recalcitrant officials.152   
This practice took on a darker dimension as the Stakhanovite year of 1936 was 
succeeded by the mass repression of the Yezhovschchina in 1937. The way this played 
out in the factory will be examined in more detail in the next chapter of this thesis, but 
it would be useful to consider the relationship between Stakhanovism and the 1937 
wave of repression at least briefly here.  
Stakhanovism was launched as an effort to raise the productivity of labour across 
Soviet industry by providing workers with a complex set of material and moral 
incentives in the form of higher wages, improved access to consumer goods, publicity 
and prestige. In this respect, it was substantially similar to efforts to improve 
productivity through labour activism in the 1st FYP. Unlike udarnichestvo however, 
Stakhanovism emerged at a time when specialist-baiting was officially discouraged 
and technical competence was overtaking the ability to ‘storm’ as the defining feature 
of the model worker. As we have already seen however, the mistrust of workers 
towards the administration was not predicated upon the political signals emanating 
from the centre but had been a permanent feature of industrial relations on the factory 
floor at least since the beginning of the period examined here. It was the scale of this 
mistrust, as well as the way in which it could manifest inside the party organisation 
that the political initiatives of the leadership determined.  
This is consistent with the views of a number of scholars who have argued that 
Stakhanovism provided the background to repression in industry by creating multiple 
opportunities for conflict between workers and management, which fed into the waves 
of denunciation that fuelled the terror.153 Following the Union-wide trend, 1937 at the 
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Kirov works saw allegations of blocking Stakhanovite initiatives turn into accusations 
of wrecking and industrial sabotage. During a meeting of the factory’s 3rd mechanical 
shop, a recent promotee named Vetiutnev came under fire for allowing ‘wrecking’ to 
take place in the shop. One Kotliarenko, possibly a raikom instructor, warned party 
members that there were many enemies of the people in their factory and accused 
Vetiutnev of underestimating the threat of wrecking while letting the Stakhanovite 
movement fizzle out without leadership.  Spitsa, a worker who took the floor after 
Kotliarenko, suggested that part of the blame for the shop’s failures should be 
attributed to the factory’s new director, Ter-Asaturov, who having placed Vetiutnev at 
this post did nothing to check up on the shop’s progress. ‘Essentially’, he went on, 
‘willingly or not, everything has been done so that the plan would not be fulfilled’. 
Spitsa finally claimed that nothing had been done to improve the workplace and 
wondered if this was because ‘they’ could not or did not want to do so. His rhetorical 
question elicited a quick response from the floor with an unnamed participant 
interrupting to state in no uncertain terms that it was because they did not want to.154   
Given the account of industrial relations presented in this chapter, it is hardly 
surprising that party members like Spitsa seized the opportunity provided by the 
changing political climate to launch attacks against the administration. What is worth 
noting here however is that, as demonstrated by the shop meetings of October 1935 
discussed above, party activists had already identified the main potential obstacles to 
the then nascent Stakhanovite movement in the usual suspects of bureaucratic 
administrators and foremen at a time when the party leadership was still committed to 
a technocratic orientation in its industrial policy.155  
This suggests that in spite of the promotion of professionalism and managerial 
authority by the leadership for at least a few years, the outlook of rank-and-file party 
members had not changed substantially since the 1st FYP. Much as had been the case 
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with the introduction of edinonachalie into the factory, party members manipulated a 
political initiative which the leadership had hoped would rationalise the work-process 
and raise productivity to improve their position as workers with respect to the 
administration. The technical expertise required to make Stakhanovism work thus 
ended up making it possible to hold experts and foremen responsible for its failures, 
just like the authority bestowed upon directors by edinonachalie ended up making 
them responsible for failures in plan fulfilment.  In both cases, it was the activity of 
communist workers in their capacity as enforcers and troubleshooters of party policy 
that undermined the position of managerial staff and made them targets for the 
authorities. Once the party began looking for wreckers rather than solutions to 
industrial problems, political discourse on the factory floor changed seamlessly from 
allegations of incompetence to accusations of sabotage, as exemplified in Spitsa’s 
statement that consciously or not, as if it made no difference, his shop’s plan was being 
sabotaged.  
The stabilisation of industrial relations that had been amongst the priorities of 
the party’s economic policy for the 2nd FYP thus met a sticky end in 1937 in a violent 
conclusion to a process which, although initiated with benign intent, was badly suited 
to promote industrial peace. In the end, from the workers’ point of view, Stakhanovism 
went much the same way as udarnichestvo, with the ever expanding ranks of the 
movement making Stakhanovite status progressively less meaningful with respect to 
remuneration and benefits.156 In its short heyday however Stakhanovism gave rise to a 
new round of spetseedstvo which, for a different set of reasons, turned bloody. 157 
Undoing the damage this caused would be one of the main themes of the party’s 
industrial policy in the run up to the Second World War. 
 
1.6 Chaos to discipline? 1938-1941 
The end of the Yezhovshchina roughly coincided with the launch of the 3rd FYP in 
1938. The rapidly deteriorating international environment led to an enormous increase 
of the relative weight of the arms industry in the economy, both in terms of investment 
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and labour employment.158 At the same time, the massive expansion of the armed 
forces during this period led to a renewed intensification of the labour shortage that 
had plagued the Soviet industrialisation effort from the beginning.159 
Given these economic realities and the extent to which the repressions of 1937 
had destabilised industrial administration throughout the country induced the party 
leadership to embark once more on a campaign to raise the authority of specialists and 
administrators accompanied by a number of measures to enforce stricter labour 
discipline on the factory floor. As has already been shown in the introduction to this 
chapter, there is consensus amongst labour historians of the Soviet Union that the 3rd 
FYP period saw the introduction of the harshest labour laws to date, culminating in the 
June 1940 law making it illegal to leave one’s job. Whether this was the conclusion of 
a decade-long process of expropriation or the last in a series of desperate and/or 
misguided measures is not amongst the immediate concerns of the final section of this 
chapter, although the evidence and analysis presented here is as previously more in 
line with the latter conclusion.  
Instead, the focus shall remain on the effect of this new policy turn on the activity 
of Kirov’s party organisation. Siegelbaum has argued that the party’s post-1937 
industrial policy represented a closing of ranks with management and a return to ‘the 
status quo ante’.160 This is perhaps true, but as this account has shown, the status quo 
ante at the Kirov works was hardly one where labour discipline reigned and the ground 
shook under the director’s footsteps.161 The previous pro-managerial initiatives of the 
party had had partial success in suppressing some of the most extreme cases of 
industrial strife, but had never really transformed the party organisation into a 
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disciplinary instrument. The evidence suggests that this state of affairs did not change 
substantially after 1937. 
The organisation’s 1st All-Factory conference held over seven days from 19 to 
25 April 1938 is indicative of the limits of the ability of leadership initiatives to 
transform political dynamics on the ground. In line with the resolution of the January 
1938 CC Plenum, one of the main themes of the conference was the denunciation of 
slanderers who had purportedly been responsible for the expulsion of honest 
communists as well as the rehabilitation of their victims. 162  Indeed, Nikolai 
Dmitrievich Es’kov, the former partorg of the 1st mechanical shop who was now the 
organisation’s acting secretary, spent at least a few minutes of his opening contribution 
on this subject.163 Nevertheless, Es’kov insisted that the significant delays in plan 
fulfilment the factory was experiencing yet again were to a large extent due to the 
perfidious activities of a ‘trotskyite-bukharinite gang of fascist agents’ that had been 
allowed to operate by enemies within the partkom, such as the purged former director 
Ter-Asaturov.164 
If the intention of the leadership had been to rebuild the authority of 
administrative personnel and limit the extent of industrial strife, it failed to 
communicate this to the Kirov plant organisation. For although it could be argued that 
rehabilitating a relatively high-profile victim of the purge would have been politically 
difficult, it is harder to explain Es’kov’s attacks on the plant’s new director, Viktor 
Konstantinovich L’vov. The acting secretary went in almost the same breath from 
blaming the disgraced – and executed – Ter-Asaturov for production failures to 
accusing L’vov of not taking decisive measures to improve a series of problems he 
was perfectly aware of.165  
Es’kov’s criticisms were relatively mild however in comparison to the attack 
launched against L’vov and other members of the administration by a rank-and-file 
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member named Fedorova. Fedorova made a caustic, lengthy speech in which she 
accused by name several members of the administration of demonstrating 
inappropriate lifestyles and questionable uses of socialist property. It is worth quoting 
at some length:  
‘Let’s take for example the use of our light transport. Things there are like, I do 
not want to say there exists still the Ter-Asaturov method, but our method is 
similar to the old method.  […] Our ZiS cars are assigned to engineers etc. but 
they are mainly used by their wives and families. Zal’tsman’s wife lives opposite 
the House of Soviets and we know that one hour of such a car costs 80 roubles. 
Well just before the New Year she used the car for four hours in order to go round 
every market to find herself a fir tree. I think that we should take into account here 
that we do not elect engineers to the Party Committee in order to give such 
examples to the non-partyists who are observing us. […] And yourself comrade 
L’vov. When we elected a new partkom we screened everyone carefully. Ter-
Asaturov turned out to be an enemy of the people. He spent 160,000 roubles of 
the public purse to decorate his apartment. And L’vov’s wife calls a car and our 
enterprise pays the driver’s overtime. […] And then you can see cases like for 
example N. V. Volkov, whose heart bleeds about work, he asks for a car to get 
him to Smolny to sort out fuel supply problems, and they tell him that all the cars 
are assigned. Turns out there are no cars for such cases but there are for wives. 
[…] You get decent salaries, hire a taxi and drive your wives around. […] This is 
nothing to laugh about comrades and if it isn’t wrecking then, at the very best, it 
is bad management. […] And our party committee says that there must be pure 
samokritika without fear or favour. Well then, wherever you look, disgraceful 
things are happening.166  
 
Although other speakers’ contributions were not as vitriolic as Fedorova’s, she 
was far from alone in expressing disapproval of managerial behaviour. What is more, 
notwithstanding the several outbreaks of laughter amongst the audience recorded by 
the stenographer, it is unlikely that the engineers and administrators attacked by 
Fedorova viewed the parallels she drew between their behaviour and that of their 
recently departed predecessors as attempts at humour. After all, the acting head of the 
partkom had also warned the director against neglecting his duties, a point he reiterated 
responding to a zapiska during his concluding remarks a few days later.167 
In line with the all-Union trend, accusations of wrecking became rarer after 
1938. However, although conflicts between workers and industrial cadres became non-
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lethal in their intensity, they did not go away reverting instead to the familiar manner 
of buck-passing and mutual accusations of incompetence.168 
This detente notwithstanding however, there are strong indications that 
managerial authority at Kirov remained severely constrained and had hardly recovered 
its pre-Stakhanovite level by 1941. By 1939 the Kirov works had once more a new 
director in Isaac Moiseevich Zal’tsman the former head engineer of the factory who 
had been a subject of Fedorova’s criticism a year earlier.169 Zal’tsman’s administration 
came under intense scrutiny during a rare stenographed session of the partkom that 
took place on 25 September 1939 on the subject of a recent fire in one of the factory’s 
warehouses. 170  Zal’tsman’s contribution to the meeting was limited to a short 
introductory speech in which he affirmed that fire safety was a ‘cardinal matter of 
factory work’.171 Following this Vladimir Drabkin, the zavkom chair, invited the head 
of the factory’s fire brigade, Iushkov, to report on the incident. Iushkov prefaced his 
report by stating that he along with the trade union group (proforganizatsiia) had tried 
to put pressure on administrators that ‘did not implement our measures’ and had even 
brought that matter to the attention of the NKVD.172 He then went on to give a detailed 
account of the fire’s development and after rejecting a number of possible scenarios 
left open the possibility of sabotage.173 The members of the committee who spoke after 
Iushkov, including the secretary, vice secretary and a superintendent who had been 
assigned to investigate the issue, all agreed that sabotage was the most likely cause of 
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the fire.174 Drabkin then suggested that the supervision of the implementation of safety 
measures be assigned to himself personally. The partkom accepted his self-nomination 
and went on to pass a resolution criticising the factory administration for ‘not devoting 
sufficient attention’ to the factory’s water supply, ‘despite repeated warnings from the 
partkom’.175  
Whether the matter was pursued further is unclear, but Zal’tsman remained in 
his post reflecting the by then much more benign attitude of the state towards industrial 
cadres. What is interesting about this episode however is that it also demonstrates the 
extent to which the party’s function as an instrument of political control persisted even 
during a time when the party leadership was signalling and effecting a pro-managerial 
line. Despite this political turn at the top, the immediate response of the partkom to a 
potentially important problem was to blame the administration. For Drabkin, this was 
also an opportunity to raise his profile as well as that of the zavkom, usually thought 
of as the weak part of the ‘triangle’ of Soviet enterprises). That the partkom secretary 
at the time was a CC organiser (partorg TsK) Vladimir Stepanovich Efremov may or 
may not have moderated the attack on Zal’tsman but Efremov himself said nothing in 
the director’s defence, instead joining in the criticism of the other members.176 This 
was hardly a resolute defence of edinonachalie. 
A few months later, Zal’tsman’s status within the factory would suffer a further 
blow when the organisation’s 2nd all-factory conference, held in February 1940, did 
not elect him to the new partkom despite his candidacy.177 The election took place after 
two days of discussion in which remarkably little was said about labour discipline 
despite the conference taking place a mere week after the Red Army Winter War 
breakthrough of 11 February. Although the factory’s obligations towards the war effort 
figured prominently in Efremov’s main report, the problems he identified in 
production were primarily organisational in nature and therefore easily framed as 
administrative failures.178 Thus Buter, the open-hearth shop delegate who took the 
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floor immediately after the secretary could complain: “We are so close to the front, 
but we have stoppages because of the lack of mazut oil, despite there being some in 
the factory.” 179  Babaev, the secretary of the party bureau of the 2nd mechanical 
department went a bit further, saying that “comrade Zal’tsman is a young director, he 
needs to be helped at work. For this reason it was necessary to demonstrate the 
director’s shortcomings…Not a word was said about him…Comrade Efremov will 
have to speak about this in his closing remarks.”180 A similar note was struck by a 
tractor department delegate, Vinokur, who accused both Zal’tsman and Efremov of 
never visiting his shop.181 
If the anti-managerial contributions of the speakers on the first day of the 
conference could be attributed to their possible detachment from the political 
mainstream as very busy people engaged in war-time production, or even to the 
organisation’s internal political dynamics, the same could not be said for the 
intervention of the raikom secretary Iakov Fedorovich Kapustin, a native KP worker 
who had been promoted to party work and served as partkom secretary in 1938-9.182 
Kapustin criticised Zal’tsman’s ‘method’ and admonished Efremov that a CC 
organiser should closely supervise (sledit’ za) the director of such an important 
enterprise.183 Using rhetoric that was indistinguishable from that of the decade-old 
samokritika campaign and too much applause from the floor, Kapustin added:  
We must sweep all of our departments with a party broom. Comrades say that… 
the system is too cumbersome, there are many spongers of various kinds, many 
inspectorates, who do nothing, but get money. Is it not time then to go through the 
whole apparatus with a party broom and clean out (povichistit’) people who get 
money illegally?... For this is a disgrace – the office has turned into its own kind 
of department, with a superintendent, a deputy and a ZiS car. Shouldn’t we go 
round these departments and clear out some people from there with an iron party 
broom?184  
 
With this being the political tone of the conference, it is not difficult to see why 
Zal’tsman would fail to get elected to the committee. It is however harder to explain 
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why a member of the raikom would actively incite anti-managerial feelings by making 
such a contribution at a time generally seen as the apogee of Soviet industrial 
authoritarianism. It may be that Kapustin’s long past as a worker in the factory had 
made him inclined to take a hard line against the administration when problems arose. 
If this were so, then his was by no means an isolated case as many low ranking 
apparatchiki of the time had spent considerable time as workers at the bench.  
It is however unlikely that Kapustin would act purely on the basis of his personal 
views if he knew them to be at odds with party policy. It seems more plausible to 
suggest that in fact, his actions were fully in line with what was expected of him and 
others in his capacity. For although the leadership did want to tighten labour discipline 
and restore managerial authority after 1937 it never seemed to think of party activism 
as being counterproductive to this goal. As late as February 1941, the 18th VKP (b) 
conference sough to expand party control over industry by creating new secretarial 
posts at the city and regional levels to oversee specific industrial sectors. At the same 
time, it instructed party organisations to establish “permanent control over the work of 
enterprises” and “increase the masses’ labour activism in every possible way” while 
also expanding socialist competition.185 The CC proceeded to call for a new Union-
wide competition on 16 June 1941.186 
Even then on the eve of the Great Patriotic War the party leadership remained 
firm in its conception of party activism as complementary to its objective of 
establishing order within industry. Kapustin’s behaviour becomes more 
comprehensible in this light. If the enterprise was lagging behind in its production plan 
(which it was) and if Kapustin’s task was to remedy this by, among other things, 
inducing the party organisation to be more active in its involvement in production 
matters, there was no better way to do this than by attacking management for taking 
advantage of its privileges while also doing a bad job. For the past fifteen odd years, 
greater party involvement had meant precisely that.  
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Combined with the heightened labour shortage, the persistence of party 
sanctioned activism on the shop-floor after successive political – and some physical – 
blows to managerial authority made the enforcement of labour discipline an uphill 
struggle. Zal’tsman’s contribution to the Kirov plant organisation’s 3rd conference held 
in May 1941 is indicative of the extent to which this was the case at this major factory.  
Zal’tsman began his report by going over some familiar problems like stoppages 
and the practice of fake Stakhanovism, citing the case of one shop which had 
purportedly recorded more than 500 Stakhanovite records in one day.187 He then went 
on to touch on labour discipline problems in a curiously roundabout way, beginning 
by offering an apology about his past rudeness and pledging to take into account the 
criticism he had received on that score. This, Zal’tsman suggested, was a matter of 
culture and in order to get better at it, he would require help from the organisation. 
“Help”, went on the director, “I consider to be the following: our factory needs to pay 
more attention to questions of discipline… order and implementation.”188  
This was the most Zal’tsman was willing to insist on the priority of raising labour 
discipline. In fact, the director went on to say that while truancy was a problem, it was 
mostly one caused by the inexperience of new recruits, who should not be treated too 
harshly. 189  Zal’tsman went as far as to warn against “overcautiousness” 
(perestrakhovka), citing examples of honest workers who had been referred to the 
authorities for minor or inadvertent breaches of the June 1940 labour law.190  
Thus, less than two months before the German invasion of the USSR, the director 
of one of the country’s most strategically important enterprises was still far from the 
fearsome figure which some of the most authoritarian industrial executives had hoped 
for at the start of the 2nd FYP. 
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This chapter began with a review of the historiography on Soviet industrial relations 
during the interwar period. It is now possible to revisit this discussion in light of the 
account given above. As this account has shown, the party’s industrial policy during 
this period moved in a broadly cyclical fashion between the two extremes of mass 
activism exemplified by samokritika and military-like industrial discipline 
culminating in the June 1940 law. Thus, the regime of economy was followed by the 
campaign of samokritika and the shock-work movement, which in turn gave way to an 
attempt to re-establish order in the workplace after the completion of the 1st FYP. This 
came to an end with the promotion of the Stakhanovite movement of record-breaking 
leading to a re-emergence of specialist-baiting which then merged into the blood-
letting of 1937. During the period 1938-1941, the party’s industrial policy again 
assumed a disciplinarian character, seeking partly to undo some of the damage done 
in 1937 but also responding to the imperatives of a rapidly deteriorating international 
situation. 
A long tradition of scholarship has interpreted these developments as milestones 
of a process of class struggle between Soviet workers and the regime, one which the 
latter decisively won in 1940. The problems of this interpretation were discussed in 
the introduction to this chapter but should by now be much clearer. For as the KP/Kirov 
case demonstrates, far from acting as an instrument of labour discipline, the party 
organisation, one of the pillars of the regime, was the main institutional obstacle to the 
consolidation of managerial control in Soviet industrial enterprises. Throughout the 
period examined here, communist workers and party full timers acted as an opposition 
to the administration on the factory floor, whether in the form of deflecting managerial 
demands for labour intensification or demanding adjustments to wage policy. When 
tensions ran high, some were not above making thinly veiled threats of violence.  
As we have seen, this peculiar form of politics took place at all levels of the 
organisation from the shop to the partkom. Significantly, the basic pattern of party 





promotions, purges and shifts in central policy. 191  At the Kirov works, party 
conferences remained critical, if not suspicious, of the director and parts of the 
administration even as ITR staff came to outnumber workers from the bench as 
delegates towards the end of the 3rd FYP.192 Indeed, it seems that the KP/Kirov party 
organisation was at its most pro-managerial when it was headed by Ivan Gaza in the 
late NEP period. There are good reasons for this. By the late 1930s, a lot of the full-
time party workers and low-ranking industrial cadres had until recently themselves 
been working at the bench and therefore probably maintained personal relations with 
rank-and-file workers. In fact, both the director of the factory and the secretary of its 
district were former Kirov workers, by the time the decade came to a close. What is 
more, being seen to be fighting their shop’s corner at all-factory meetings would 
probably have made foremen and technicians more popular amongst their workers, 
which in turn would have made it easier for them to do their jobs. Even more so if they 
won concrete concessions like extra materials or funds.  
Significantly, this state of affairs was in line with official policy. The party’s 
central leadership not only abandoned its disciplinary policies periodically for 
campaigns of labour activism, but insisted on qualifying even its most authoritarian 
decrees with calls for the party to whip up mass activism. They simply never saw the 
two as mutually exclusive. This would seem to lend validity to Kotkin’s thesis of 
positive integration. For if the regime had rendered opposition impossible and workers 
participated in its initiatives as expected, does that not mean that workers defined their 
interests in line with the political priorities of the regime?  
Not quite so. If we take at face value the contents of the party’s policy documents 
and the pronouncements of its leaders, it would seem that they genuinely believed that 
greater workplace discipline could be achieved at the same time as and as a result of 
greater workplace activism. But although party members did act according to party 
policy by taking an interest in matters of production, the result was not a well-ordered 
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workplace but the transformation of plan fulfilment and resources allocation inside the 
factory into matters of political contention. The reasons for this are obvious. In 
conditions of extreme scarcity and “taut planning” the general interest of enterprise-
wide plan fulfilment diverged significantly from the interests of particular shops, as it 
did from the interest of workers to conserve their labour power.  
There was however an important way in which party activism served the 
regime’s interests. By making it possible for state directives to be moderated in 
practice and providing opportunities for promotion as well as limited control over the 
production process, industrial party organisations played an important role in 
preventing a catastrophic collapse of relations between workers and the state during 
the worse periods of the industrialisation drive. Overall, cases such as the Teikovo 
strike wave were exceptional. 
This view has much in common with Straus’s account of parallel integration. 
However, although I agree that the ability of workers to carve out a niche in the system 
was a fundamental feature of the interwar Soviet labour relations, I have tried to show 
that the primacy assigned by Straus to Red Directors in the formation of this social 
contract is not possible to sustain given their high turnover at the not atypical in this 
respect case of KP/Kirov. It was the institutional framework of the party organisation 
rather than the shrewdness of directors that made possible the containment of industrial 
strife and consequently, the completion of the industrialisation process. 
This had important implications. As stressed earlier in this chapter, the party 
organisation was not a trade union and the workers who joined the party in order to 
strengthen their position in the workplace took on a number of other responsibilities 
in doing so. Not least among these was taking part in internal party life, from the major 









2. Conflict, Purges and Administration: Politics on the factory floor 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Grassroots participation in interwar Soviet politics has been most commonly 
examined within the conceptual framework of the “politics of mobilisation”, that is 
with respect to attempts on the regime’s part to whip up support for its policies by 
involving broad swathes of the population in mass political campaigns surrounding 
specific policy objectives, themselves often the focus of intense factional struggles at 
the top.1 The intention, often realised, was both to crowd out grassroots opposition and 
to extend the regime’s reach beyond that of the executive organs of the state. Because 
of this methodological approach, most of the literature on the activist dimension of 
Soviet politics has tended to focus on specific cases of mass mobilisation as aspects – 
albeit central – of broader political developments.2 As a result, although there is now 
a significant volume of work on the impact of grassroots participation on processes 
ranging from the mid-1920s opposition struggles to the Moscow trials and the ensuing 
terror, there is considerably less work on the institutional parameters that made such 
input possible by inducing and sustaining popular mobilisation. Thus, while grassroots 
involvement in specific campaigns has been studied in great detail, the continuities 
and caesurae between these have seen less light. This is because mobilisation is viewed 
primarily as a one-way, top-down process whereby the centre switched on mass 
activism in order to facilitate the implementation of certain policies. Thus, the 
conditions within which such mobilisations took place are viewed only as facilitators 
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or limiting factors to the success of such campaigns. A prime example of this is the 
literature on the social dimensions of mass repression in Soviet factories. Scholars like 
Wendy Goldman, Roberta Manning and Robert Thurston have argued convincingly 
that the rapid spread of repression through industrial enterprises in the mid-1930s was 
fuelled by social tensions generated by the still recent rapid industrialisation drive.3 
The account offered here is not inconsistent with this view, but it goes a step further 
arguing that the primary party organisation provided the institutional framework that 
made possible the process described by Goldman and other proponents of this view. 
That is, the PPO was a necessary condition for the transformation of industrial tensions 
into political repression.  
The purpose of this chapter is to show that although the major policy initiatives 
of the central leadership certainly relied on mobilising grassroots communists, the 
party rank-and-file was not a politically inert mass waiting to be activated from above. 
Every new political directive that reached the KP/Kirov PPO found it in an already 
rather mobilised state, most often engaged in troubleshooting issues relating to the 
factory’s production plan. The renewed flurry of activism that ensued then left its own 
mark on the subsequent workings of the organisation, which in turn determined the 
way the next directive would be received. This dialectical interplay between the world 
of factory politics and the party’s large-scale political campaigns will be the main 
subject of the discussion that follows. 
The following pages will examine the function of the KP/Kirov plant party 
organisation as an instrument of mobilisation and channel of participation in the 
political campaigns of the post-1925 interwar period. The focus will be on those 
initiatives of party policy that were not directly related to industrial production and did 
not therefore concern the organisation’s members as factory employees but as 
communist citizens of the Soviet Union. It will be shown that the political-
organisational framework of the primary party organisation made successive waves of 
mobilisation possible by rendering the party’s abstract political campaigns and remote 
leadership disputes relevant to the rank-and-file membership through the same 
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medium it legitimated their concerns in the workplace, namely the ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
 
2.2 Return to the mainstream 
The Leningrad Party Organisation was at the centre of the factional struggle that took 
place at the XIV Party Congress in December 1925, providing the organisational 
power base for the group allied to Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev who sought to 
challenge the CC majority line.4 Within the LPO, the heavily industrial Moskovskii-
Narvskii district where Krasnii Putilovets was located was one of the hotbeds of 
oppositionist activity, with the raikom secretary A. D. Sarkis being amongst the most 
ardent critics of CC policy.5 
There were good reasons for this. Although the importance of the defeat of the 
New Opposition in the process of Stalin’s ascendance to political supremacy has 
concentrated scholarly interest onto the implications of the affair for central politics, 
there are strong reasons to suggest that the origins of this factional fight lay in the 
tensions generated by the party’s New Economic Policy and that the central role 
Leningrad played in the events was due to more than Zinoviev’s control of the northern 
capital’s party organisation.6  
By the time the crisis came to a head in late 1925, the NEP had succeeded in its 
immediate aims of staving off economic collapse and repairing relations between the 
Bolshevik government and the country’s vast rural population. The success of the NEP 
had however come at the cost of growing social stratification in both city and 
countryside while economic growth was primarily concentrated in light industry, 
casting doubts on the country’s industrialisation prospects and alienating the party’s 
proletarian support base. Several years after the revolution, the market conditions of 
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the NEP meant that industrial enterprises that could not secure the funds necessary to 
remain in operation had to either go out of business or be leased to the private sector, 
with roughly a third of these returning to their pre-revolutionary owners.7 
Being one of the country’s most industrialised areas, Leningrad experienced the 
side-effects of the NEP particularly acutely. KP faced closure on two separate 
occasions in 1923 and 1924, as the enormous enterprise accounted for some 90% of 
the regional machine-building trust’s debt while operating at less than 5% capacity.8 
In September 1925, the party secretary of KP Aleksandr Aleksandrov reported to the 
regional secretary and prominent oppositionist Piotr Zalutskii that the insufficient 
growth rate of the factory was a “serious danger” with respect to the political moods 
of its workforce. 9  There were thus strong reasons for Leningrad’s rank-and-file 
communists to rally behind a political programme attacking the purported retreat from 
socialist principles represented by the NEP and in favour of an expansionist economic 
policy oriented towards the development of heavy industry. 
Realising that the roots of the rebellion in the LPO went deeper than Zinoviev’s 
political ambitions, the CC majority tailored its response to address the concerns of 
the rank-and-file even as it moved to neutralise the leaders of the opposition. 
Prominent members of the party leadership, including Viacheslav Molotov, Klim 
Voroshilov and the future regional secretary Sergei Kirov, toured the city’s enterprises 
addressing mass meetings of worker communists in order to affirm the party’s 
commitment to industrial expansion and win the organisations back from the 
opposition.10 The extraordinary conference of the LPO that followed the defeat of the 
opposition was addressed by Felix Dzerzhinskii and Nikolai Bukharin, who both 
sought to reassure the delegates by promising an increased pace of industrialisation. A 
few months later, in April 1926, Stalin himself would make a rare visit to Leningrad 
to report on the USSR’s economic state to an LPO aktiv meeting. The New Opposition 
crisis had thus brought home to the party leadership that a disgruntled rank-and-file 
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could act as a launching board for opposition factions. In order to prevent the re-
emergence of similar problems in the future, the new regional leadership in Leningrad 
sought to rebuild trust between the centre and the LPO’s mass membership, refraining 
from a punitive treatment of the oppositionists. Greater political engagement and 
ideological astuteness on the part of the rank-and-file were instead declared to be the 
only available means to prevent future factionalism, prompting the gubkom bureau led 
by Kirov to make the promotion of party activism one of the top priorities of its work 
in 1926.11 
Having been heavily involved in the clash between the CC and the LPO, the 
party organisation at KP now became a focus of the new leadership’s policy of 
rehabilitation through political mobilisation.12 Ivan Gaza, an old Putilov worker and 
former Red Army commissar who had consistently opposed the Zinovievites 
throughout the crisis became the new secretary and quickly set to work reorienting the 
organisation towards the political mainstream.13 
The first major party meeting held under Gaza’s leadership was an expanded 
joint session of the bureau with its shop-level equivalents, shop-section organisers, 
communist foremen and trade-union activists that took place on 9 February 1926, one 
day before the LPO’s extraordinary conference. Attended by 306 members, the first 
meeting of the factory’s new leadership had been called to review and discuss ways to 
remedy the effects of the factional struggle that had shaken the organisation.14 As 
shown in the previous chapter, what had been intended as the first step towards a return 
to normality in the factory’s party life, quickly descended into a row between the 
administration and party activists from the shops as each side tried to blame the other 
for declining labour discipline. It is worth briefly revisiting this event here because it 
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is indicative of the way in which the party organisation remained a political institution 
imbued with Marxist-Leninist ideology even as it functioned as a space of contestation 
for competing interests on the factory floor. 
Gaza spoke first, declaring that the main task before the organisation was the 
rebuilding of party discipline, which had suffered as a result of the factional conflict. 
This was seconded by Anushenko, a communist from the iron constructions shop, who 
argued that shop-level party work had taken a particularly hard hit during the crisis, as 
unruly young party members “had been walking all over their shop cells”.15 It was in 
this context that zavkom members argued that communists in the shops should become 
more active in bringing workers’ grievances to the committee’s attention, to which 
many of those present responded by arguing that such grievances were the fault of the 
administration. Some of them however went further than simply passing the buck to 
management. Nazimov, from the wagon shop, cautioned against the administration’s 
purported slackness and then went on to argue that factory security had to be tightened, 
as there were people who were trying to take advantage of the situation to cause 
trouble. This comment was made in relation to some fires that had recently broken out 
on factory grounds, which the director Grachev conceded as reflective of lack of 
adequate security measures but not of integrity on the administration’s part. While 
other speakers went on to criticise the administration on pay and related issues, 
Gubanov, a communist from the instrument making shop chose to remain on the 
security theme. Gubanov stated that former White Army officers and generals had 
been discovered at Krasnii Treugol’nik, another one of Leningrad’s iconic factories. 
He went on to muse if it would not be a good idea to investigate if the same was true 
for KP as well, concluding that it was “necessary to shake-up” all of the factory’s 
staff.16 
The meeting seems to have concluded on an uncertain tone, with Gaza reiterating 
that rebuilding party discipline was a task of paramount importance but without any 
concrete measures being agreed on. At first glance, the way the meeting played out 
seems to fit very well with the analysis offered in the previous chapter. The first formal 
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meeting of the new leadership of the party organisation was overwhelmed by the 
internal contradictions of factory life, as communists from the shops attacked the 
administration and the discussion was derailed from the original issue of rebuilding 
party discipline to problems like adequate remuneration for stoppages.  
While this is true however, it is also necessary to add an extra layer of analysis 
here in order to fully account for the content of the some of the speakers’ contributions. 
For although “the politics of production” are definitely at play in Grachev’s defence 
of the administration and the shop communists’ criticisms of its performance, it is 
harder to draw such a conclusion from the suspicions expressed by Gubanov regarding 
the presence of counterrevolutionaries in the factory, especially given his conclusion 
that all of KP’s staff needed a shake-up. It would instead be more plausible to read the 
security concerns expressed by some of the speakers as reflective of the fact that for 
all its preoccupation with the minutiae of production, the party organisation remained 
a political institution. As stressed in the previous chapter, the party was not a trade-
union and although worker communists used their membership to press their 
workplace concerns, they did not necessarily do so in bad faith and were thus not any 
less communist for it. The corollary of this is that even issues that were not directly 
related to industrial relations within the enterprise could attract the attention of militant 
activists like Gubanov. In this particular case it seems that only a few years after the 
end of the Civil War, the confusion generated within the organisation by the political 
crisis of the New Opposition had made some party members feel that the factory was 
vulnerable to the machinations of counterrevolutionaries. Thus, more than a decade 
before the Yezhovshchina, grassroots party members were interpreting in terms of 
sabotage what was most likely an accident due to lax fire safety measures. Such an 
outlook however had not at that time become prevalent amongst the party leadership 
itself and on that occasion, Gaza closed the meeting by urging his comrades to rebuild 
the organisation by promoting party discipline, rather than vigilance.17  
In line with the policy adopted by the new regional leadership, such discipline 
had less to do with persecuting the remnants of the opposition than with the more 
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mundane task of promoting a modicum of organisational culture amongst the 
membership, still overwhelmingly composed of recent recruits.18 Thus, of the eleven 
disciplinary cases reviewed by the organisation’s conflict commission on 17 March, 
six were about lost party cards.19 The remainder concerned internal squabbles as well 
as accusations of “careerism” and corruption, as in the case of Ivan Balashov, a 
storekeeper accused by the main factory store bureau of not informing the organisation 
of his criminal convictions for bribe-taking, blackmail and theft of evidence.20 None 
of the cases reviewed had any connexion to the events of the preceding winter, or to 
any subsequent oppositionist activity.  
The promotion of party discipline with respect to organisational matters seems 
to have remained the primary political concern of the party at KP for most of the 
remainder of 1926. Low meeting attendance and high levels of arrears in party dues 
emerged as major issues in the organisation’s general assembly held on 27 May. 
According to Gaza, the organisation had only collected 60% of subscription dues in 
March and 56.3% in April. Similarly, the shop bureau re-election campaign that had 
taken place after the organisation withdrew its support for the opposition had only been 
attended by 65% of the membership, although this was apparently an improvement on 
past performance.21  Similar concerns were expressed by the raikom bureau during a 
review of the performance of some of KP’s shop-level party organisers held in August. 
The higher party organ deemed the work of the organiser of the open hearth furnace 
shop party group Morozov to be “very weak”, demanding “decisive measures against 
disciplinary offences” like unexcused absences and delays in the payment of 
subscription dues. Ivanov, a party activist from the tractor department was also 
criticised for failing to keep good attendance records, despite the rest of his work 
having been “satisfactory”.22 
Despite the repeated complaints about the state of party work expressed by the 
leadership at both the enterprise and the district level, things do not actually seem to 
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have been so bad in every shop. The wagon shop organisation for example held regular 
meetings throughout the year, with an average attendance by members and candidates 
of around 66%, as well as regular though fluctuating presence by non-members. 
Although perhaps being an exception in that regard, the wagon shop party group had 
by May 1926 collected 90% of its members’ subscription dues.23 Its activities included 
presentations followed by discussion on a variety of topics ranging from the perennial 
problems of production to more abstract issues like the state of the worker-peasant 
alliance and the international political situation. Throughout the year, the group seems 
to have also conducted its organisational affairs in a more or less orderly manner 
managing to hold a smooth re-election of its bureau in January and elect other officer-
bearers in subsequent months. 24   These are hardly disappointing results for an 
organisation composed predominantly of new recruits of overwhelmingly low 
education levels and that the leading cadres of the organisation found them substandard 
is more reflective of the importance they attached to the task of party building rather 
than the performance of the rank-and-filers.25 
It should not be surprising that the KP organisation focused on party building 
while devoting little time to the events of the winter crisis. Both the CC and the new 
regional leadership had resolved that the factional activity of the opposition had 
become possible because of demagogic exploitation of legitimate grievances amongst 
the party’s rank-and-file by Zinoviev and his allies. Having neutralised the opposition 
organisationally, it had become possible for CC loyalists to begin to remedy the 
problems that were the source of its political legitimacy. By making rank-and-file 
communists more politically astute – or “conscious” in the parlance of the time – 
Bolshevik leaders expected to make them less susceptible to similar demagogy in the 
future. A satisfactory level of political awareness could in the spirit of Marxism-
Leninism only be gained by getting party members fully involved in the every-day life 
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of the organisation, through participating in meetings and actively promoting party 
policy amongst their fellow workers. This was also a necessary component of the 
party’s response to the economic problems at the root of the crisis. The 14th Congress 
had resolved to step up the development of heavy industry and the Regime of Economy 
adopted in April 1926 was a measure in this direction which required the collaboration 
of the party’s grassroots activists in order to become operative. Raising the rank-and-
filers’ level of political awareness was thus expected to make them both less 
susceptible to the pernicious views of the opposition and more capable of putting to 
practice the party’s plans for economic development. As shown previously however, 
the smooth compliance of shop-floor activists with the measures of the Regime of 
Economy was hardly a foregone conclusion and there was certainly no direct relation 
between such cooperation and more party activism, as the latter could just as soon be 
channelled into passing the blame for economic failures, rightly or wrongly, onto the 
administration.  
Thus, for most of 1926, the KP party organisation was kept busy with the task 
of getting its apparatus in working order and raising the political activity of its 
members while also attempting, usually without much success, to prevent it from 
getting in the way of plan fulfilment. Things would start to change toward the end of 
the year, as party unity was once again shaken by the emergence of a new challenge 
to the CC, this time from the combined forces of the Zinoviev-Kamenev bloc and their 
erstwhile opponent Leon Trotsky, who along with the remnants of the pre-NEP 
Workers’ Opposition and Democratic Centralists came together to form what came to 
be known as the United Opposition.26  
The alliance of these former political opponents against the CC majority was 
first announced at a joint session of the CC and Central Control Commission in July 
1926 which, among other business, expelled Zinoviev from the Politburo on the charge 
that he had continued his factional activities following his defeat at the 14th Congress, 
exploiting his position as chair of the Comintern to build support among foreign 
communist parties while also building parallel organisations with the intention of 
                                                 





establishing a second party in the Soviet Union. 27  Possibly in response to this 
development, Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky expressed regret about their past 
political differences. 28  The renewed crisis lasted for more than a year, until the 
oppositionists suffered a final defeat at the 15th Congress which voted to expel the 
“active leaders of the Trotskyist opposition” from the party.29 
Employing similar political tactics to that of the preceding winter, the revived 
opposition attacked the CC majority on the grounds that its general line served the 
interests of the NEP-bourgeoisie and the rural kulaks at the expense of the working 
class, therefore compromising the country’s path to socialism. This critique was 
supplemented by charges of organisational malfeasance to the effect that CC loyalists 
prevented the oppositionists from airing their views.30  
Sergei Kirov addressed both of these issues when he visited KP on 4 August to 
report on the decisions of the July CC plenum. The gubkom secretary spoke on the 
familiar problems of the NEP-era and defended party policy by arguing that the 
extensive operation of private capital in the economy did not pose a threat to the state-
owned, socialist industrial sector. Then, responding to the oppositionists’ protests 
regarding their treatment by the CC majority, Kirov went on to ridicule Zinoviev’s and 
Kamenev’s political about-turn in allying with Trotsky and adopting the political 
positions they had fought him over in 1923.31 Interestingly, contributions from the 
floor were largely confined to the second theme of Kirov’s report. Grigoriev spoke in 
favour of the opposition demanding more intra-party democracy and greater rights for 
oppositionists to present their views. Kodatskii responded by recognising that there 
were differences of opinion within the party but went on to warn against the “formation 
of grouplets”.32 Finally, Kirillov expressed zero tolerance for factionalism stating that 
he and other workers from the bench demanded “a monolithic party”.33 
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Tensions between the opposition and the CC majority remained high throughout 
the autumn of 1926.  On the first day of October, Pravda led with an article which 
inverted the opposition’s criticisms, accusing its members of undermining the 
country’s socialist prospects by breaking ranks just at the time that economic 
restoration had been achieved and the party was about to embark on the construction 
of socialism proper.34 A month later, the 15th all-union party conference condemned 
the opposition as a social-democratic deviation using revolutionary rhetoric to mask 
its essentially opportunist policy.35  
Despite this escalation however, a KP party meeting held in October to discuss 
the growing rift in the CC was addressed by none other than Zinoviev accompanied 
by the former gubkom secretary Grigorii Evdokimov and Sarkis, the former raikom 
secretary of KP’s district. Zinoviev was given a standard ten-minute time slot as a 
contributor from the floor, which was then extended, following a vote by hand, by 
another fifteen minutes. Zinoviev was not granted a further extension, and he was cut 
off when his extra time ran out by Ivan Gaza who was chairing the session.36 
The organisation’s attitude towards the opposition remained reasonably 
accommodative for several months after the party’s all-union conference. On 15 
January 1927, 1,260 KP communists assembled to hear a report on the latest plenary 
session of the Comintern executive. 37  By that time, the party’s leadership of the 
Comintern had emerged as a major issue of contention between the CC majority and 
the United Opposition, with the oppositionists accusing the majoritarians that their 
policy undermined the prospects of world revolution.38 The question notes passed to 
the presidium from the floor thus reflected the rank-and-file’s interest in both 
international affairs and their connexion to the brewing party crisis. As shown in the 
following sample, the questions posed suggest that at that stage the rank-and-file still 
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regarded the conflict in the upper echelons of the party with curiosity rather than any 
firm conviction either way: 
What party work are the oppositionists doing? Trotsky, Kamenev etc. 
Can the opposition mess with the situation in China? How? 
What is Zinoviev currently doing? What is his problem with rationalisation? Is he 
for it or not? What is the difference between socialist and capitalist rationalisation?  
What is the dispute over the Chinese and Polish questions?39  
 
Six months later, at the next general assembly of KP communists held to discuss 
international affairs, the mood on the factory floor had become markedly different. 
The meeting had been scheduled for 9 June to hear a report by Leningradskaia Pravda 
editor Aleksandr Ugarov on the Comintern executive plenum that had taken place in 
May. By that time, the Comintern’s China policy of an alliance between the 
Communist Party of China and the nationalist Guomindang had suffered a catastrophic 
failure after the nationalists turned on their communist partners in April 1927, killing 
several thousands in the process. Although the Chinese strategy of the Comintern had 
played no part in the early rounds of the United Opposition’s struggle against the CC 
majority, the obvious failure of the official policy became a significant source of 
ammunition for the struggling minority. The May Comintern plenum was the first 
major forum in which the opposition attacked the majority leaders on these grounds.40 
The meeting that would hear the report on the plenum convened under the 
shadow of dark events that had taken place far closer to home than those of remote 
China. On 26 May, while the Comintern plenum was in session, the diplomatic crisis 
between Britain and the USSR that had been gathering pace since the police raid on 
the offices of the Soviet diplomatic mission in London two weeks earlier came to a 
head. The Baldwin government finally severed relations with the Soviet Union and 
cancelled the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 1921, thus initiating the 1927 war scare 
in the USSR. 41  On 7 June, a counterrevolutionary émigré assassinated the Soviet 
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ambassador to Poland Petr Voikov inside the Warsaw central rail station just as he was 
meeting Arkadii Rozengol’ts, the former ambassador to Britain who was on his way 
to Moscow following the break of relations between the two countries.42 The same 
evening in Leningrad, another group of counterrevolutionaries led by the former White 
captain Viktor Larionov carried out a bombing attack against a centrally located party 
club on the Moika river, injuring several party members and successfully escaping to 
Finland.43 
The day after the attack, several party organisations demonstrated throughout the 
country in protest against the growing aggressiveness of the enemies of Soviet power. 
In Leningrad, KP communists produced one of the most militant resolutions, vowing 
to defend the USSR against foreign aggression and denouncing imperialism and “its 
faithful servants and minions, social-democrats and socialists of all hues”.44 
In such circumstances, it should come as no surprise that the benign curiosity 
towards the United Opposition demonstrated by KP communists half a year earlier had 
by that time given way to a much more polarised political climate within the 
organisation. Following Ugarov’s report Tuzhikov, the first contributor from the floor, 
sought to defend the opposition’s line on China, demanding to know why the party 
was not supporting a “soviet line” and going on to argue that the opposition supported 
cooperation with the Guomindang as long as it was “critical”. 45  This hardly 
inflammatory speech provoked the rage of Ruzin who denounced Tuzhikov as an 
oppositionist whose arguments could convince only the politically illiterate. “The 
opposition” he argued “is only offering demagogy. We cannot allow any disunity in 
our ranks at this stage”.46 
Some of the speakers that took the floor after Ruzin tried to keep the focus of 
discussion on the relative merits of the Comintern’s China policy, in what might have 
been an attempt to deescalate. The inopportune timing of the oppositionists’ 
publication of their differences with the CC majority however made such efforts futile. 
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Taking the floor after a speaker had criticised the opposition’s radical line on the basis 
that China’s proletariat was still young, Sharkov told the meeting that the murder of 
Voikov in Warsaw required every party member to be “on the alert (nacheku)” while 
the opposition wanted “to have a discussion”. Ivan Gaza then took the floor to 
denounce the “Declaration of the 84 (sic)” as a “shameless (nagleishii) attack against 
the Party”.47  
Gaza’s speech seems to have acted as a signal to the more militant opponents of 
the opposition that the time for restraint was over, for the content and tone of the 
contributions that followed it is markedly different, with very little to say on Comintern 
politics but quite vocal in their condemnation of the opposition’s factionalism. Thus 
Smirnova, a non-KP worker present at the meeting said the following: “We don’t have 
oppositionists in our collective. But one must feel for KP, when they have workers 
running about the shops distributing silly leaflets. The opposition is speculating on our 
difficulties. Enough!”48 It is however the question notes attached to the meeting’s 
protocol that provide the strongest indication of the growing impatience of the rank-
and-file with the opposition. Out of 18 zapiski in total a full 13 contained questions or 
statements demanding Trotsky’s and Zinoviev’s expulsion from the party.49  
On 18 August the KP party organisation met again to discuss the results of the 
joint plenary session of the CC and Central Control Commission that had convened 
earlier that month to review a motion to expel the leaders of the opposition from the 
CC which had been tabled by the politburo at the end of June.50 Following a declaration 
by the opposition of its unconditional commitment to the defence of the Soviet Union, 
the party tribunal issued a formal reprimand and concluded its deliberations without 
taking any further disciplinary action against Trotsky and his allies.51 By that time 
however, the growing schism within the party leadership had already become widely 
known amongst the rank-and-file and could thus no longer be contained without a 
fight. Thus, instead of following the standard format of a main report followed by 
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discussion, the meeting’s agenda also included a supplementary “co-report” 
(sodoklad) by Grigoriev, a supporter of the opposition. 
The meeting protocol indicates that Grigoriev was interrupted by loud heckling 
from the floor and had to cut his report short after a motion by the presidium to allow 
him to continue his report was voted down by the assembly. Tuzhikov faced similar 
hostility and was also shouted down mid-speech. In this climate, it was an easy task 
for party loyalists to focus on the opposition’s factionalism without having to confront 
any of the issues that its leaders were trying to wield as political weapons against the 
CC majority. Almost all of the speakers who took the floor to attack the opposition did 
so on the basis of its systematic violation of the ban on factions. Unlike past meetings, 
no energy was expended on arguing on about the wisdom of party policy on China or 
even the national economy. As one speaker put it, the assembly could not afford to 
“lose time arguing about the party’s unity”.52 
Even those communists who were not comfortable with the way the 
oppositionists were being treated by the majoritarians could not but condemn 
violations of party discipline. Such views were expressed by Baranovskii, an old 
Putilov communist who had left the factory to serve on the Smolensk Control 
Commission. The party enforcer argued that the oppositionists had the right to present 
their views to the meeting and distanced himself from attempts to shout them down, 
stating that their contributions should and would be properly recorded. Nevertheless, 
he went on to condemn their attempts to bring the issue outside the confines of the 
party, “at train stations etc.” and called on them to respect the rules of discipline.53 
The meeting concluded with two separate resolutions being put to the vote. The 
one supporting the CC majority was overwhelmingly carried and consisted of the usual 
expressions of approval of the party’s general line along with threats of expulsion for 
unrepentant factionalists. The opposition’s resolution fell with only sixteen votes in 
favour, but its content is worth mentioning here because it demonstrates the extent to 
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which the rift had by that time become irreparable. The motion demanded not only 
space in the party press for the expression of its views, but also the recognition of these 
views as correct and their immediate implementation by the CC.54 This clause, which 
could scarcely have done the oppositionists any favours, seems calculated to provoke 
and can hardly be ascribed to mere political naivety. It seems rather that despite the 
purported truce agreed at the top, the tensions that had been generated by the brewing 
crisis within the KP organisation had by that time become impossible to contain. The 
oppositionists were no longer seeking to win over the organisation, they were 
attempting to make their presence as strongly felt as possible before the inevitable 
showdown. Belying the relatively restrained language of the majority resolution, the 
question notes attached to the meeting protocol suggest that the majoritarians had also 
ceased to entertain any notions of reconciliation.55 
As the conflict at the top reignited in the run up to the 15th party congress, KP 
party meetings also became tenser affairs. On 29 September, the party assembly met 
again to elect its new leading organs for the following six-month period. The 
supporters of the opposition put forward a separate slate of candidates for the 
organisation’s bureau. More than its inevitable defeat, it is the composition of the slate 
that reflects the opposition’s isolation within the organisation; only five of the 
proposed candidates’ names were different from the majority-proposed list.56  The 
discussion of amendments to the majority slate that followed its confirmation by the 
meeting also became caught up in the internal party struggle, as allegations about the 
oppositionist past of some of the candidates came to dominate the process. Even Gaza 
came under fire, with another candidate stating that he had been a Trotskyist in the 
past. This elicited a furious response from the incumbent secretary, who went on to 
query his accuser about his whereabouts during the Civil War.57 The last candidate to 
be reviewed before the final confirmation of the slate was Smirnov, the organiser of 
the wagon workshop party group mentioned earlier in this chapter. Having been 
challenged about his oppositionist past, Smirnov took the floor to admit that he had 
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supported the New Opposition in the run up to the 14th Congress but had broken with 
it at the time of Zinoviev’s attack on the CC. He then claimed that he had since been 
approached by supporters of the United Opposition and asked to sign their platform, 
which he refused. Finishing his response, Smirnov condemned the oppositionists for 
their attempts to organise non-party workers around their views and stated that in his 
view, “they would not be against an armed coup”.58 
Tensions inside the KP organisation came to a head after the October plenum of 
the CC finally expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the party. On the first day of 
November 1927, the communists of KP assembled once more to hear a report on the 
decisions of the party’s leading body. The protocol record of the meeting suggests that 
the last confrontation between majoritarians and oppositionists was extremely 
acrimonious. Following the main report, Grigoriev and Leontiev took the floor to 
protest the exclusion of the opposition’s views from the party press and argue that 
workers supportive of the CC majority were not fully informed of the substance of the 
intra-party dispute. The assembly heard their speeches but went on to deny speaking 
rights to Oskar Tarkhanov, the organisation’s former deputy secretary in 1924-1925 
who had since been working as a political advisor in China.59  
As Tarkhanov was no longer a member of the organisation, the decision was not 
strictly-speaking against the rules but the reaction of the oppositionists to having one 
of their ablest allies barred from the meeting was, not surprisingly, to protest. The 
protocol record notes “disruption” of the assembly by the oppositionists in response to 
the decision to bar Tarkhanov, followed by threats of disciplinary action by Antipov, 
who chaired the meeting. Things in the hall apparently calmed down enough for the 
meeting to continue only after the assembly ejected Grigoriev following a motion by 
Ivanov.60 The latter then took the floor to condemn oppositionist factionalism, stating 
that Grigoriev did not recognise the authority of the coming 15th party congress, 
viewing it instead as “an all-Russian aktiv meeting”.61 At that, he was interrupted by 
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Mukhin who blandly confirmed that this was so, to applause from the oppositionists 
still present. Ivanov then concluded his speech by warning the oppositionists that if it 
were truly their intention to defy the party’s sovereign body, their only remaining 
option would be to come out in armed rebellion against the Soviet state.62 
The last major intervention in favour of the opposition came from Ivan Bakaev, 
the decorated chekist who had chaired Petrograd’s security commission during the 
Civil War. Bakaev was attending the assembly in his capacity as a member of the 
party’s Central Control Commission and unlike Tarkhanov, could not be barred from 
speaking. In any case, the assembly seems to have heard his appeal for party unity and 
detailed defence of Trotsky and Zinoviev with considerable interest, as Bakaev was 
the only speaker to have his fifteen-minute speaking slot extended by an extra ten 
minutes.63  
Nevertheless, whatever the extent of Bakaev’s popularity or rhetorical ability, it 
was not enough to sway the KP party assembly away from the CC majority. The 
resolution passed at the end of the meeting approved the decisions of the October 
plenum and condemned Trotskyism once more.64 On 29 December, when Sergei Kirov 
visited the factory to personally deliver the report on the party’s 15th Congress, only 
one person took the floor to defend the views of the defeated opposition while with 
few exceptions, most of the question notes concerning the opposition read more like 
inquiries about the fate of its leaders as opposed to the indignant denunciations of 
factionalism and defiant rejections of orthodoxy that been pouring onto the 
presidium’s desk in the previous months. 65  Two years after it first emerged as a 
stronghold of Zinoviev’s New Opposition, the KP party organisation had been 
transformed into a pillar of CC loyalism. Given the extent of this transformation, it 
may be useful here to offer some remarks regarding the implications of the preceding 
account for our understanding of the place of the primary party organisation in late-
NEP Soviet society. 
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KP communists rallied to the New Opposition because its pro-industrial political 
platform resonated among workers who felt, with reason, that they were not getting 
their fair share out of the economic growth generated by the NEP. When Kirov and 
the CC delegation arrived in Leningrad to retake control of the organisation, the KP 
party assembly abandoned the opposition, whether because its members were 
convinced by the arguments and assurances offered by the leadership representatives 
or because the very fact of their presence brought home the isolation of the 
Zinovievites outside of Leningrad.  
In order to reintegrate the organisation into the political mainstream, the new 
leadership at KP had to follow a two-pronged strategy based on improving economic 
performance so as to deprive the opposition of its most potent argument while at the 
same time rebuilding the party organisation on the basis of the CC majority line, 
without alienating rank-and-file members who had initially sided with Zinoviev. These 
two tasks were almost the sole concern of all levels of the organisation for several 
months after January 1926. Such efforts notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the 
economic hardship that had fuelled the party crisis persisted, in less acute form, 
throughout 1926-1927 and it was around this issue that re-emboldened supporters of 
the opposition agitated after Kamenev and Zinoviev allied with Trotsky in mid-1926, 
well before Chinese affairs became an issue in the internal struggle. Why then did the 
resurgent opposition fail to mount a challenge similar to that of 1925-1926, even within 
the confines of the KP party organisation? 
We have little reason to doubt the veracity of the oppositionists’ protestations 
about their exclusion from the press and the suppression of their organisational 
activities. Neither of these things was sanctioned by either the Party Rules or the laws 
of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it would be hardly plausible to suggest that reading 
articles in Pravda would have done more to attract KP communists to the opposition 
than the visits of such of its luminaries as Zinoviev, Sarkis and Bakaev to the factory 
grounds. As it was thus possible for leading oppositionists as well as rank-and-file 
supporters to put their views to the thousand-plus strong KP party assembly, the root 
causes of the oppositions’ defeat must be sought in conditions other than censorship 
and organisational pressures, even though these constraints certainly limited its ability 





The failure of the opposition should instead be seen as evidence that the response 
of the new Leningrad leadership to the 1925-1926 party crisis was working. As shown 
in the previous chapter, the party’s economic initiatives after the 14th congress were 
amenable to interpretations that favoured workers on the shop-floor. The party’s 
economic policy in the last years of the NEP not only pulled the rag from under the 
opposition’s feet by declaring industrialisation to be the order day, but crucially also 
gave rank-and-file communists the opportunity to pursue their immediate interests 
while remaining part of the political mainstream. Thus, it also made it desirable and 
possible for former rank-and-file oppositionists to become CC loyalists, depriving the 
opposition of potential cadres as well as arguments as demonstrated by the case of 
Smirnov who, from a supporter of Zinoviev until December 1925, had by January 1926 
become a party organiser in his shop. There is little reason to suggest that this process 
was peculiar to KP.66 
Having thus secured the opposition’s defeat at the grassroots level, it became 
easy sport for the CC majority to convincingly ridicule the Trotskyists’ claim to 
represent the genuine views of the rank-and-file and the party’s true Bolshevik spirit, 
making their defeat at the 15th congress a foregone conclusion.67 This outcome had 
significant implications for the subsequent development of Soviet grassroots politics, 
especially with regard to their function within the USSR’s one-party system. 
The opposition’s refusal to openly reject the Bolshevik party’s monopoly on 
power and organise itself into a separate political organisation has been cited by many 
scholars as one of the major factors that contributed to its defeat.68 By adhering to 
single-party rule, the argument goes, the opposition locked itself into an irresolvable 
political contradiction whereby it had to constantly scale back its activities in order to 
deflect accusations of factionalism by the CC majority. Notwithstanding its merits, 
this argument still leaves open the question of why the leadership of the opposition 
never took the decisive step of organisational separation. Although this is usually 
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attributed to the subjective commitment of Trotsky and his allies to the organisational 
principles of Bolshevism, the account offered here suggests that there was another, 
equally important factor at play. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the influence of communist workers inside 
the factory was predicated on their ability to frame their interests in terms of political 
orthodoxy; that is as being more in line with the party’s policy than the actions of the 
administration at any given conjuncture. This was only possible within the institutional 
framework of the Soviet party-state, where the party was fused with and at every level 
senior to the state. Appeals to party policy would have been meaningless in a situation 
where parties alternated in government and public officials, like factory administration 
staff, could claim to be apolitical. In 1926-1927, as economic policy became more 
closely aligned to the interests of heavy industry, there was little incentive for 
communist workers to jeopardise their influence at the point of production by splitting 
the organisation and quite a bit of incentive for them to react to any initiatives that 
threatened its unity with negativity, as they did. Rank-and-file oppositionists who, in 
Leningrad, had until recently themselves been majoritarians, could hardly have failed 
to see this.69 
There were thus strong social factors pertaining to the interests of rank-and-file 
communists, the very constituency that the opposition was hoping to attract, mitigating 
against full organisational separation. Having established this, the implications of the 
opposition’s defeat can now be more clearly stated. First, the whole process trained 
the rank-and-file to use party orthodoxy to its advantage, and regard challenges to it as 
threats to its own interests. Second, the outcome taught the central party leadership 
that it could rely on the rank-and-file to see off challenges to its power. In January 
1926, the CC had to send some of its most prominent members to win back Leningrad 
from the Zinovievites factory by factory. A year or so later, it could let Zinoviev and 
Bakaev visit Krasnii Putilovets while trusting low-ranking functionaries like Ivan 
Gaza to maintain the rank-and-file’s loyalty to the centre. The result was that the KP 
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party organisation never again became a space where party policy could be contested 
as such, but was instead established as the main site of the politics of production 
described earlier. From the perspective of the centre, this transformation was also what 
made possible the politics of mobilisation more broadly, as it was only after militant 
loyalty had become the norm amongst the rank-and-file that it could be mobilised, in 
the sense of being deployed en masse in order to implement or lend support to the 
centre’s policy initiatives. As shown in the preceding chapter, the samokritika 
campaign, launched less than a year after the final defeat of the United Opposition, 
was the first instance in which the politics of production and mobilisation were brought 
together, with far-reaching effects on the factory floor. We have already seen how, 
within that context, the failure of the factory’s tractor plan cost director Grachev his 
job and influenced the organisation’s relations with his successor. There is no reason 
to revisit these themes here. Instead, the following section will examine the party 
building activities of the organisation during the first time in its history when the threat 
of internal grassroots opposition had finally been eradicated. 
 
2.3 No Right Deviation 
The breakneck pace of industrialisation required by the First FYP made it necessary 
for KP communists to devote an even greater part of their efforts than usual to 
problems of production. Nevertheless, a close reading of the organisation’s records 
from that period reveals that KP communists never lost sight of the organisational and 
ideological tasks inherent in party membership, even as they were busy trying to 
remedy bottlenecks, stoppages and waste while also making sure management took 
the blame. 
In the short interval between the final defeat of the United Opposition and the 
full scale launch of the FYP, the KP party organisation returned to the familiar business 
of party building that had been the order of the day in early 1926. Like then, the 
oppositionists and their activities disappeared from the agendas of party meetings and 





archives do reflect considerable lingering interest on the part of the rank-and-file.70 
Instead, it was assumed once again that getting on with business would be the best way 
to return to normality.71  
Thus, in May 1928, at the first electoral general assembly of the KP party 
organisation held after the defeat of the opposition, Gaza could declare that the party 
was now “stronger than ever” and that the time had come to fully “develop party 
democracy and samokritika”, while joking that Trotsky had been right about one thing, 
“the party is always right”.72 Attended by 1,411 delegates and lasting over five hours, 
the meeting was a milestone in the organisational consolidation of the KP PPO, as 
demonstrated by the meticulous detail in which the assembly went through its agenda. 
Gaza delivered the main report on behalf of the bureau which, although predictably 
focusing mostly on the familiar problems of factory life like truancy and accidents, 
devoted considerable time to the theme of the organisation’s political rejuvenation. 
Having pronounced the party group to be at the peak of its strength, Gaza went on to 
praise the activities of the shop-level cells which had achieved record levels of 
participation and contributions during a recent round of bureau re-elections. The 
secretary then expressed his ambition to transform the shop-cells into “genuine 
political centres on the factory floor”, arguing that it was at that level that the rank-
and-file membership of the organisation could most effectively exert its influence. 
This, he went on, would require a careful reorganisation of party meetings in order to 
ensure that their agendas included only relevant topics that could be meaningfully 
addressed at their level. In conclusion, Gaza admitted that the KP party was still some 
way short of achieving this goal and urged his comrades to spare no effort in 
revitalising the shop-cells.73 
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Gaza’s bureau report was followed by an equally long-winded account delivered 
by a representative of the monitoring commission which had been set up by the 
organisation’s last plenary session. The commission, composed of eleven experienced 
worker communists, was charged with the task of checking the bureau’s work against 
directives issued by the raikom.74 The singularly dull document it produced went over 
the activities of the organisation’s leading organ in excruciating detail, dividing it into 
thirteen major areas of assessment including among others agitation, leadership of the 
Komsomol and the communist caucus in the zavkom, “participation in economic life” 
and “control of directive implementation”. These were further subdivided into a total 
of sixty-eight sub-categories.75 
In itself, this document represents a significant step in the organisational 
maturation of the KP party cell; only a few months earlier, internal conflict had made 
it practically and politically impossible to even discuss the organisation’s work, let 
alone set up a functioning monitoring commission on it. The content of the report 
however provides further indication that party life was finally entering a period of 
stability for the first time since 1926.  
To be sure, the commission found much that was wanting in the bureau’s work, 
but it commended its members on managing to stick to the agreed work-schedule and 
successfully resolving tensions between the zavkom and the factory administration.76 
What is more, the problems highlighted by the commission were different to the ones 
that leading members of the organisation had been complaining about in the early 
months of 1926. The report mentioned neither attendance nor timely payment of party 
dues as issues in need of improvement, suggesting that at least some progress had been 
made in these elementary aspects of party discipline. Instead, the commission 
representative criticised the outgoing bureau for failing to address the fact that around 
a quarter of party members in the factory did not have party assignments and suggested 
that “there are no party members without party assignments” should be adopted as a 
political slogan by the new leadership. This being a problem that could only be 
adequately addressed at the shop level, the commission also admonished the incoming 
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bureau that care should be taken to ensure that shop-cells conducted their work in an 
orderly manner, starting by producing minutes of their meetings.77 
With the assembly taking place a mere month after the Shakhty affair, the 
contributions from the floor that followed the commission’s report were predictably 
saturated with attacks on the factory’s administrative and technical staff. The political 
and organisational issues raised by the main speakers were thus almost entirely absent 
from the ensuing discussion, with the speakers being more concerned about Gaza’s 
purported tolerance towards engineers of seemingly dubious loyalty.78 Nevertheless, 
the bureau election that concluded the assembly seems to have taken place in an 
orderly manner, with the exchange of personal accusations that had plagued 
discussions of candidacies the previous year being notably absent. An element of 
contestation beyond the confirmation or rejection of candidacies was also introduced 
to the process, with a slate of thirty-three candidates being put to the vote in order to 
elect twenty-five full and five candidate bureau members. The election was conducted 
by process of elimination, with the number of objections (vozderzhaniia) being listed 
next to candidates’ names in the manner of negative votes. Candidates were then 
ranked according to the number of objections, with the three that received the most 
being disqualified and the next five assuming candidate status.79 
These modest organisational improvements took place against the backdrop of 
the smouldering social unrest generated by the grain procurement crisis that struck the 
country in the end of 1927. The attendant bread shortages and “extraordinary 
measures” sanctioned by the CC to secure the amount of grain necessary to feed the 
cities and the military acted as the prelude to the full collectivisation campaign that 
marked the end of the NEP in 1929.80 As many KP employees maintained links with 
the countryside and food shortages placed considerable pressures on workers just as 
the country was gearing up for the first FYP, none of these developments could have 
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escaped the attention of the organisation’s members. Throughout 1928, the zapiski 
collected at the organisation’s assembly meetings reflect growing concern with regard 
to conditions in the countryside. Thus, when on 8 August CC member Aleksei Stetskii 
visited the factory to report on the committee’s July plenum he received, among others, 
the following question notes:  
Will we import bread from abroad? 
What explains the high tax on peasant livestock? 
Why is there a bread crisis now, when in 1924 industry was far less developed and 
yet there was no crisis? 
There have been rumours that supposedly the Ukraine is leaving the Soviet Union 
that this is the cause of the bread shortages. If this is not true, and I am convinced 
it is not, just mention this and confirm. 
I observed the following situation in the village: in the autumn the kulaks bought 
all the bread, even from the cooperative. And in the spring they sold it no less than 
five roubles for every pud’ of rye. 
What concrete measures have been taken for peasants to sow more bread and 
won’t the raising of taxes on the peasant make things worse? 
People say that by extraordinary measures the crisis have been overcome but it 
hasn’t as there are queues everywhere. The peasants are saying that we have 
returned to war communism. 
What measures are being taken against peasants who have deliberately reduced 
the sowing of bread and cotton?81  
 
While a stenographic record of Stetskii’s responses to the zapiski has not been 
preserved, this sample is by itself indicative of the multitude of views held by KP 
communists with respect to the rapidly deteriorating situation in the countryside. 
Ranging from traditional Bolshevik hostility to the kulak through to doubts regarding 
the economic rationality of the party’s agricultural policies with various shades of 
bewilderment in between, the attitudes of the rank-and-file were once again divided 
along the same fault lines as those that split the party’s central leadership. However, 
although opposition to collectivisation at the top found coherent political expression 
in the alliance between Nikolai Bukharin, Aleksei Rykov, Mikhail Tomskii, and 
Nikolai Uglanov that came to be known as the Right Deviation, it never gave rise to a 
defined factional opposition on the factory floor, in sharp contrast to the events of 
                                                 





1925-27. Barring critical comments about the state of agriculture made in the zapiski, 
the rightists did not make their presence felt at KP by stating their views or by being 
subjected to attacks on account of them. The first mention of the Right as the chief 
threat to the party’s unity was made by the chair of the organisation’s first delegated 
conference, held on 18 November 1928. 82  More formulaic than substantial, this 
denunciation was not a signal for an attack on the rightists, as the conference proceeded 
without much reference to the brewing internal crisis. The relative calm at the meeting 
made it again possible for the new leadership slate vote to proceed without much 
controversy. Reflecting the growth of the organisation, the new body consisted of 
thirty-five full members and five candidates and became a partkom instead of a bureau. 
The old Putilovite Bolshevik Ivan Alekseev replaced Ivan Gaza as party secretary 
while, reflecting the strategic importance of the enterprise for the FYP, Sergei Kirov 
himself also took a seat on the committee.83 
  Instead then of dividing the organisation, the attack of Stalin and his allies on 
the purportedly pro-kulak Bukharin seems to have provided an opportunity for 
reconciliation with some of the factory’s most prominent supporters of the Left 
Opposition. A month before the 1st Conference, at a meeting attended by Sergei Kirov, 
the former leading oppositionists Tuzhikov and Kovalevskii formally re-joined the 
party renouncing their previous factionalism.84  
By that time, the split in the ranks of the leadership coalition that had defeated 
Trotsky and Zinoviev had already been made public. The Sunday issue of Pravda 
published on 30 September 1928 featured a lengthy article by Bukharin under the 
rather non-belligerent title Notes of an Economist, in which Stalin’s erstwhile ally 
provided an eloquent warning of the destabilising economic effects of the rapid 
industrialisation course the leadership was about to embark on.85 Less than three weeks 
later the rightists suffered their first major organisational defeat, when an extraordinary 
plenary session of the party’s Moscow Committee and Control Commission called in 
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mid-October by Stalin’s supporters amongst the city’s activists condemned the rightist 
leadership of the capital’s organisation.86 
It is not hard to explain the failure of the last in the series of 1920s oppositions 
to generate much support amongst KP communists. Throughout the internal struggle 
that had tested the unity of the organisation in the previous years the desirability of 
industrialisation and the hostile nature of the kulak had never in themselves been 
matters of dispute. No CC loyalist at KP ever expressed any doubts that the massive 
expansion of heavy industry was a sound political objective. The CC majority itself 
had always maintained that the Left Opposition’s policies were adventurist and 
unrealistic on the basis of current circumstances, not of their goals. When these 
circumstances were declared to be no longer valid and the “socialist offensive” came 
to be the order of the day, the effect was not the creation of further division between 
those who stuck to the moderate outlook of the previous line and those for who loyalty 
to the CC remained paramount. Instead, what had been the only real political division 
within the organisation disappeared, leading to an even more solid ideological 
consensus.87  
The measure of this political achievement can be gauged not only on the basis 
of the successful reintegration of leftists like Tuzhikov and Kovalevskii into the 
political mainstream – a process taking place throughout the USSR at the time88 – but 
also by the organisation’s performance at the various political campaigns that 
constituted the socialist offensive of the 1st FYP. The efforts of party activists to 
promote the shock-work movement have already been discussed. However, KP 
communists and their Leningrad comrades more broadly also excelled in campaigns 
that were not so obviously related to their lives as factory workers. 
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Leningraders made up 12,000 of the roughly 70,000 workers who in 1929 
volunteered to be part of the twenty-five-thousanders (dvatsatipiatitisiachniki), the 
contingent of worker activists who left the cities to spearhead the collectivisation 
campaign in the countryside. KP communists were a significant part of the total 
number of volunteers, with the actual recruits totalling around three-hundred and 
including prominent party members like the chair of the factory’s zavkom Arkhipov as 
well as other workers with decades of experience at the bench and also the recently 
redeemed Tuzhikov.89 
The performance of the organisation in the 1929 party purge provides an even 
stronger indication of the KP organisation’s successful political consolidation into a 
stalwart of CC loyalism. The purge campaign was proclaimed in April 1929 by the 
16th Party Conference as a means to rid the party of “petty-bourgeois […] self-serving, 
careerist elements” and thus “strengthen its mobilising readiness in the cause of the 
socialist offensive”.90 As in the rest of the USSR, the campaign at KP happened in 
stages and consisted of several public meetings where party members were examined 
about the details of their political activities as well as aspects of their personal lives.91 
The first to go through the process at KP were prominent communists who had been 
selected to serve on the purging commissions of other organisations, like the former 
secretary Ivan Gaza, the zavkom chair Arkhipov and the lathe worker Aleksander 
Nikiforov, then serving as secretary at the 3rd mechanical shop cell. They underwent 
the screening process before thousands of KP workers at a mass, largely ceremonial, 
meeting held inside the factory’s tractor workshop.92 For the broader membership the 
purge came a few months later, with the first meetings starting on 1 October and most 
of the process having been completed by the time of the organisation’s 4th Conference 
on 14 November.93 
Unlike the first screening round, the main chistka seems to have been a much 
more thorough affair. According to the gross figures given in the report (svodka) 
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prepared for the district control commission, the number of speeches made during the 
purge amounted to 2,967 and the grand total of questions asked of those examined was 
22,313 by 17,815 participants, of whom 5,499 did not belong to the party.94 More 
importantly, the KP organisation performed significantly better than the national 
average in terms of both the thoroughness of the purge and the incidence of expulsion. 
By the time the 4th Conference met to discuss the results of the campaign, more than 
90% of the membership had been examined with only 4.4% having been shown the 
door, compared to less than 87% and 11% respectively union-wide.95 
The report delivered at the conference by the district control commission 
representative Amosov elaborated further on the different causes of expulsion. 
According to the report, the largest group of the expelled was made up of members 
who had let their membership lapse by not paying in dues or not attending meetings, 
while drunkenness was also a common cause for ejection from the ranks. 
“Concealment of social background” was the most serious offense mentioned in 
Amosov’s report, which had claimed eighteen out of the total 140 expelled members. 
96Although these were hardly alarming figures, Amosov called on the organisation to 
not be complacent about the presence of hostile elements in the organisation, citing the 
case of one former member who “owned three houses and two dachas” and whose 
father had been “involved in the shooting of communists”.97  
Whatever the veracity of the sensational examples used by Amosov to illustrate 
the dangers of lax recruitment standards, they do not seem have had much of an impact 
on the subsequent discussion. While some of the speakers lamented the common 
practice of not asking many questions as long as members performed the tasks 
assigned to them, most of the contributions focused on the problem of lapsed 
memberships as an indication of the failure of the organisation to assimilate new 
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members.98 Party-building, rather than revolutionary vigilance was once again the 
order of the day. 
Overall, rather than shrinking and weakening the organisation the purge largely 
performed the opposite function, with its many sessions acting as recruitment events 
as much as disciplinary procedures. During the campaign, the organisation recruited 
325 new members, more than double the number of those expelled.99 A further seventy 
workers, some of who had spent decades in the factory, triumphantly announced their 
intention to join the party by marching into the conference and interrupting the main 
report.100  
This was possible because, in contrast to the supporters of the New and Left 
Oppositions, the enemies of the socialist offensive – rightists, kulaks and their minions 
– never appeared in great numbers amongst KP communists. Although frequently 
condemned in speeches and resolutions, their activities were rarely if ever directly 
experienced by the broad party mass in the enterprise and thus never generated the 
vicious infighting that had accompanied the emergence of earlier disputes at the top.101 
The early stages of the 1st FYP were thus a period of consolidation for the KP party 
from which the rank-and-file came out both more united in its outlook and more 
competent organisationally. Overcoming the division of the mid-1920s was a 
necessary condition for the transformation of the organisation into the permanent 
source of opposition to managerial authority that was described in the previous 
chapter. From 1928 onwards the administration replaced the oppositionists as the main 
target of rank-and-file discontent. Its first victim, the director Vasilii Grachev, lost his 
job less than a year after the completion of the 1929 purge. 
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2.4 Another purge 
By the end of the 1st FYP, the political health of the KP party organisation was once 
again becoming a matter of concern for the leadership and aktiv. Success at the 
campaigns of 1929-1932 had come at the cost of increasing neglect of the qualitative 
aspects of party building, as the need to keep up with the growth of the workforce had 
led to mass recruitment amongst the ranks of udarniki and other promising young 
workers. Assimilating the new communists proved to be a significant challenge for the 
organisation, with 47% of its strength in April 1932 being made of candidate members 
according to a report delivered at the 9th KP party Conference by Aleksandr Ugarov, 
then chief of the cultural-propaganda department of the Leningrad gorkom.102 Of the 
650 delegates that had been elected to hear and deliberate on Ugarov’s report, 380 had 
joined the party from 1928 onwards, ninety-five of whom had done so in 1931 and 
seventeen in the four months of 1932.103 In an attempt to remedy the growing levels of 
political inexperience within the organisation, the partkom had resolved a few weeks 
before the conference that all new party secretaries of shop-level cells should undergo 
an intensive training course that would involve of a total of twenty-four hours of study 
and include topics ranging from technical aspects of the production process to more 
abstract notions like “the vanguard role of communists”.104 The extent to which that 
programme was implemented remains unclear as do its immediate results. Judging 
however by the fact that less than months later, the partkom had to provide guidelines 
to its own members regarding the adequate preparation and timely submission of 
materials pertaining to items on its order of business, it seems that organisational 
competence was a skill in short supply even above the shop level.105 
The ability of the inexperienced, massively expanded communist rank-and-file 
to exert influence on the young former peasants that had come to make up a large part 
of the industrial workforce during the FYP had become a major worry for the party 
leadership all the way up to the top. In early 1933, the leadership decided that the 
circumstances called for a new purge campaign, announcing its decision in an article 
signed by the CC and published in Pravda in April. Noting that the party had almost 
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doubled in size by acquiring 1,400,000 new members over the previous two-and-a-
half years, the front-page piece declared that the speed of recruitment had once more 
allowed the by then proverbial “alien elements” that were “careerists”, “double-
dealers” and “self-servers” to contaminate the membership. At the same time, it was 
highlighted that a number of “conscientious” but “unfamiliar with the programme, 
Rules and main resolutions of the party” comrades were unable to actively promote 
the party line. Thus, in addition to being an opportunity for the party to demonstrate 
its integrity before the public by cutting loose the corrupt and the “morally rotten”, the 
purge was also meant to act as a means to gauge the political literacy of new 
communists as well as to provide them with an opportunity to raise their “ideological 
level” within the context of a structured, mass campaign. 106  It was thus a typical 
exercise in political consolidation following a period of disciplinary relaxation and 
ideological confusion, much like those that had followed the opposition crises of the 
1920s.107  
The first meetings of the campaign at KP began in the first week of June and 
most of the purging process had been completed by the end of October, with the 
exception of some busy commissions which exhausted the November deadline set by 
the CC. A total of 5,324 full and candidate members of the party underwent the 
scrutiny of their comrades and co-workers under the oversight of twelve shop-level 
purge commissions. As in the whole of the USSR the expulsion rate was significantly 
higher than in 1929, with 779 members excluded from the organisation according to 
the report given in its 12th Conference on 15 November 1933.108 
 In contrast to 1929, records of the public meetings of the 1933 purge at KP have 
been preserved in the organisation’s archival collection, making possible a more direct 
examination of the purge campaign on the factory floor. The purging process consisted 
of a brief political-autobiographical statement given by the member under review 
followed by a number of questions asked by the commission and those present at the 
meeting. These were subsequently followed by contributions from the floor, after 
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which the commission could pronounce its verdict. No specific limitations were 
stipulated with respect to the number of questions or contributions, with some of the 
more controversial cases taking up several hours. 
 The purge meeting protocols suggest that the higher rate of attrition was an 
effect of the indiscriminate recruitment of the previous couple of years much more 
than of any revival of oppositionist activity. In fact, while past oppositionist activities 
were brought up by suspicious or curious participants at the purge sessions, these were 
in themselves neither sufficient grounds for disciplinary sanctions nor did they elicit a 
particularly inquisitorial style of interrogation from the commissions. 
One “comrade Shchagin” from the turbine shop-cell for example, for whom the 
only biographical information recorded is that he had a party penalty (vziskanie), was 
asked by one commission member about his participation in the 1925 opposition. 
Shchagin responded that he was “politically uneducated” at the time and that he no 
longer held such views. The commission member pressed on, asking Shchagin about 
his views on a “newly emerging class”. Shchagin responded that he had “believed the 
ITR to be a new class, but [was] more or less past this” following the clarification of 
the Marxist concept of class by one comrade Sinev. In order to determine the extent of 
Shchagin’s grasp of the party line, the commission went on to ask him “what is the 
error of the Trotskyist view”? Shchagin responded correctly that Trotskyites were 
mistaken on the questions of the peasantry and “socialism in one country”.  
Despite his past, Shchagin seems to have been a conscientious worker. 
“Comrade Tomason” took the floor to speak in his favour after the end of the question 
session, saying that “Shchagin doesn’t have much education, but by his proletarian 
instinct always does the right thing.” Kostia Karimov, the secretary of the 1st 
mechanical shop cell who served on the commission also took Shchagin’s side on the 
basis that he was “a devoted worker” and therefore “must stay in the party”.109 
Such leniency regarding ideological infractions was also applied with respect to 
more recent events as shown by the case of Ekaterina Ivanova, a 21 year-old candidate 
member who worked as a polisher. Ivanova, who was of peasant stock, gave 
                                                 





satisfactory responses to a number of general political knowledge questions but was 
cornered by the commission about some limited commercial activity she seems to have 
engaged in at some point since her recruitment. In response to a commissioner’s 
inquiry on whether she thought it “appropriate (k litsu) for a candidate to sell products 
on the market”, Ivanova could only answer that she had been “in a tight spot”. 
However, neither the circumstances nor the very fact of Ivanova’s transgression were 
of much interest to her comrades and colleagues, who cared about her skill as a worker 
much more than any ideological infraction. Thus, after the end of questioning, one 
comrade Shatsman took the floor to deliver a fiery defence of the young polisher’s 
record. Having reminded those present that Ivanova was an udarnitsa, Shatsman 
concluded that “if everyone worked like her, we’d have a lot less brak”. The applause 
that followed Shatsman’s defence sealed the positive outcome of Ivanova’s review.110 
Ivanova’s and Shchagin’s purge sessions were by no means atypical of the 1933 
chistka at KP. The purge protocols contain numerous examples of communists under 
review receiving spirited defences by their comrades, as well as non-party participants, 
on the basis of their good record as workers. It is worth pointing out here that, strictly 
speaking, these arguments were for the most part irrelevant to the actual transgressions 
or failures that party members were grilled about; Ivanova’s skill as a polisher was not 
in any way connected to her trade activities or to the question of their political 
permissibility. But as the purge campaign had been framed in broad ideological terms 
demanding ruthlessness towards self-seekers but clemency to those of pure intention, 
without stipulating concrete grounds for expulsion or demotion, it was possible for the 
rank-and-filers to interpret these political imperatives in their own way.  
At a time of rapid industrial expansion and technological change accompanied 
by rising levels of waste, stoppages and industrial accidents, skill at one’s specialty 
and a good work ethic were far more valued qualities by shop-floor communists than 
the ability to distinguish between minute conceptual details or to adhere to political 
principles that were not directly related to factory life. It must be stressed again that in 
conducting the purge in this way, the rank-and-file was neither hijacking nor being 
disingenuous about the campaign in any meaningful sense. The main duty of the 
                                                 





industrial party organisation was to create and maintain appropriate political 
conditions for the realisation of the party’s ambitious industrial plans. In this sense, a 
skilled communist was also the “committed in practice to the cause of the working 
class” communist that the CC directive had explicitly shielded from the purge.111  
Who then was not? From the available evidence, it seems that the penalty of 
expulsion was reserved for those who were politically entirely ignorant, as well as 
those who demonstrated a gratuitously careless attitude towards their work and had a 
very bad reputation amongst their colleagues and/or subordinates. The questions asked 
by the purge commissions to gauge the general level of communists’ political 
awareness seem to have been deliberately designed to weed out only the entirely 
clueless, ranging from the blatantly obvious but not uncommon “Who is Stalin?” to 
the bizarre “When will Lenin rise from the dead?” asked of one Antipenko at the 
factory’s electrical shop.112 Even so, ignorance was not by itself a punishable offense 
as even elementary mistakes were overlooked if the reviewee was a sufficiently 
capable worker.113 
 The reverse was not true however and there are several cases of members whose 
past political credentials had been impeccable but fell afoul of the purge because of 
their attitude towards work and their colleagues. V. I. Pavloskii, a stoker-crew foreman 
with voluntary service in the Red Army and former agent of the OGPU, was deprived 
of membership after he was denounced as a “bad and careless brigadir” in the 
contributions of his co-workers. 114  Most expulsions were nevertheless due to a 
combination of political and work-related irresponsibility, with persistent absence 
from party meetings and truancy or drunkenness at work emerging as the most 
common issues.115 The most high-profile of such expulsions was that of the assistant 
superintendent of the electrical shop Mironenko, whose examination lasted over six 
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hours and had to be extended over two sessions. Mironenko, who seems to have been 
despised as a rude bureaucrat, was also discovered to have concealed his social origin 
when entering the party in 1930 and was purged as a class-alien element after it was 
revealed that his kulak father had owned 35 horses and employed around 40 
labourers.116 
Much then like the 1929 campaign, the chistka of 1933 had very little to do with 
internal political opposition, having instead been an attempt to ensure that the party 
membership maintained at least a tolerable level of political awareness as well as some 
understanding of and identification with the goals of party policy, after the immense 
pressures of the 1st FYP had caused political education to be neglected at a time of 
mass recruitment. The inevitably vague CC directives emanating from Moscow and 
demanding a separation of the wheat from the chaff, were implemented in practice by 
the KP communist rank-and-file as a mass examination of professional competence 
and collegial behaviour. At the purge meetings held in the shops of the enterprise, skill 
and work-ethic emerged as the ultimate markers of political reliability, the ability to 
confront and resolve the myriad of production-related problems thrown up during the 
socialist offensive having overtaken unreserved support for rapid industrialisation as 
the sine qua non of a good communist.  
It was argued earlier that the events of the late 1920s entrenched the status of the 
party organisation as a distinct locus of power on the factory floor, first by teaching 
the rank-and-file to draw links between its own work-place demands and party policy 
and second, by eliminating internal divisions which threatened its political legitimacy. 
The purge of 1933 also consolidated the strength of the organisation on the factory 
floor, but it did so in a slightly different way which would however have significant 
consequences for the future. Apart from training a new cohort of party activists in the 
ways of mass samokritika, the purge’s focus on and reward of technical competence 
also equipped communist rank-and-filers with the arguments and rhetoric they would 
need in order to confront the administration in the less voluntarist political 
environment of the 2nd FYP.117 By the same token that skill and competence became 
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equivalent to political loyalty, incompetence or mere failure could now be framed in 
terms of duplicity, leaving administrative staff particularly exposed in the climate of 
individual responsibility promoted by edinonachalie.  
 
2.5 Vigilance, repression, revival 
While in 1933 the conflicts surrounding the identification and removal of the disloyal 
remained within the limits of relatively benign administrative sanctions, a year later 
things started to take a darker turn when in the evening of 1 December 1934 the lapsed 
communist Leonid Nikolaev shot Sergei Kirov dead inside the headquarters of the 
Leningrad Party Organisation at Smolny. A pivotal event in Soviet history, the Kirov 
murder and its connexion to the bloody events of the Yezhovshchina a few years later 
have been the subject of much debate since the 1930s, with the weight of scholarly 
opinion currently against earlier speculation suggesting a Stalinist conspiracy. 118 
Neither the motives of the murderer nor the effects of his act on the outlook of Stalin 
and the party leadership are of import to the account offered here. It is however 
necessary to briefly consider the impact of the murder of the popular Leningrad party 
chief and regular visitor at KP on the factory’s own party organisation. 
News of the murder spread quickly to KP and the first meetings to discuss the 
fateful event took place just after the end of the factory’s evening shift, only a few 
hours after Kirov’s death. 119 These produced a resolution, published the following 
morning, which denounced the “vile hired murderer”, praised Kirov and called 
members and workers to “close ranks around the party”.120 In the late afternoon of 2nd 
December, KP workers marched to the Taurid Palace where Kirov’s body lay in state. 
Having paid their final respects, party members and supporters returned to the factory 
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to hold funerary meetings and discuss the implications of the party chief’s death. Karl 
Ots, the factory director, led one such meeting at the 3rd mechanical shop. Ots opened 
the funerary gathering with the solemn declaration that “Kirov has been killed. Kirov 
is no more. He is dead.”121 According to the stenographic record, everyone present 
stood up at this point, following which Ots proceeded to give a political appraisal of 
the murder. The bottom line of the director’s speech was that Kirov’s death was a form 
of punishment for the party’s underestimation of the class enemy a sign that “the many 
tales regarding the end of difficulties, that our enemies recognise us as a great power 
[…] that the class struggle is over that we can live quietly, have not been proven 
right”.122 
A number of contributions from the floor followed Ots’s opening remarks, 
mostly consisting in short expressions of indignation and the occasional declaration of 
intent to join the party or Komsomol as a militant response to the crime. However, the 
change in political outlook within the organisation brought about by the shocking event 
was best captured by a longer speech made by Matveev, an old worker and party 
member. Matveev wondered how it had been possible, at a time when “the final class 
struggle” was approaching, for a class enemy to find his way into Smolny when one 
needed a permit to enter even the factory’s workshops. He went on to add his own 
political appraisal of the murder which different slightly, but substantially, from that 
offered by Ots:  
At the morning meeting I looked at people’s faces and read on those faces that 
they wanted to go and fall on (brosit’sia) that enemy. Who is that [enemy]? It is 
all those who are in the enterprises and waste-producers (brakodeli) and work-
bench breakers (stankolomi), loafers, all truants, all those who mess up our 
socialist construction. Look, on the Neva there is a monument to Peter I. He was 
a great reformer. He is preparing to charge (brosit’sia) into Europe but old Russia 
in snake form holds him by the leg. Thus we must fall on our enemies.123  
 
The resolution produced by the organisation in the hours after the murder and 
the speech made by Ots later in the day of its publication approached Kirov’s murder 
in similar terms that would have been squarely within the mainstream of the party’s 
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political thought at the time. The victorious construction of socialism pronounced by 
the party’s 17th Congress in January and the USSR’s accession to the League of 
Nations in September of the same year had taken place against the disturbing backdrop 
of Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and the Nazi’s assumption of political 
power in Germany in 1933. The murder of Kirov must have served as an indication 
that no economic or political success could guarantee security in the current 
international context, making a call for unity and vigilance a reasonable, if formulaic 
response under the circumstances. 
Matveev’s understanding of the situation was different. Not content with a mere 
call of unity in the face of the enemy, the old communist also stated his views on who 
the enemy actually was and in this, his views differed considerably from those of Ots. 
For instead of placing the murder within the framework of the menacing foreign threat, 
Matveev drew the attention of his comrades to enemies within not just the country but 
the very factory. The defeated class enemy, “old Russia”, had struck against the party 
just as it was preparing to confront its enemies from abroad. It was not only those who 
were willing to resort to terrorism and murder that were enemies within. Matveev 
explicitly branded as enemies all those who were in anyway related to failures in 
production, attributing malicious intent to a broad range of problems ranging from 
truancy to equipment breakdowns. In line with Matveev’s parallel, the party 
organisation had to fall on these enemies just as the Bronze Horseman tramples the 
snake under hoof. 
Although preceding the mass violence of 1937 by more than two years, 
Matveev’s speech foreshadowed the character of the terror as a campaign driven in 
large part by the misperception of failures or accidents as hostile acts. What makes it 
particularly striking is that it was not prompted by anything Matveev could have seen 
on the press. Although Stalin’s suspicions appear to have settled on Zinovievites 
almost immediately after the murder, it was not until a couple of weeks later that 
supporters of the old Leningrad boss would be formally blamed for the crime.124 The 
articles that appeared in Pravda the day after the murder described the killer as “sent” 
                                                 





or “planted” (podoslannii) by the class enemy, suggesting a foreign angle. 125 
Matveev’s identification of the incompetent and the indifferent with the class enemy 
was therefore an independent conceptual act. Significantly, neither Matveev nor any 
other speaker had anything to say about the Zinoviev or any other opposition; it had 
not after all been a matter of concern within the organisation since the end of the 1920s. 
Although then Kirov’s murder was viewed as an attack on the party, Matveev’s speech 
provided an interpretation in distinctly new terms. 
It was only after Zinovievites in league with Whites were declared to have 
masterminded the murder that pressure on former oppositionists started to build in 
party organisations in Leningrad and throughout the country.126 Even so, vigilance with 
respect to the perfidious activities of oppositionists would emerge as a secondary 
theme at the meetings held as part of the renewed campaigns of organisational 
consolidation that were launched the following year. On 10 February 1935, the party 
organisation of what was now the Kirov plant held a general but closed meeting to take 
stock of the results of the discussions held around the confidential letter sent to party 
organisations nation-wide by the CC on 18 January. The letter had reiterated the 
allegations placing the “Leningrad centre” that had organised the murder under the 
tutelage of a “Moscow centre” that was therefore morally complicit in the crime and 
in no uncertain terms condemned the Zinovievites as “the most traitorous, the most 
contemptible of all factional groups in the history of our party”.127 
Kostia Karimov, by then a partkom member, delivered the main report. Karimov 
started his speech with some typical invocations of the need for revolutionary vigilance 
at a time of intensifying class struggle and, in the spirit of the CC letter, went on to 
warn that the party’s enemies were everywhere and would use any available means in 
their desperate struggle to undermine socialist construction. As an example, he cited 
the one million rouble loss suffered by the Institute of Workers’ Provisions, allegedly 
a result of the activities of the convicted Tolmazov who had been employed there.128 
Karimov went on to admonish his comrades to shed the habit of overlooking social 
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origins and political pasts in favour of workplace achievements, mentioning the case 
of one comrade Reviakin “who although not a bad communist or a bad superintendent, 
gave a bonus (premiroval) to a class alien and then made a theory about it, saying that 
bonus payments are not related to class”. According to Karimov, Reviakin failed to 
realise that “working well is a method of class struggle on the part of kulaks who have 
entered our party”.129 
It would be stretching credibility to suggest that Karimov seriously held this 
view, having observed him advocating for fellow communists precisely on the basis 
of their work record less than two years earlier. In fact, only a few minutes later he 
would return to the familiar theme of a strong work-ethic as a marker of political 
reliability, stating that the activity of party members, especially their performance in 
production, would have to be reviewed in a number of shops as “the vanguard role in 
production of our communists” was the main indicator of good party character 
(partiinost’).130  
Similarly contradictory views were also expressed by other speakers. Ter-
Asaturov, the engineer who would succeed Ots as factory director a year later, declared 
that it would be best to rid the factory once and for all of foreign elements, which he 
nevertheless equated with those who were not working correctly. According to Ter-
Asaturov, two mechanics at the 2nd mechanical shop had been found to disorganise 
production and been subsequently discovered to be class aliens. Nevertheless, “from 
the point of view production […] they probably worked better than the previous 
mechanic”. Ter-Asaturov admitted that if they had not been alien elements, their work 
could have been deemed satisfactory but in light of the circumstances the 
administration “had to remove them immediately”. He promptly went on to contradict 
himself as follows: 
On the other hand, we have instances in the shops of people who had been White 
NCOs (proporshchiki), but then spent ten years in the Red Army and have proven 
themselves in production. And what should we do? Let them be or remove them 
immediately? Of course it would be good if these workers were our own (nashi), 
but at the present day it is undoubtedly necessary to leave them at work, but in the 
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name of vigilance, some workers do not understand this issue, and begin to 
surround them in such an atmosphere in which a worker can’t work.131  
 
Even those militant speakers who did not see any reason to urge restraint could 
not quite decouple the question of one’s political attachments from that of their 
performance at work. Speaking immediately after Ter-Asaturov, Sokolov from the cast 
iron shop warned that the careful approach suggested by previous speakers could “lead 
to problems”. Among such problems Sokolov counted the activities of the planning 
department of his shop, which was staffed by people who were “difficult to trust”. 
After some further speculation that the problems created at his foundry by the 
suspicious planners were derailing the plan elsewhere in the factory, Sokolov 
eventually came to the topic of Zinovievism with reference to one Gusev. A “double-
dyed Zinovievite”, Gusev was apparently a serial “wrecker” who had somehow 
managed to be classed as a shock-worker and get “a shock-worker’s rations card and 
receive a good sum of money”. Having nearly beaten up some worker who called him 
out, Gusev was eventually fired but until that time, Sokolov claimed, “everyone was 
pampering (laskali) him” and gloating that they were thus creating “nice conditions”.132 
Karimov, Ter-Asaturov and Sokolov were all responding to a political signal 
from the centre by interpreting it in terms that were comprehensible to themselves and 
their audience, while at the same time drawing attention to those issues to which they 
assigned the greatest priority. Karimov, an experienced communist with years of shop-
floor experience as a fitter understood that if communists did not behave as model 
workers they could scarcely expect to induce their non-partisan colleagues to do so. 
An engineer with responsibility for plan fulfilment, Ter-Asaturov was probably more 
concerned about holding on to skilled and capable workers than about their pre-
revolutionary past. As high-ranking members within the context of the organisation, 
both Karimov and Ter-Asaturov demonstrated their vigilance by warning that 
performance should not be mistaken for loyalty but they had both barely finished their 
sentences before declaring that performance was in fact the most important form of 
loyalty.  
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By contrast, Sokolov’s concerns could be easily expressed in the language of 
vigilance, so that he did not have to qualify his condemnation of the Gusev with any 
calls for caution. According to Sokolov, Gusev was a bad worker, a “wrecker”, 
allowed to pretend to be an udarnik because of the organisation’s softness. He thus 
undermined both the interests of the factory and the authority of the party amongst 
non-party workers, having access to shock-worker privileges at a time of renewed 
concern about the availability of staples.133 For Sokolov, Gusev’s Zinovievism seems 
to have consisted entirely in his bad qualities as a worker. 
It is worth noting at this stage that the CC letter that provided the occasion for 
this meeting did not mention “wrecking” or sabotage as activities that the minions of 
the Leningrad and Moscow centres should be expected to engage in. Rich in adjectives 
but low in concrete information, the letter had denounced the Zinovievites as an 
unprecedentedly treacherous faction but had failed to provide any indication as to what 
kind of activities their devious henchmen might get up to. Thus, Karimov and the other 
speakers were of their own accord linking the question of the presence of political 
enemies with that of problems in production. It is unclear if they were doing so in an 
attempt to respond to views that had been expressed by workers like Matveev in the 
weeks since Kirov’s murder, or if they themselves genuinely believed that production 
was under threat because of the presence of hostile elements in the factory. In either 
case, their inability to discuss the problem of Zinovievism in its own terms 
demonstrates the extent to which political labels were meaningless outside the context 
of production within the framework of an industrial party organisation. 
As Kirov’s murder receded into the past, the notion of an organised political 
threat broadly related to Zinovievism gave way in party discourse to the older and 
much vaguer idea of the presence of alien elements amongst the ranks. The corollary 
of this was that at the grassroots level, the indeterminacy of the purported threat made 
it even less distinguishable from the ever present problems of industry. Thus, the 
national verification of documents campaign launched in May 1935 quickly got 
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entangled with the numerous other challenges faced by party organisations during that 
period, not least of which was the launching of the Stakhanovite movement later in the 
year.134 Protocol records from meetings held in the factory’s shops in late 1935 indicate 
that the verification campaign was rarely discussed even when it appeared on the 
meetings’ agendas, with speakers often admitting that they were failing to give it the 
required attention. When they did talk about it, Kirov communists more often than not 
linked the need to confirm the reliability of party card holders to specific failures in 
plan fulfilment which, in light of their comrades’ presence where they occurred, were 
seen as inexplicable.135 
An “explanation” would start to emerge about a year later, when the arrest of the 
deputy commissar of heavy industry Georgii Piatakov in September 1936 signified the 
shift of NKVD interest to industry as a site of subversive activities. Only a few days 
after the arrest, a lethal explosion at the Kemerovo mines in Siberia prompted the 
appointment of Nikolai Yezhov as NKVD boss. The subsequent highly publicised trial 
of former oppositionists and managerial staff as wreckers who had deliberately caused 
the explosions was followed less than three months later by the trial of the Parallel 
Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Centre, the second Moscow Trial which condemned Piatakov 
to death. 136  Thus, by the end of January 1937, the party leadership was issuing 
unequivocal signals that problems in production were the malicious work of enemies 
and saboteurs who inhabited the party-state apparatus. 
The ubiquitous presence of wreckers acted as the main point of reference against 
which the mass campaign of repression that marked Yezhov’s NKVD tenure was 
waged in industrial enterprises.  If however the perceived need to root out saboteurs 
provided the rationale for the hunt for enemies, the mechanism by which repression 
spread through industry was what on the face of it was a much more benevolent 
initiative. Apart from the Yezhovshchina, the year 1937 also witnessed the initiation of 
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Union-wide democratisation campaign, connected to the adoption of a new 
constitution in 1936. Intended to both reinforce and demonstrate political stability by 
introducing secret, multi-candidate elections to the soviets, the campaign was extended 
to the party and trade-union apparatuses with the aim of breaking up corrupt cliques 
and raising the legitimacy of their leadership bodies by forcing them to reconnect with 
the rank-and-file. 137  What amounted to a revival and amplification of the old 
samokritika campaign at a time when any production failure could be potentially 
viewed as an intentional compromising of national security provided the explosive mix 
of circumstances that fuelled the spread of repression throughout industry. 
Regional party chiefs throughout the country attempted to protect their fiefdoms 
by stalling or deflecting the campaign of democratisation. Since Kirov’s death 
however, the communist party in Leningrad had been led by Andrei Zhdanov, who 
had by that time emerged as the chief promoter of democratisation. Thus, a week after 
the end of the February-March 1937 plenum where he had first announced the 
campaign, Zhdanov gave an almost identical report to a plenum of the Leningrad 
obkom, where he harshly denounced the established practice of cadre appointment 
instead of election, declaring “long-term democratisation” to be the order of the day. 
The plenum then passed a resolution requiring all primary party organisations to begin 
holding their electoral meetings by 1 April and stipulating that reports on the work of 
outgoing partkomi be presented at every gathering.138 There would be no stalling in 
Leningrad. 
Promptly complying with the directive, the Kirov factory party organisation held 
its own meeting over three days from 15 to 17 April 1937. In line with the plenum 
resolution, the organisation held a non-delegated general assembly of party members, 
with over 2,500 communists congregating at the 5th mechanical shop to hear the main 
report.139 The partkom secretary Aleksei Tiutin painted a worrisome picture about the 
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political state of the enterprise, stating that there were over 1,000 expelled former 
members still in employment, “a whole army” of whom at least 37 had been 
Trotskyite-Zinovievites. Drawing attention to the dangers posed by the relaxation of 
vigilance, Tiutin attacked comrade Sviatogorov, the head of the factory’s inventors’ 
club, who loved to “write reports and a brag about his achievements” but had 
apparently failed to notice that his group had become the home of several enemies of 
the people.140 
Tiutin’s report extended over three hours and took up the entire time of the 
assembly’s first session. Despite the secretary’s attempts to appear sufficiently self-
critical about the work of the partkom in promoting political participation and 
promoting revolutionary vigilance, the following day’s issue of the factory newspaper 
Kirovets carried a less than ringing endorsement of his report: “The report of comrade 
Tiutin insufficiently mobilises to struggle, to the liquidation of weaknesses in party 
work, because of its weak samokritika and insufficient political acuteness”.141  
If Kirov communists had needed a definitive indication than a full-scale 
samokritika campaign was on the agenda, the Kirovets leader provided just that. Tens 
of party members registered to speak before their comrades that evening, with the 
agitated audience often interrupting with heckles, applause or laughter. Ribakov 
attacked both the partorg of the 2nd mechanical shop who had apparently gotten in 
trouble with the police for some financial offense and the partkom which had 
attempted to hide this from the shop-cell. He then attacked Ter-Asaturov for having 
spent only 14% of the assigned housing fund since becoming director, showing that 
“he cares more about plan-fulfilment, than about those who fulfil the plan”. 142 
Speranskii criticised the partkom practice of appointing so called “Varangian” 
organisers, that is outsiders who did not have the confidence of the shop-cells, noting 
that its choice for the cast iron shop had after Kirov’s murder been found to belong to 
“a Trotskyist gang”.143 
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A perennial issue, housing was also one of the lines of attack employed by one 
comrade Spitsa who, having started his speech with an attack on the Kirovets editor 
Antselovich for being lukewarm about samokritika, went on to warn that workers were 
spending thousands on temporary accommodation while the factory administration 
remained indifferent. Spitsa had exceeded his timeslot, but several voices from the 
floor demanded that the presidium allow him to continue. Buoyed by his comrades’ 
support, Spitsa pressed on:  
“I know of instances when a shop is not fulfilling its programme and comrade 
Ter-Asaturov, by secret order, illegally, gives the ITRs 40-20 thousand in bonuses. 
Why, I ask? ‘They insisted, what can you do, I had to give it’ /laughter, applause/ 
[…] We then put this issue before Tiutin, and Ter-Asaturov’s explanation satisfied 
[him].144  
 
The accusations of favouritism, suppression of criticism and plain indifference 
kept piling on the party and factory apparatuses as speakers succeeded each other on 
the podium. The partorg of the 1st mechanical shop Nikolai Es’kov emerged as one of 
the most skilled wielders of samokritika, beginning his contribution with an extensive 
apology concerning a recent bout of heavy drinking he had been seen to engage in after 
an aktiv meeting. Es’kov then spoke extensively on a number of problems 
demonstrating the lamentable state of party work, including the Kirovets editor’s 
disdain of samokritika, the almost non-existent accounting of members – an affliction 
which according to Es’kov extended to the raikom – and chiefly, the habitual neglect 
of duty by partkom members, only four of whom had bothered to turn up at its last 
session. Before standing down, Es’kov also attacked the partkom and Tiutin in 
particular for their careless attitude towards party members. A distinguished old 
worker, “auntie Niusha” Moiseeva had been suffering from a chronic illness but with 
the exception of Es’kov, none of the organisation’s officials had as much as paid her a 
visit, despite Es’kov’s attempts to get Tiutin to organise a visit. “Is this a way to treat 
people?” wondered the partorg, to applause from the audience.145 
Having thoroughly thrashed the factory’s party leadership in their speeches, the 
communists of the Kirov plant reassembled the following day to elect a new partkom, 
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with forty-four candidacies proposed for the committee’s eleven seats. 
Notwithstanding the attacks of the previous day, the incumbents Tiutin, Ter-Asaturov 
and Antselovich were successfully returned to the committee, joined by mostly new 
additions like Es’kov.146 
Within the next few months, the newly elected partkom would be decimated by 
arrests as the democratisation campaign initiated at the general assembly spilled over 
into the mass repression spreading through the country. Although it is not possible to 
examine the succession of denunciations and arrests in detail, the available evidence 
indicates that the dynamics of the process were similar to that in other major 
enterprises.147 In spite of complaints to the contrary during the assembly, Kirovets 
seems to have acted as a major facilitator of repression, publishing denunciations and 
egging on its readers to provide more “exposures”, with Tiutin coming once more 
under fire for attempting to keep a lid on the campaign.148  
In the summer of 1937, production failures relating to Kirov’s armaments 
building plans attracted the attention of both NKVD officers and the military 
representatives present in the factory. A number of arrests were made amongst 
managerial staff, while Ter-Asaturov himself started coming under intense pressure 
for his suspect staff appointments. During a shop-cell meeting, Spitsa, who as we have 
seen was rather suspicious of Ter-Asaturov’s soft treatment of underperforming ITRs, 
questioned the wisdom of the director’s appointment of Boris Vetiutnev as head of the 
factory’s artillery department, as he purportedly displayed a very relaxed attitude 
towards brak.149 
Vetiutnev was arrested on 29 June 1937 and tried by the Military Collegium of 
the Supreme Court of the USSR on 25 August. He was shot the same day.150 Similar 
fates would befall many other employees of the factory, both party members and non-
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partyists. By the end of 1937, three members of the partkom including Ter-Asaturov 
would be arrested by the NKVD and subsequently shot. When the mass violence 
campaign was finally wrapped up in the final months of 1938, almost three hundred 
of the factory’s employees had been executed, over a quarter of whom were 
communists.151  
In an incisive account, one of the most perceptive researchers of repression in 
industry argued that in effect, “the party organisations devoured themselves”. 152 
Although capturing the essentially senseless nature of the violence visited upon the 
Soviet people, this poignant formulation is not entirely accurate. Lethal as it was, the 
quantitative effect of the Yezhovshchina on the Kirov party organisation was in fact 
well below the incidence of expulsion during the 1933 purge and probably not much 
higher than the low rates of 1929.153 A different study by the same author reported 
similar rates in major Moscow factories.154 
Certainly, the disappearance of known colleagues and comrades cannot but have 
had a psychological impact that cannot be conveyed by statistical observations. 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that many, if not most, of those who 
perished did so because they were denounced by their comrades on the basis of 
suspicions that although baseless, were nonetheless real. As we saw earlier, the notion 
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that production failures amounted to sabotage had hardly been foreign to members of 
the organisation before it became standard discourse in the national press. 
At the same time, however macabre, the emergence of vacancies made possible 
the promotion of a new cohort of party members and distinguished workers to posts of 
greater significance. Es’kov was the only elected member of the 1937 partkom to be 
returned in 1938, this time as secretary.155 Viktor L’vov, until 1937 a superintendent at 
the blast furnace shop, briefly replaced Tiutin as partkom secretary, then became 
director and before the end of 1938 had become head of the short-lived People’s 
Commissariat of Machine Building.156 Even some who were subjected to denunciation 
managed through luck or effort to shake off the charges and end up in a better position 
than prior to 1937. Such was the case of Iakov Kapustin, who was expelled, reinstated, 
elected to the partkom and then left the factory to head the raikom.157 In total, around 
500 technicians, engineers and Stakhanovites were promoted to higher posts in 1938.158 
Thus, irrational violence notwithstanding, the Yezhovshchina had much the same 
function for the party organisation as the more benevolent purges of previous years, 
trimming the membership and opening up space for promotion within the context of a 
mass activist campaign. Significantly, the democratisation campaign that had 
precipitated the explosion of denunciations in the factories did not fizzle out entirely 
along with the repressions. Multicandidate elections for party posts at Kirov continued 
until the German invasion in 1941. These ranged from shop-level bureaus and the 
partkom to delegates to the district party conference. 159  All of these conditions 
contributed to the post-1937 rapid re-emergence of the organisation as a check on 
managerial authority that we observed in the preceding chapter. Rather than causing it 
to devour itself, the upheaval of repression seems to have strengthened the party 
organisation on the factory floor. 
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It was argued earlier that although acting as the main channel of rank-and-file 
influence on the factory floor, the party organisation differed significantly from a 
trade-union, in that its power was predicated on a set of political conditions that its 
activities were meant to maintain, most notably the nature of the Soviet party-state as 
a dual structure of distinct but overlapping executive and supervisory apparatuses, 
wherein the party performed the latter role. This chapter has traced the development 
of the KP/Kirov plant party organisation as part of the party-state within the context 
of the major political campaigns of the interwar years.  
The defeat of successive oppositionist challenges in the late NEP period laid the 
ground for the transformation of the party organisation from a space of contestation of 
alternative political projects to one of conflicts over matters pertaining to the 
productive process, which however continued to be framed in political terms. By 1929, 
the politics of production had emerged as the main activity of the organisation, 
displacing as it were the politics of politics. From that point onwards, the main concern 
of the organisation when it was not trying to run the factory was the process of party 
building. This amounted to a strengthening of the organisation as an actor in the 
politics of production by means of numerical expansion, raising members’ skill levels 
and excluding those who threatened the minimum level of political consensus 
necessary for the organisation to perform its new role. 
The successive purge campaigns initiated by the leadership during this period, 
including the repressions of 1937-8, were in effect concentrated, sped-up instances of 
the party-building process, during which party organisations were expected to reach a 
new level of political maturity before embarking on a new stage of the socialist project. 
Agitation, speeches, reviews and expulsions were the main components of all purges.  
Viewed in this larger context, these major political initiatives of the party 
leadership provide the opportunity for some broader remarks on the politics of 
mobilisation than was possible at the start of this chapter. First, while it is true that the 
purge campaigns fit well into the conceptual framework of mobilisation in that they 





offered here demonstrates that the process was more complicated than either a top-
down model of the activists as foot-soldiers of the leadership or a more interactive 
view allowing for the pursuit of relatively autonomous interests by the rank-and-file 
would suggest. The party organisation had a political life that extended beyond the 
mobilisation campaigns of the leadership. That is, the centre was not mobilising a 
politically inert mass and the rank-and-file did not have to wait for signals from above 
to become active. Instead, the centre’s initiatives mobilised an organisation that was 
already going about its own business which in the case of industry was the politics of 
production. The outcome was that the each campaign ended up being conducted within 
the current context of production politics while also leaving an imprint on its further 
development. 
Second, because the party leadership and the rank-and-file operated essentially 
within the same ideological framework, and because industrial production was itself a 
top political concern for the centre, it was possible for the rank-and-file to anticipate 
central political developments. The framing of production failures in terms of political 
disloyalty by KP/Kirov communists, well in advance of the press, is the most striking 
example of this. Having politicised the production process, securitising it was hardly 
a massive conceptual leap for communist workers. When this view came to dominate 
the national leadership, the stage was set for yet another mobilisation campaign that 
would differ from the others in that it would involve lethal state violence. It is perhaps 
not immaterial then that Nikolai Yezhov acquired his first experience of labour 
activism as a young striker in the Putilov works.160
                                                 









It has been argued in the preceding two chapters that the ability of party members to 
fulfil their vanguard role in production was predicated upon them having an adequate 
grasp of Marxist-Leninist ideology and elementary respect for the norms of Bolshevik 
organised life. To promote the interests of their shops and colleagues, communist 
activists had to be sufficiently in tune with the prevailing political moods in order to 
be able to frame their demands and arguments within the terms of official policy. It 
was the central role played by the party organisation in the politics of production that 
drew the rank-and-file into the sphere of politics proper from collectivisation to the 
unmasking of enemies. 
While participation in party life did not require a profound grasp of the minute 
details of Marxist political economy, in order to be an effective activist one still needed 
a level of knowledge of Marxism-Leninism that was not imparted by the mere fact of 
acquiring a party card. It was thus expected of party members to devote a considerable 
amount of time to their self-education, or “working on one’s self” in the parlance of 
the time.1 The raising of the rank-and-file’s level of political-ideological astuteness, as 
well as its cultural level more broadly, was thus a major aspect of the party building 
process described earlier and the organisation devoted a considerable amount of time 
and resources to activities that contributed to members’ cultural development.2 
Like most of the party’s initiatives, educational activities were more campaigns than 
events, seeking to involve broad numbers of non-party participants and taking place 
over extended periods of time. This chapter will examine the cultural-educational 
aspect of party activism at KP/Kirov and relate this to the functions of the organisation 
                                                 
1 On self-education as an ideological imperative, see Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, pp. 16-17. 
2 Enlightenment, or a general broadening and deepening of mental horizons, was an ambition that the 
Soviet state had for its entire population. Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses, pp. 211-237; Halfin and 
Hellbeck, “Rethinking”; Hellbeck, Revolution in my Mind. The point here is that much like in other 
areas, party members were expected to lead the way in cultural affairs both as a matter of principle 





examined earlier, thus rounding off the account of the industrial communist rank-and-
file offered in this thesis. It will be shown that the broad range of activities that fell 
within scope of the party’s mission of cultural enlightenment gave the latter significant 
material implications. Because of this, the intensity with which KP/Kirov communists 
engaged in cultural activism was to a significant extent independent of the attitudes 
prevalent amongst the central leadership, whether with respect to the relative weight 
attached to the party’s cultural mission or the actual content of the latter. This 
observation has significant implications that extend beyond the immediate scope of 
this thesis onto the broader historiographical debate of Soviet cultural policy in the 
interwar period. This will be examined in the following pages in greater detail, but it 
is worth briefly setting out the shape of this debate here in order to better frame the 
argument of this chapter.  
In broad terms, scholarly interest on Soviet cultural affairs has focused primarily 
on the question of the relationship between early attempts to transform the cultural 
landscape by means of ambitious educational and artistic initiatives, and a later turn 
towards more traditional practices and values. At its core, this debate has been about 
the extent to which these two periods, roughly delineated by the end of the 1st FYP, 
are better viewed as being defined by distinct and mutually exclusive political projects, 
or rather as a more incremental succession of cultural policy that did not signify a sharp 
political reorientation.  
Although few scholars would deny that significant changes did take place, there 
remains considerable difference of opinion on whether these may be subsumed under 
a broader continuity.3 This chapter will show that from the perspective of the party 
rank-and-file, the latter was the case. It will be argued that because the party relied on 
the same overworked activists to promote its cultural policy as it did for all of its 
initiatives, its ambitious plans always came up against the fact that the rank-and-filers 
could only do so much. In practice, communist workers engaged in the kind of cultural 
activism they could fit into activities they were engaged in anyway and which in any 
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case were higher up on their list of concerns, that is the familiar matters of factory life. 
The corollary of this is that when the overall direction of cultural policy did change, 
its shop-floor manifestation did less so. Cultural activities continued to rank below 
factory problems in the hierarchy of activists’ concerns and the content of those that 
did clear the bar was not particularly affected by whatever change of policy took place 
at the top.  
3.2 An attempt at Cultural Revolution, 1926-1931 
The period of Cultural Revolution in the USSR is usually conceived as part of the 
broader “socialist offensive” or “revolution from above” of the First Five Year Plan 
period and roughly dated from the Shakhty affair in 1928 to Stalin’s Six Conditions 
speech in June 1931. It therefore coincides chronologically with the party’s 
samokritika campaign, it being one of the means to the end of transforming the Soviet 
intelligentsia from a remnant of the former ruling class to a new revolutionary 
leadership with proletarian consciousness. 4  While this is certainly an accurate 
description for the country as a whole, there is some evidence suggesting that the party 
in Leningrad was attempting to pursue more ambitious cultural and political education 
projects than was the case nationally already upon Sergei Kirov’s assumption of the 
regional leadership.  
The resolution adopted at the extraordinary conference of the LPO held in 
February 1926 after the defeat of the Zinoviev Opposition made specific reference to 
the cultural underpinnings of the recent party crisis. The document urged members to 
pay closer attention to the rapidly expanding Komsomol, as well as the broader “non-
party mass” in the trade-unions, soviets and co-ops. 5  In the ideologically blurry 
environment of the NEP, these broader groups of people who had not “been through 
the school of class struggle and proletarian organisation” were more vulnerable to 
falling victim to pessimistic petty-bourgeois mentalities.6 Motivated by concerns about 
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the politically unhealthy effects of such attitudes on members and their ability to 
promote party policy amongst the population at large, the new gubkom bureau adopted 
an extensive plan of cultural and educational activities, ranging from organising 
recreational walks and excursions during the summer period to doing work with 
national minorities and establishing cultural clubs.7 Some months later, the bureau 
reaffirmed its commitment to this aspect of party work, requesting the CC to almost 
double the budget of its agitprop department.8 
These were not isolated actions. Throughout 1926, the new Leningrad leadership 
had kept a close watch on the progress of the party’s cultural-educational initiatives, 
with matters falling within the purview of the agitprop department appearing with 
almost the same frequency as economic issues on the bureau’s agenda.9 Only a few 
days after the LPO’s extraordinary conference had confirmed the leadership change, 
the bureau produced a resolution expressing alarm over the state of the region’s 
rabselkor, or workers’ and peasants’ correspondents’ movement and ordering its 
complete overhaul.10 Territorial and city-wide correspondents’ associations were to be 
abolished, and district committees were instructed to reorganise the movement on the 
basis of activist circles (kruzhki) formed around the wall newspapers (stengazeti) of 
specific workplaces, to make sure that published content was more relevant to their 
readers.11 
Kirov’s bureau also laid out ambitious plans with respect to the LPO’s work 
amongst women, their emancipation (raskreposhchenie) being a major pillar of the 
party’s struggle against cultural backwardness throughout the interwar period.12 On 23 
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March, the bureau produced a “work plan for women workers and peasants” aimed at 
strengthening the party apparatus amongst women by recruiting to the party those most 
actively engaged in public and professional organisations. The document also 
proposed a thorough review of the state of shop-floor party work amongst women to 
take place over the following thirty days, with representatives of the gubkom to visit 
district and primary party organisations’ meetings and conduct personal interviews 
with women activists. According to the resolution, the LPO was to intensify its efforts 
to attract women to literacy circles and increase their presence in technical skills 
courses to a level correspondent to that of their presence in the workforce. Mass 
cultural work amongst women was to be expanded, with a series of activities on topics 
like “Marriage and Family” and “Religion and Worker (Rabotnitsa)” planned for the 
Easter period. With respect to this, the resolution instructed activists to pay particular 
attention to domestic workers and housewives due to their relative isolation from 
public affairs, and devise appropriate forms of organisation to ensure the establishment 
of permanent contacts amongst them.13 
Similar issues were a major theme in regional party directives the following year 
as well. A review of the work of the party organisation of the Skorokhod factory 
identified members’ low level of political education as one of the least bright spots of 
the group’s record and instructed its bureau to strengthen its network of party schools, 
with special attention to women and youth.14 Cultural and political work amongst 
women was also the main item on the agenda of a gubkom bureau meeting on 16 
February 1927 which reviewed the implementation of the relevant work-plan of the 
preceding year and, noting some modest achievements, set higher targets for the 
“promotion of women to leading posts”.15  
The commitment of the regional leadership to revolutionising the city’s cultural 
life is also reflected in another resolution taken at the same meeting which set out plans 
for party work amongst “science workers”. According to the document, the main task 
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of the LPO was to “attract a broad circle of materialist-minded, loyal to soviet power” 
scientists and intellectuals to cooperate with the party in “a common front against 
reactionary idealist worldviews”. In order to achieve this goal, the party would have 
to strengthen its organisations in educational institutes and ensure that communist 
scholars were relieved of party assignments to concentrate on their research. At the 
same time, the resolution stipulated that research should be “oriented towards the 
concrete tasks of socialist construction” and that its results should be “disseminated 
amongst the masses” in open workshops and public debates.16 
The preceding examples provide a good picture of the close attention paid to 
cultural and education affairs by the LPO gubkom bureau under Kirov’s leadership.17 
A number of reasons can be adduced to account for this. First, cultural experimentation 
was a major trait of the NEP-period and as the traditional centre of Russian intellectual 
activity and home of the Revolution, Leningrad could not remain unaffected.18 Second, 
as discussed earlier, the new leadership saw the intellectual and cultural development 
of the party rank-and-file as a key task in preventing the re-emergence of an 
oppositionist challenge to the CC majority line. Higher education institutions in 
particular had a complicated role to play in this process, with the Leningrad student 
body having in the past demonstrated particular vulnerability to the allures of the Left 
Opposition and the faculty of the city’s University having been compromised by its 
association with the Zinovievites.19  
A combination of factors relating to contemporary political imperatives and 
historical precedent thus led the various aspects of cultural development to the top 
places of the political agenda of Leningrad’s regional leadership. Given the importance 
attached to this area of party work by the gubkom bureau, we should expect the 
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activities of the city’s primary party organisations to reflect similar priorities at least 
to some extent. This, however, seems not to have been exactly the case. We have 
already seen in previous chapters that the new leadership of the party organisation at 
KP was immediately overwhelmed by the problems of production in the enterprise. 
Despite the commitment of Ivan Gaza’s bureau to party building, the strictly political 
and organisational aspects of party work had to take second place to resolving issues 
like stoppages, brak and wage disputes, all of which had contributed considerably to 
the success of Zinoviev’s supporters in attracting the factory’s workers to their cause. 
Education being the qualitative aspect of party building, it too was put on the 
backburner. 
This is not to say that KP communists did not make any efforts to implement the 
gubkom’s directives. A month after the party assembly that withdrew the 
organisation’s support from the opposition in January 1926, members serving on the 
agitprop committee of the organisation held a meeting to discuss plans and distribute 
responsibilities for educational work for the following three months. The resolution 
produced stipulated that efforts should be made to attract more workers to be rabkori 
while making sure that the existing network of political education (partprosv) should 
be strengthened by recruiting more workers from the shop-cells to do educational 
work. During the meeting, Kovsh argued that more attention should be paid to political 
agitation amongst women. This point was also included in the resolution, which 
assigned Kovsh the responsibility of coming up with a plan for the relevant work.20 No 
other concrete measures were agreed on.  
The underwhelming output of this meeting lies in stark contrast to the ambitious 
plans produced by the regional bureau a few months later and cited above. A similar 
assessment of educational work at the factory was made by the agitprop collegium of 
the Moskovsko-Narvskii party raikom in a review of the organisation’s progress on 19 
April. The main report was delivered by Kasparov, who outlined the achievements of 
the organisation in terms of organising courses and study circles on Marxism-Leninism 
and “self-education” and promoting press subscription amongst the party rank-and-file 
and KP’s workers more broadly. Kasparov stressed that cultural activities had been 
                                                 





more popular amongst non-party members than expected, with around 45% of the 
entire workforce of 12,000 having taken participated in one way or another. 21 The 
libraries organised and maintained by the organisation were amongst its most popular 
achievements, having served 4,122 readers in February of whom 847 belonged to the 
party.22  
Despite these results however, Kasparov complained that the party’s cultural 
activism was being undermined by the fact that foremen did not take it into account 
when assigning shifts, leading to some workers being irregularly, if at all able to 
participate. This had the effect of keeping the level of discussion at study circles at a 
very elementary level, a problem compounded by the fact that 17 out of 20 shop-cell 
agitprop activists had only joined the party in the last mass recruitment drive of 1924-
1925.23 Kondratiev, the communist responsible for agitprop at the factory’s old forge 
gave his report after Kasparov, noting in similar manner that shift work and the lack 
of appropriate premises were posing significant problems to the expansion of shop-
floor cultural activism, despite the recent achievement of organising a “red corner” for 
the first time. The overall assessment of cultural work at KP given by Levina on behalf 
of a monitoring committee (obsledovatel’nii komitet) set up to review the shops’ 
agitprop painted an even bleaker picture. In her supplementary report, Levina stated 
that KP organisation had failed to take advantage of “the positive peculiarities” of the 
factory in terms of history and party saturation to establish a strong grassroots agitprop 
network. No work-plan had been produced, the shop-cells remained without leadership 
from the bureau and the study circles organised were doing poorly both in terms of 
their curricula and their composition.24 
Levina’s criticisms and the complaints of Kasparov and Kondratiev are very 
illustrative of the constraints placed by shop-floor realities on the party’s ambitious 
plans of cultural transformation. Inexperienced activists had to teach their colleagues 
things they probably barely understood themselves, more often than not after a long 
shift at the bench with all the attendant frustrations caused by stoppages and break-
                                                 
21 TsGAIPD, f. 1012, op. 1, d. 264, l. 1. 
22 Ibid., l. 2. 
23 Ibid., l. 3. 





downs. Whether members of the party or not, foremen were more concerned about 
meeting their production targets than not upsetting the schedule of party study circles 
with their shift rotas. It is perhaps indicative of both the misunderstanding of the 
problem and the helplessness of the organisation before it that the only suggestion 
made by Levina was moving “towards a system of shop-level agitprop assemblies”, 
which was to add one more layer of activity to resolve an issue brought about in large 
part by excessive workloads.25 
The raikom review had a certain urgency about it because less than two weeks 
later, the factory would be hosting a major celebration of its 125-year anniversary. The 
event took place one day before the May Day celebrations on the 30th of April and 
seems to have been an enormous success.26 Thousands of KP workers and other locals 
assembled at the factory’s giant tractor shop which had been converted to a beflagged 
exhibition of the factory’s achievements. An artillery gun and a KP-produced tractor 
were placed on each side of the meeting’s presidium to represent the factory’s 
transition from military to peaceful production under Soviet rule. The main event 
consisted of a series of speeches by old Putilovites who recounted their experience of 
clandestine organisation during the 1905 revolution and WWI, urging the new 
generation of workers to new feats of labour and industry. The celebrations were 
attended by a number of dignitaries, including Sergei Kirov, trade-union, Red Army 
and Comintern representatives along with delegations from the Communist Party of 
Germany and the Mongolian Popular-Revolutionary Party. 
Representatives from Leningrad City Soviet and other factories also addressed 
the meeting. A worker from Krasnii Viborzhets drew much applause from the audience 
after he presented the presidium with a figurine of a tongs-wielding worker 
representing the readiness of Soviet metalworkers to “nip the tail of the global 
bourgeoisie”.27 The jovial atmosphere was enhanced by the flourishes and tunes played 
by KP’s own choir and orchestra, which also performed a march it had composed 
especially for the occasion after Ivan Gaza’s closing speech. 
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All of the traits of the new socialist culture envisaged by the Bolsheviks were in 
evidence at the celebration, including awareness of past sacrifice, optimism for the 
future and an internationalist outlook tempered with a resolute determination to defend 
revolutionary gains from the machinations of global imperialism.28 It seems however 
unlikely that the KP party organisation, whose agitprop activists were struggling to 
draw up plans for study circles, could have put together such a well organised event.29 
It is instead more probable that given the high profile of the event and the presence of 
foreign visitors, the regional leadership had provided at least some material and 
organisational assistance.30 
Whatever the case, as successful as the anniversary celebration was in its own 
terms, it does not seem to have provided a boost to KP cultural activism for much 
longer than its one-day duration. A similarly festive mood was apparent the following 
evening at the opening of KP’s cultural club on the site of an old church across the 
factory gates, but less than a month later complaints about the persistent weakness of 
cultural activism re-emerged at party meetings.31 At the annual electoral assembly of 
the organisation which met on 27 May, the uninspiring record of the organisation in 
the agitprop priorities set by the gubkom was remarked on by a number of speakers. 
In the main report, Gaza lamented the state of political education, the drop-out rate of 
which had reached 40%. Little progress had also been made in setting up a rabkor 
collective, as members of the would-be editorial group were at odds with each other 
on how to proceed. Chervinskii commented that at the tractor department they did not 
even know who the candidate editors were.32 Dmitriev complained that agitprop was 
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non-existent and cultural activism had been left to its own devices without any 
leadership from the party.33  
It should be noted here that all such mentions of the problems faced by the party 
in its mission of enlightenment appeared as afterthoughts within much longer speeches 
on production problems and disputes. One of the zapiski passed to Gaza from the floor 
complained that the he had not said a word about work amongst women in his report. 
The secretary responded that there were about three hundred women in the factory and 
that a special organiser had been assigned by the raikom to lead work with women 
workers.34 In a factory of more than 10,000 workers, the otherwise attentive Gaza 
could only think about the issues concerning specifically the small minority of female 
employees as being somebody else’s problem, despite indications by the gubkom that 
they ought to be taken seriously.35 The resolution produced at the end of the meeting 
showed a similar attitude to cultural work more generally, stating that the organisation 
had to “increase the political and cultural level of the aktiv”, but offering little in the 
way of practical measures to achieve this goal.36 
The revival of internal political turmoil the following year pushed cultural 
activism even further down the list of priorities of the organisation. For the duration 
of 1927, educational activities and the state of agitprop were rarely mentioned at party 
meetings, as the combined strain placed on the organisation by the Regime of 
Economy and the emergence of the United Opposition left little time for the 
consideration of other matters. To the extent that the state of activity circles and similar 
initiatives was discussed, it was usually in the form of complaints by the communists 
leading them about the lack of support they had received from the bureau.37 Even when 
the state of the organisation’s cultural activities was among the main items on 
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meetings’ agendas, it was often the case that discussion strayed into the more pressing 
matters of the factional struggle. Thus, while the annual bureau report delivered by 
Gaza at the party assembly of September 1927 contained extensive information on the 
number and attendance of the various kruzhki organised by party members, it was 
impossible to keep the meeting focused on this topic. The intensification of the 
leadership struggle during the preceding summer overwhelmed the discussion, leading 
to calls from the floor to interrupt speakers not addressing the actual business of the 
meeting or wrap up the assembly altogether.38 
The information presented by Gaza provides furthers indication of the 
organisation’s difficulties in implementing the party’s ambitious plans for cultural 
activism. On the basis of the figures cited by the partorg, it appears that KP 
communists had made considerable progress in setting up things but were not doing 
as well in sustaining participation. Thus, some form of agitprop had reached every 
single factory employee at least once, with a gross number of over 90,000 having 
participated in 845 lunch-break discussion sessions (besedi).39 These figures do not 
however provide an indication with regard to the extent of participants’ commitment 
or actual interest in the issues discussed, beyond recording the fact that some sort of 
discussion took place. Similarly, the numbers given on the membership of mass public 
organisations appear impressive on the one hand, with the civil defence group 
OSOAVIAKHIM and the International Association of Aid to Revolutionaries (MOPR) 
counting 2,082 and 4,799 members amongst the KP workforce respectively. However, 
the aktiv of these groups was considered to be made up of only 96 and 124 of these 
members.40 KP communists had thus succeeded in getting several thousands of their 
comrades and colleagues to demonstrate civic consciousness by signing up to assist in 
civil defence and support persecuted communists around the world, but had failed to 
ensure that they actually stayed regularly involved in the relevant activities. 41 
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Participation rates left much to be desired even amongst those activists specifically 
charged with the task of overseeing cultural activism in KP, with meeting attendance 
reaching an average of only 50% for the factory’s 29-member cultural commission.  
This puts into perspective some of the other achievements claimed by Gaza. 
According to the report, there were 380 rabkori at KP writing for no less than 8 factory-
wide and 15 shop-level papers. While we have no reason to doubt that these numbers 
are real, we may question the extent to which these papers were produced with any 
regularity. Even if there was enough going on at KP to justify the existence of eight 
separate publications covering the entire enterprise, one third of the rabkori editorial 
groups had never met.42 This suggests that the ambitious cultural plans of the new 
Leningrad leadership notwithstanding, the KP party achieved mixed results in putting 
them into practice. Rabkor groups and kruzhki for various activities had been set up 
and large numbers of KP workers had been attracted to them regardless of party 
affiliation. On the other hand, a large part of the membership of these groups likely 
existed only on paper, leaving overworked and poorly qualified activists to run them 
with little assistance from the organisation’s leadership. 
This trend would persist even as the Cultural Revolution began to gather 
momentum the following year. On 13 March 1928, the obkom held a joint meeting 
with the secretaries of primary party organisations of the city’s Vasileostrovskii and 
Moskovsko-Narvskii districts, thus including KP’s Gaza. The regional agitprop 
department had prepared an extensive report on the progress of the party’s 
enlightenment mission which warned that cultural development lagged significantly 
behind economic growth throughout Leningrad. Despite significant achievements in 
setting up adult education institutes and similar activity groups, the report indicated 
that library work and the literacy campaign had slowed down considerably in the 
preceding year, in the latter case leading to significant relapse rates.43 This is of course 
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consistent with the account of KP cultural activism given above; whether students or 
instructors, the party’s overworked activists could just not keep up with everything 
expected of them.  
This would not change significantly in the years of the 1st FYP. Despite the 
party’s determination to create a new, thoroughly proletarianised intelligentsia through 
cultural class struggle, the flurry of new initiatives promoted during the Cultural 
Revolution ended up considerably tempered by the constraints of time and resources. 
As the collectivisation and industrialisation campaigns got underway, the obkom began 
to devote increasingly more time to coming up with stop-gap measures to resolve 
supply bottlenecks and acute shortages than proletarian enlightenment.44 The party’s 
educational mission did continue, but it was now subordinated to the more pressing 
tasks of providing the population with the skills needed to run an industrial economy.45 
As might be expected, primary party organisations felt the strain of the socialist 
offensive more directly than the obkom, leading to a proportional shift of rank-and-file 
attention even further away from cultural activism than had been the case during the 
Regime of Economy period. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, during the 1st 
FYP KP communists among other things got involved in the 25,000ers campaign, the 
1929 purge and the shock-work movement, all against the backdrop of bitter conflicts 
with the factory administration over the impossible tractor target assigned by the 
government. It should be hardly surprising then that cultural and educational activities 
appear in KP party records from this period primarily with reference to their failure or 
absence, if at all.46 In fact, what was perhaps the greatest success of the organisation in 
terms of agitprop in this period had taken place several months before the launch of 
the FYP in February 1928, when the factory’s rabkor publications were consolidated 
to form the Krasnii Putilovets paper.47 The paper went on to become an established 
part of factory life and played an important role in the ouster of the factory’s director 
Grachev a couple of years later.48 Putilovets also became the main medium for KP’s 
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litkruzhkovtsi, the group of primarily Komsomol amateur poets and writers among the 
factory’s workers. 49   Nevertheless, the rabkor movement was only one of many 
initiatives through which the party was attempting to transform daily life, few of which 
would thrive during the FYP.50 
KP communists were not entirely indifferent to their organisation’s failures on 
the cultural front. The more conscientious amongst them demonstrated strong concern 
about this crucial aspect of party building even at the height of the industrialisation 
drive. The last person to take the floor during the discussion of the purge campaign 
results in November 1929, Trutnev warned that the campaign had revealed that “many 
of our communists are captives of cultural-political darkness”. He went on to wonder: 
Is it possible for a communist without elementary knowledge to exert influence 
over alien and even hostile forces amongst us? Is it possible for a superintendent 
who is a cultural-political invalid [sic] to lead work on the balance of class power 
etc.? Before everything else, we must study, study and study.51 
 
Like the obkom, Trutnev believed that the low educational level of the rank-and-
file posed a threat to the party’s ability to perform its leadership role, both in terms of 
running production and forestalling political opposition. Whatever the views of 
Trutnev’s comrades however, they did not view the matter with the same urgency. 
Neither the question notes nor the main speaker’s closing remarks expressed similar 
concerns. This trend continued for the remainder of the 1st FYP period and besides the 
occasional lecture on ideology, cultural activism retreated into the background.52 
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Transforming a giant machine-building plant into a beacon of culture was always 
going to be a tall order. This was doubly so within the context of the 1st FYP, with 
shop-floor conflict and chaotic work schedules placing severe limits on the scope of 
activities not directly related to production. Against this backdrop, the successful 
setting up of Krasnii Putilovets and a writers’ collective were no mean feats. At the 
same time however, the organisation failed to establish a reliable, functioning network 
of educational and cultural activities to free the rank-and-file from the bonds of cultural 
darkness as per the words of Trutnev. Like most aspects of the socialist offensive, the 
attempt of KP communists at cultural revolution yielded mixed results. 
 
3.3 Not so great a retreat, 1932-1941 
Following the completion of the 1st FYP, the party leadership embarked on a campaign 
of all-round consolidation that was marked by a more moderate approach to most 
aspects of policy. In industry, technical competence came to be valued more than 
shock-work and edinonachalie started to be promoted over samokritika, if not always 
consistently so. A similar attitude of going slower and taking stock led the party to 
freeze recruitment and shift through its vastly expanded membership in the 1933 
purge.  
Disillusionment with the results of earlier rounds of radical experimentation also 
motivated a series of reversals on the cultural sphere. The Soviet 1930s witnessed 
among other things the rehabilitation of Russian history, the reintroduction of 
traditional methods of schooling and the promotion of traditional family values. 53 
Avant-garde tendencies in literature and music were condemned in favour of 
purportedly more accessible themes inspired by tradition and every-day life. 54 
Famously, Stalin started to become the subject of increasingly magniloquent public 
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adoration which cast his leadership in patriarchal terms, not entirely unlike those used 
to praise the Tsars.55 
The Russian exile sociologist Nikolai Timasheff interpreted these developments 
in terms of a “Great Retreat” from the Soviet revolutionary project, inspired by a 
realisation on the Bolsheviks’ part that their experiment had failed.56 It is not the 
purpose of this account to examine Timasheff’s argument in depth, but it should be 
noted that the view from the ground suggests less of an about-turn than is implied in 
the notion of a great retreat.57 This seems to be due to a misrepresentation of the actual 
state of affairs under the status quo ante.58 As indicated above, there are strong reasons 
to doubt the extent to which the party had succeeded in implementing its cultural 
programme by the time this was purportedly abandoned at the end of the FYP.  
The same combination of ambitious plans for cultural projects and recalcitrant 
objective realities on the ground is reflected in the activities of KP communists 
throughout the 1930s. The first couple of years after the completion of the 1st FYP the 
LPO’s first order of business was to address the crises generated by the upheaval, with 
the food and housing shortages caused by famine and in-migration being the most 
pressing issues.59 Thus, resolutions addressing problems in housing construction and 
the distribution of rations dominated the agenda of obkom plenary sessions in 1932-
1934.60 Even then however, the regional leadership remained sufficiently concerned 
with the cultural state of the LPO to keep the pressure on the lower party organs 
regarding the educational dimension of their work. In October 1934, at one of the last 
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plenums before Kirov’s death, the obkom voted on a lengthy resolution regarding the 
“ideological arming” of Leningrad communists. The document noted a number of 
weaknesses in the party’s ideological work, including predictably that organisations 
were not affording it the appropriate amount of attention. The resolution went on to 
state that cultural awareness was a necessary precondition for the performance of the 
party’s vanguard role, listing “science, art and literature” among the main subjects that 
the good communist ought to be conversant in. Such broad general knowledge would 
enhance the ability of rank-and-filers to participate actively in the party’s discussion 
and decision-making processes, while at the same time enabling them to relate party 
policy to real every-day issues.61 
During the same period, KP communists attempted to get their own cultural 
activism up to the standards of the obkom. The 9th Conference of the organisation held 
in April 1932 heard a report from Aleksandr Ugarov, head of the cultural department 
(kul’tprop) of Leningrad’s city party committee (gorkom). The hour-long speech 
concerned the “tasks of Marxist-Leninist education in the factory” and its content is 
indicative of both the importance attached to this task by the party leadership and the 
difficulties faced by the rank-and-filers trying to implement it.62 
Ugarov began his talk by reiterating the importance of educational activities as 
an “enormous part of party work” without which it would be impossible to “resolve 
the fundamental questions of socialist construction” and “craft a successful foreign 
policy”.63 In order to stress his point, the gorkom functionary referred to the case of a 
kolkhoz in Valdai district, where the local party organisation’s relaxed attitude towards 
ideological instruction had allowed former kulaks to assume leading posts. According 
to Ugarov, after predictably distributing most of the collectivised animals to their own 
households, the kulaks went on to cancel the party’s educational initiatives.64 The 
morale of the story was that only the class enemy stood to benefit from an 
abandonment of the party’s educational mission, a lesson especially apposite in the 
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case of KP’s own organisation, where youth of peasant origin made up a large part of 
its massively expanded membership, around half of which had only candidate status.65  
During his talk, Ugarov received a note from the floor suggesting that 
educational sessions should be treated in the same way as labour discipline, with 
“truancy” controlled by means of appropriate disciplinary sanctions. This prompted 
the kul’tprop to warn against “administrative attitudes” towards the party’s cultural 
activism, arguing that the process of assimilating recent recruits and improving the 
abilities of old ones was necessarily a protracted one that required patience.66  
Ugarov’s report provides a succinct overview of leadership views on party 
education, but it is the ensuing discussion that offers a glimpse into the way these were 
received by the rank-and-file. Of course, nobody disagreed in principle with Ugarov’s 
take on educational activities; the problem was one of implementation. Fratkin, one of 
the members of the editorial group of Krasnii Putilovets complained that factory affairs 
took up all of the organisation’s time, with shop cell meetings often having to hear 
extensive reports on the progress of their production plans. This left little time for 
discussing even such prominent political affairs as party conferences, let alone 
questions of cultural activism. According to Fratkin, wall-newspapers were little more 
than complaints forums, reporting that “this or that guy is a self-seeker, truant, etc.” 
but not much of substance.67 Similarly, Sobolevskii stated that at the factory’s turbine 
department, around two thirds of the party’s members and candidates were not 
involved in any kind of educational activity.68  
Deviatkin brought up the perennial issue of the organisation’s failure to devote 
sufficient time to work among women, noting that this had not even been mentioned 
in the report, to supportive cries of “that’s right!” from the floor.69 Krasnopolina, a 
delegate from the KP’s Komsomol, warned that the state of education amongst the 
factory’s youth was such that some members lacked basic political knowledge and 
even thought that “the Komsomol is the vanguard of the party”. She went on to argue 
                                                 
65 Ibid., ll. 20-21, 58. 
66 Ibid., ll. 27-28. 
67 Ibid., ll. 39-41. 
68 The exact numbers were 173 out of 268 and 56 out of 83 for members and candidates respectively. 
Ibid., l. 54. 





that party members had failed to provide adequate leadership to the youth, with not a 
single one of the tractor department’s shop cells having devoted any time to reviewing 
Komsomol work. Seizing on Ugarov’s point regarding the vulnerability of young 
people to bourgeois ideology, Krasnopolina stated that the factory Komsomol had 
attempted to put together a series of events dedicated to the life of youth before the 
revolution, but very few party members had agreed to help out. The youth 
representative closed her contribution by urging the organisation to pay as much 
attention to education as it did to production, drawing applause from the floor.70 
Like their comrade Tutnev some years earlier, activists like Deviatin and 
Krasnopolina were genuinely worried by their organisation’s substandard performance 
in cultural activism and education. In this, their views were entirely in line with those 
of the party leadership as expressed by Ugarov and the obkom resolutions cited above. 
Like the leadership, concerned activists could do little more than reiterate the 
significance of the party’s cultural mission and the resolution produced at the end of 
the conference itself merely recorded the many weak-spots of educational work, 
without stating any concrete plan of action to remedy these.71 
It is hard to gauge the extent to which these complaints reflected real indifference 
to cultural activism on the part of large numbers of the party rank-and-file or the 
unrealistic expectations of those who voiced them. To be sure, even with the best of 
intentions, it is not hard to imagine why experienced workers would be keener to get 
on with the business of making tractors and turbines than offering history lessons to 
the young. Solving problems of production was simply a higher priority, affecting both 
remuneration and personal safety for everyone involved. On the other hand, warnings 
against ideological laxity notwithstanding, there was quite a lot of party-educational 
work going at KP at the time. Shortly before the organisation’s conference, the 
partkom had organised a competition between the numerous party study groups 
operating in the factory. One of the best was run by Krasnoshevskii, a 1930 recruit 
who had spent twenty years working at the factory. Krasnoshevskii’s group had an 
attendance rate of 72% and had organised a small campaign of looking into the state 
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of consumer services available to workers of the tractor department’s erecting shop, as 
an assignment in connection with the decisions of the October 1931 CC Plenum.72 
Significantly, the group had managed to recruit five new members to the party during 
its activities. Similar achievements were reported by the partkom for the other winning 
groups, all of which were awarded literary book-coupons.73 The partkom awarded 
similar prizes to some instructors dispatched to the enterprise from the Leningrad 
Region Communist Academy (LOKA), the prestigious party-affiliated educational 
institute that had been supervising the organisation’s cultural mission for the preceding 
couple of years.74 
In light of these achievements and the fact that KP communists were receiving 
specialised assistance from the party’s own higher learning institute, it may be 
tempting to view the alarm expressed regarding the state of cultural activism by some 
of the speakers at the conference as misplaced or exaggerated. It is more likely 
however that what was at play had once again more to do with a divergence of 
priorities than an absolute lack of interest about cultural matters in some quarters. In a 
still primarily male factory, the even more male party membership struggled to take 
women’s issues sufficiently seriously, even though it was a male communist who 
raised the issue.75 Even young communist workers were probably more concerned with 
everyday matters than the type of ideological education appropriate for youth. The 
advantage of the consumer services related activities organised by groups like 
Krasnoshevskii’s was that they touched on issues that were of primary concern to 
every worker in the factory, perhaps more so for the minority of women.76 
Other initiatives of cultural activism that met with success during the same 
period lend further support this view. Perhaps the most extensive and elaborately 
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planned of these was a competition for the best canteen (stolovaia) held over two 
months in September 1933. The competition involved the setting up of a seven person 
commission to investigate the performance of the factory’s canteens in terms of 
cleanliness, speed of service, the food’s caloric value and responsiveness to 
complaints. Apart from visiting twelve canteens and interviewing users and staff, the 
commission also conducted two “night raids” to ensure appropriate standards were 
maintained during the night shifts too.77 The results were announced at a meeting 
attended by one hundred representatives from the party, trade-union, Komsomol, 
administration and canteen committees (stolovie kommissii). Speakers at the event 
demonstrated all the traits of Bolshevik militancy, including samokritika, 
denunciations of incompetence and mutual admonishments to strive for better results. 
Delivering the report, the commission member Potikov classified the stolovie in 
groups of “bad”, “good”, and “best”, enumerating the achievements and failures of 
each to the audience. Thus amongst the “bad” ones, canteen No. 29 of the rolling-mill 
shop had failed to make planned renovations, did not provide tea and had been the 
subject of rat and cockroaches infestations for which nothing was being done. No. 5 
of the tractor department’s forge shop was also a poor performer with Potikov stating 
that there was “no discipline in the canteen”, as reflected by the numerous broken 
forks, flies in the kitchen and two kilograms worth of wasted cabbage. On one 
occasion, the poor planning at No. 5 had led to lunch service being delayed for two 
hours.78 
“Good” canteens were not necessarily free of such problems, but their 
committees demonstrated an attitude conducive to improvement. Thus, canteen No. 32 
serving the factory’s construction workers had been on schedule with its repairs and 
was regularly meeting the target of 1,033 calories per meal and smooth service ensured 
that there were no queues. However, No. 32 had had wastage (brak) amounting to the 
18kg of potatoes and been the subject of complaints about cockroaches. What saved 
No. 32 a “bad” assessment was that its committee was “leading a struggle” (vedet 
bor’bu) against these failures.79 In the same way, it was the efforts of its committee 
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that won canteen No. 34 the best assessment in the competition. This stolovaia had not 
only exceeded its caloric target on two separate samplings and never been infested by 
any critters, but its committee had been on such good terms with staff that they had 
even managed to organise the production of a wall-newspaper.80  
Closing his report, Potikov encouraged those canteens that were “lagging 
behind” to strive to “transform themselves into leading, exemplary canteens” by the 
October celebrations. 81  In the discussion that followed, speakers addressed issues 
overlooked by the report in similarly militant terms. Belokurova, a trade-union 
representative, criticised the poor oversight exercised by some committees, noting that 
at canteen No. 28 – which had not been part of the competition – the committee had 
failed to realise that the canteen’s auditor, one Solov’ev, was working with expired 
credentials. As a result, Solov’ev “almost seized the revenue” of the canteen, before 
union activists “unmasked” (razoblachili) him.82 Martianov, the committee chairman 
of canteen No. 17 took the floor to criticise the non-rounded prices that canteens had 
to charge leading to complaints when workers were short-changed because of the low 
availability of single kopek coins. 83 Other speakers complained about the familiar 
problems of bad planning, interference by outsiders and substandard performance by 
some activists. In his closing remarks, the chair of the meeting Zhukov suggested that 
the issues that had not been resolved through the competition could be taken up during 
the upcoming round of the 1933 purge.84  
There is something slightly comical in associating one of the party’s most 
exalted procedures of political introspection with the performance of canteens, as there 
is in the notion of a struggle against cockroaches. Strange as the use of language 
charged with revolutionary pathos might seem in connection with such quotidian 
things as caloric measurements, it actually reflects the importance attached to the 
issues discussed by the participants.85 With famine spreading through the country and 
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the availability of food at state trade and market outlets severely restricted, the network 
of canteens operating at factories and other public institutions had become a primary 
means of subsistence for the Soviet people.86 Making sure that their canteens were 
clean, efficient and wasting no food was thus a matter of more than cultural importance 
for KP workers. This is not to say however that any cultural dimension was absent 
from the campaign. Promoting habits of personal and communal hygiene had been a 
strong theme of the Bolsheviks’ ongoing campaign to “cultivate the masses” since the 
early years of Soviet power and remained part of the Leningrad obkom cultural agenda 
throughout the interwar period.87 One of the most proudly proclaimed aspects of KP’s 
extensive renovation during the 1st FYP had been the building of shower-rooms on the 
factory premises.88 Moreover, promoting a “cultured” attitude towards consumption, 
including food, emerged as a major aspect of state policy regarding the provision of 
goods in the 1930s.89 
At the same time, involvement in the campaign should not be mistaken for a 
disingenuous hijacking of a party initiative by workers attempting to draw attention to 
their concerns. Party policy foresaw and presupposed public involvement in the retail 
sector both as a means to generate information on quality and uncover malfeasance.90 
Indeed, less than a year after the KP competition, an obkom plenum criticised the state 
of the public catering with respect to the sanitary standards of canteens as well as the 
nutritional value and even presentation of meals offered. The regional leadership also 
admonished party and trade-union organisations to ensure the greatest possible 
“participation of the masses” in overseeing the public catering network.91   
This raises an interesting point regarding Soviet cultural activism and the role of 
party activists within it. In the absence of widely available marketed goods, 
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participation in party-led campaigns of involvement in and oversight of the state retail 
network became an important means of exercising control over consumption. In the 
same way that communist activists took an active and often aggressive interest in 
production as a precondition for gaining a degree of control over the conditions of their 
labour, cultural activism offered them a degree of control over what they got in return 
for it. In the years of famine, nutritious food was the most important form of 
remuneration, but even then the “cultural” services offered through factory based 
structures included theatre tickets, day care services and tourism, including highly 
desirable but rare trips abroad.92  
At the same time, the ipso facto politically charged character of party activism 
made consumption into a means of ideological hegemony. Thus, in a late 1933 
interview with the KP partkom, a 46 year old non-party shock-worker called Boroda 
reported that his life was especially hard in terms of accommodation and access to 
food, but that he could bear the hardship in the knowledge that “if not us, then our 
children will live well” and that “in capitalist countries they live worse”.93 During the 
1st FYP, Boroda had been one of the country’s exceptionally productive udarniki who 
had been rewarded with a cruise around Europe on the ship Abkhazia. The travellers 
had had time to observe the plight of workers in depression-era Europe and Boroda 
returned to KP to tell his fellow workers that Kiel’s idle shipyards resembled the state 
of Russian industry in the Civil War year of 1918.94  
For the remainder of the decade, cultural activism in the factory proceeded along 
similar lines. The first conference of the organisation to be held after the party’s 17th 
Congress met in March 1934 with an agenda dedicated to party educational work.95 
Despite significant improvements in terms of the numbers of members and candidates 
participating in educational activities, the familiar themes of competing priorities and 
work overload dominated the discussion. Thus, although the partorg Tiutin noted in 
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his report that over three quarters of communists were engaged in some form of study, 
the progress of more than half of participants was assessed as “satisfactory” and 
“unsatisfactory” and only a third or less were “good” or “excellent”.96 Even worse, 
basic literacy and numeracy skills amongst the membership left much to be desired, 
with Tiutin jokingly commenting that although everyone was Russian, “when it comes 
to an exam in the Russian language, you couldn’t tell if we were French or some other 
people”.97 
The scarcity of basic mathematical skills was a particularly sensitive issue, given 
their importance for comprehending and monitoring the progress of production plans. 
One of the last to speak at the conference, the factory director Ots described party 
education as a necessary condition for economic progress. 98  Pichugina, a KP 
communist attached to the regional higher party school (komvuz) made the same point 
more blatantly, stating that workers who studied at the komvuz learned “the language 
of political economy and diamat” without mistake but had trouble using fractions and 
percentages. Pichugina went on to attack both Ots and Tiutin for failing to take 
adequate interest in the kind of training provided to future production cadres at the 
komvuz.99 
Other speakers highlighted the persistence of religious attitudes amongst older 
workers as well as the familiar problem of lack of interest in women’s issues as areas 
in need of improvement.100 The variety of loosely related matters discussed at the 
conference may seem to indicate that the speakers were talking past each other, but is 
better viewed as a reflection of the vast scope of activities that fit under the label of 
party education. The blurry contours of the subject-matter continued to make it hard 
to discuss any concrete issues regarding the broad range of activities that constituted 
party education, beyond the common across the board problem that there simply was 
not enough time to get everything done. In the end, the most concrete measure taken 
by the conference in that respect was to instruct the organisation to extend its 
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educational reach by taking activities beyond the factory and into workers’ own 
apartments, an innovation in cultural activism apparently pioneered by the 2nd 
Mechanical shop-cell.101 In its habitual manner, the party organisation resolved to 
remedy its overwhelming workload by expanding its activities. 
Home visits seem to have become a regular component of the organisation’s 
cultural activism after the conference, with collected minutes of interviews at workers’ 
apartments appearing as separate entries in the archival catalogue.102 Although these 
were not available for examination, references to home interviews conducted by 
communists of the 2nd Mechanical made at the March conference suggest that their 
content was fairly balanced between the concerns of every-day life (“why are light 
industry products of low quality?”) and the broader political awareness expected of 
engaged Soviet citizens (“why, precisely speaking, are such contradictions developing 
in the Far East?”).103 In addition to being a means of strengthening the rank-and-filers’ 
links with their non-party colleagues, home visits also became a way by which the 
organisation monitored the private behaviour of its own members in order to ensure it 
met the cultural standards expected of communists. Activists visited the homes of their 
comrades to hold what seem to have been similar to counselling sessions, offering help 
to those struggling with alcohol and advising on marriage problems ranging from how 
to relate to a religious or non-communist spouse to more serious cases of domestic 
abuse.104 
Though not necessarily attributable to such innovations, cultural activism as a 
whole seems to have risen in prominence in the period after the party’s 17th Congress. 
In the years leading up to 1937 the organisation began to hold regular educational 
activities on specialised topics in addition to the long-running study circles. These 
included lessons on party history, shop-floor discussions on developments regarding 
the Spanish Civil-War and what seems to have been an exceptionally well-planned 
conference on Marxist theory held over two days in March 1936.105 The transcript of 
the conference – which was one of the very few party educational activities to have 
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been fully stenographed – indicates that by the mid-1930s factory communists had 
acquired substantial knowledge of Marxism that went considerably beyond concurrent 
party slogans. The event’s agenda included extensive presentations on “Utopian 
Socialism”, “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat as an instrument for the construction 
of a classless society” and “The Socialist State” by members of the factory’s shop-
cells.106 The well-informed talks were followed by equally erudite discussions during 
which speakers disputed some of the most minute points of the original presenters. 
Thus, Miliutin of the 3rd Mechanical Shop took issue with the account of pre-Marxist 
socialism offered by Markin of the energy shop on the grounds that it underestimated 
its “influence on the development of the revolutionary worldview of the proletariat”. 
This was apparently because Markin had focused on Étienne Cabet’s Icarian 
movement instead of Robert Owen’s attempts to create working-class led industrial 
communities.107 
A year later, the organisation began its descent into the delirium of denunciation 
and “unmasking” described in the preceding chapter. As we have seen, the 
combination of the campaign for party democracy and the hunt for enemies led to 
renewed rank-and-file attacks on those holding positions of authority in the factory, 
with social tensions feeding into the wave of repression. The result of this process on 
cultural activism was a forceful resurgence of interest in the service provision aspects 
of the new socialist culture being built by the factory’s workers. Thus the 1st 
Conference of the Kirov factory party organisation held in April 1938 saw the interim 
partkom that had emerged within the chaos of the previous year come under sustained 
attack with regard to the factory’s housing-building plan. The most biting criticism 
came from Sitarzh, a communist who worked as a trade-union representative at the 
factory’s dormitories (obshchezhitiia).  
Sitarzh began her intervention by saying that the new partkom had done a good 
job in putting production in order but had forgotten about the other side of party work, 
namely “concern about people, the creation of conditions for people, the nurturing of 
people who live and study and do great things”.108 She went on to attack by name 
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everyone involved in some capacity in the factory’s housing development programme 
for having failed to demonstrate said concern, to applause and encouraging cries from 
the floor. Sitarzh demanded of the new director Viktor L’vov to “find the money” to 
build a new club at one of the dormitories and went on to attack the kul’tprop Maliutin 
for his lack of concern about the provision of cultural services like film screenings to 
the dormitories.109 Maliutin attempted to respond to Sitarzh’s criticisms by stating that 
other party members had been successful in performing their cultural enlightenment 
duties without complaints, but he was interrupted by cries of “she is right!” from the 
floor and a member of the presidium dryly commenting that hear Maliutin, “one could 
think that a club is not even necessary”.110 
As a result of Sitarzh’s efforts, L’vov promised to reserve part of the factory’s 
budget for renovations at the dormitories.111 During the discussion of the resolution 
draft at the end of the conference, Sitarzh also demanded that a point be added 
instructing the partkom to build a school for the children of factory workers. Many 
pointed out that this was a matter for the city authorities and not the party but at that 
point, the chair of Leningrad Soviet who was attending the conference announced that 




Regardless of when it was that the promised school materialised, Sitarzh’s efforts to 
get it built demonstrate the very material implications of some aspects of the party’s 
mission of cultural enlightenment. In the remaining three years between the 1st 
Conference and the German invasion of the USSR, Kirov communists would continue 
their cultural activism along much the same lines as described above, with the only 
major difference being the much stronger emphasis placed on the promotion of civil-
defence and paramilitary training as appropriate “leisure” activities.113 On that note, it 
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is possible to offer some concluding comments on the KP/Kirov organisation’s efforts 
to transform the factory into a socialist cultural site. 
The account offered in this chapter has divided the party’s cultural activism into 
two main periods corresponding roughly to what cultural historical scholarship has 
identified as the Cultural Revolution accompanying the 1st FYP and the subsequent 
establishment of Stalinist culture. The picture that emerges from observing the 
activities of the factory’s communist activists on the cultural front is one that suggests 
more continuity than is implied in the twin concepts of revolution and retreat. This is 
because on the one hand, the poorly educated and extremely busy rank-and-file lacked 
the ability to affect revolutionary changes in the cultural sphere and on the other, the 
rehabilitation of traditional values in Soviet public culture did not in any way diminish 
the extent of cultural activism that was taking place on the factory floor. Paradoxically, 
the intensity with which the party KP/Kirov party organisation pursued its mission to 
cultivate the masses seems to have only increased after the national leadership 
retreated from its revolutionary ambitions. 
The reason for this development is that the recalibration at the top confirmed 
what had been always the case at the bottom. As we have seen, the new Leningrad 
regional leadership under Kirov took a great interest in the development of cultural 
activism as a means of promoting the rank-and-file’s political astuteness and 
preventing the re-emergence of pro-opposition views. In between implementing the 
Regime of Economy and fending off oppositionists however, the party grassroots at 
KP did not rush to respond to the gubkom’s repeated calls for expanded intellectual 
horizons, except in so far as these translated into the provision of much desired 
services. As crash industrialisation followed by famine further squeezed the already 
pressed living standards of industrial workers, these services increased in importance 
providing further incentive for activists to become actively involved in supervising 
their quality and provision. Although of course not attributable solely to this, the 
Union-wide shift in cultural policy towards less ambitious goals reflected the adoption 
of a more instrumentalist logic which required that cultural activism was directed 
towards the achievement of concrete policy objectives. When the securing of adequate 





actively and creatively. In famine conditions, “battling cockroaches” and preventing 
potato brak were more pressing matters than studying party history. 
None of the above goes to say that KP/Kirov communists did not engage with 
the more party-ideological aspects of their cultural mission. Marxist study circles were 
organised and joined by thousands of rank-and-filers and the progress of their studies 
was a frequently raised issue at the organisation’s meetings by partkom members and 
concerned activists alike. Organising shop-floor newspapers, amateur writing clubs 
and political theory conferences was not a mean task in a giant machine-building plant 
increasingly staffed by barely literate former peasants. The frequent complaints about 
the state of cultural activism and party education in the factory thus seem to be more 
indicative of unrealistic expectations than anything else.  
Finally, it is worth reiterating that there was nothing in the actions of the rank-
and-file that went against the tasks set by party directives. The range of activities that 
fell within the scope of the Bolsheviks’ cultural mission was so broad that every 
member of the factory’s workforce could find something to relate to. Naturally, most 
party members gravitated towards the issues that affected their lives most directly, so 
that cultural activism on the KP/Kirov factory floor came to be primarily focused on 
matters of consumption and the provision of services. Conversely, those aspects of 
cultural activism that were of interest to fewer activists were marginalised in party 
discussions. This was the permanent problem of those seeking to promote activities 
regarding women’s issues. One suspects that it was also the reason why some activists 
felt so disappointed by their comrades’ performance in Marxist education. In terms 
then of the historiographical debate regarding the fate of the Soviet Cultural 
Revolution, what this chapter has shown is that the presence of the PPO provided party 
policy with a certain ideological and practical continuity even when the leadership 
engaged in what appear to be political aboutfaces. This is because whatever the 
specific content of the party’s cultural policy, rank-and-file communists would be 
called upon to implement it in practice. Although party members obliged, they 
inevitably gravitated towards those aspects of cultural policy that were more readily 
relatable to their everyday concerns. Because of the worker-oriented nature of Marxist-





to KP/Kirov workers, making it possible for grassroots communists to engage actively 
with the party’s cultural enlightenment project even if partially and intermittently. 
The point here is that in cultural affairs as much as in industrial policy, Marxist-
Leninist ideology was sufficiently ambiguous that the varied signals and decrees 
emanating from the centre could always be selectively interpreted and partially 
implemented. In this area of party work also, the rank-and-file could thus pursue its 




4. Communists in Uniform: The Party on the Baltic Fleet 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters examined three overlapping but distinct aspects of communist 
rank-and-file activity in one of the USSR’s largest and most iconic industrial 
enterprises. As indicated in the introduction, the last chapter of this thesis will attempt 
to contextualise the account provided so far by telling much the same story from a 
perspective that differs significantly to that of a giant factory. In what follows, the 
focus of this investigation will shift to grassroots party activity in another iconic 
Leningrad institution, the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet (Krasno-Znamenii Baltiiskii Flot).1 
As this is a considerable change of scene, it is necessary once more to offer some 
extensive introductory remarks before delving into the activities of communist sailors 
and their officers. 
There are two main obstacles to crafting an account of party activity on the Fleet 
similar to the one provided in the previous chapters about KP/Kirov. The first, and 
perhaps most significant is historiographical. Due to the Soviet Union’s political 
claims as well as the intellectual interests of many of its historiographers, factory life 
in the interwar period has been a major subject of social historical research for almost 
as long as the field has existed. This made it possible to ground the argument developed 
in the preceding chapters in existing literature, relating to conceptual schemes already 
established. It is unfortunately much harder to do the same for the purposes of this 
chapter.  
Social histories of the Soviet military have understandably focused primarily on 
the life of Red Army soldiers in the battlefields of the Second World War, seeking to 
shed light on their motivations and experiences.2 Conversely, research focusing on the 
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period between the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars has tended to focus on the 
institutional development of the Soviet military and its relation with and influence over 
other state agencies of the USSR.3 Explaining the origins of the military purge initiated 
in June 1937 and its connection to the broader process of mass repression has been a 
major theme in this strand of research.4 Scholarship in both directions has tended to 
ignore the specific questions arising from the ubiquitous presence of the communist 
rank-and-file in the military, whether because it was looking at civil-military relations 
on a higher level, or because it was more interested in military personnel as peasants, 
men, women and youngsters at war rather than communist activists. The problem is 
even more pronounced with respect to the Navy which, especially in English language 
historiography, has been the subject of only highly specialist military historical 
scholarship that has tended to eschew social and political issues altogether.5  
Perhaps the only major exception to this trend is the work of Roger Reese, whose 
numerous studies of the Soviet military have included considerations of the function 
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of its political structures.6 Even in Reese’s work however, the issue of party activity is 
subordinated to the broader issue of Soviet military professionalism, or rather the 
absence thereof, which forms the core argument of most of his work. Reese argues that 
the dual presence of the party in the military in the form of party organisations and a 
parallel hierarchy of specialised political officers (politsostav) exacerbated a number 
of problems endemic to the Red Army in the interwar period, such as its chronic lack 
of personnel and persistently low quality of military training. Along with a number of 
contingent factors, extreme politicisation inhibited the development of professionalism 
in the Soviet military, leading thus to persistently substandard performance and 
ultimately contributing to the series of catastrophic defeats that ensued in the first 
stages of the German invasion. Neither space nor expertise permit a thorough 
engagement with the nuances of Reese’s military-historical argument here, but it must 
be noted that even sections of his work that are specifically dedicated to military-
political structures provide very little information on their actual activities, focusing 
instead on gauging their prevalence as a proxy measure for the lack of 
professionalism.7 
By contrast, Russian-language scholarship has examined the activity of Soviet 
military-political structures quite extensively. However, it also suffers from an 
analogous problem in that it consists primarily of examinations of the minute details 
of politsostav work, without embedding these in a broader conceptual framework.8 
Given then these historiographical constraints, the discussion that follows will have to 
be limited to the question of the extent to which party activity on the Fleet is in line 
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with the observations previously made about the party in industry, without addressing 
any specifically military-historical issues. 
The second obstacle that needs to be addressed is methodological and stems from 
the dual structure of party presence in the military. Much like in industrial enterprises, 
the institutional architecture of military formations was triangular, the difference being 
that in the latter context two out of three sides were formal party structures. In addition 
to the mass of enlisted personnel the Soviet military included, unremarkably, a 
hierarchy of officers (komsostav) to command them. Its rather more peculiar feature 
was the parallel politsostav hierarchy of commissars (voenkomi) and political 
instructors (politruki) mirroring the chain of command and answering ultimately to the 
Political Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (PURKKA or PUR), the 
military department of the party CC.9  
The politisostav was an institutional innovation that had its origins in the Civil 
War when, in the Red Army, the committees of soldiers’ representatives in military 
units created after the February revolution were replaced by individual political 
officers charged with maintaining discipline and morale, while also overseeing the 
work of commanders and professional officers.10 Originally holding extensive powers 
including the right to veto politically suspect orders, the status of politsostav officers 
was curtailed significantly as part of the military reforms conceived by Mikhail Frunze 
and confirmed by the 14th Party Congress in late 1925 shortly after his death. The 
Congress resolutions deprived political personnel of their veto powers and limited their 
authority to strictly political matters, which however included responsibility for the 
maintenance of discipline and morale. 11  The new Party Rules confirmed at the 
Congress also sanctioned the operation of primary party organisations within the 
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military and established electable party commissions to regulate recruitment and 
handle party-disciplinary affairs.12  
The ever-present institutional overlap of the Soviet party-state therefore meant 
that a Soviet serviceman could expect to be commanded by an officer who may or may 
not have been a party member and was in turn overseen by an ipso facto communist 
political officer whose responsibilities included supervising the work of a party 
organisation composed of members of any military rank and led like its civilian 
counterparts by a bureau and secretary. The extent of confusion this abundance of 
authorities must have caused is not hard to imagine and is no less a problem for the 
purposes of this account than it was for the people in service.  
In the preceding chapters, it was possible to examine the implications of rank-
and-file communist activism for state-society relations on the basis of a conceptual 
distinction between those members of the KP/Kirov organisation who held 
management posts and the majority who did not. This made sense because the interests 
of management in fulfilling plans and those of workers in conserving their labour 
power and maximising remuneration are opposed, all the more so in the conditions of 
Soviet industrialisation. The hierarchical continuum of the military makes it unhelpful 
to structure the investigation around an existing social cleavage. Conceptually 
counterposing the party organisation to command will also not work here because of 
the presence of the politsostav, who were closer to commanding officers in terms of 
rank but more analogous to the party organisation in light of their primarily ideological 
responsibilities. 
Being thus deprived of conceptual anchors on which to ground this account, what 
follows will have to take the form of a more or less impressionistic review of party 
activity on the Fleet – both politsostav and organisation – as reflected in the documents 
of PUBalt, the Baltic Fleet’s PUR section. It will emerge that in the absence of a 
productive process party activity focused almost exclusively on educational and 
cultural work, being however no less disruptive for it.  
 
                                                 




4.2 Class struggle on the Fleet? 
The duality of the Soviet party-state was a consequence of the dependence of the 
Bolsheviks on a state apparatus staffed by people they did not trust, their need, as it 
were, to maintain one group of people to do things and another to make sure that the 
former only did those things that were right. This peculiar mode of governance was 
particularly suited to the navy, where the highly specialised skills required of high-
ranking officers meant that top ranks in individual ships and units continued to be 
dominated by old-regime specialists. As late as 1928, a statistical report on the social 
composition of the Baltic Fleet showed that all four commanders in the Fleet’s 
Battleship squadron belonged to the former nobility, although one had since joined the 
party. Similarly, out of five head mechanics, one was a noble by descent, two were 
peasants, one a worker and one was marked as ‘other’; none of them were party 
members, although one was a candidate. Party saturation was higher in the less senior 
ranks, with all artillery officers in the squadron being communists.13 This suggests that 
although by that time the new naval academies had already started to produce a new 
generation of officers without ties to the old regime, these had not by that time acquired 
the necessary experience to assume command. 
For as long as this situation persisted, it was necessary for political departments 
and party cells to keep a close watch on the activities of old-regime officers and make 
sure that, if they did not convert to the Bolshevik cause, they were at least not working 
against it. An example of the uneasy relationship between the representatives of Party 
authority and those they were watching over can be seen in a 1926 collection of reports 
on surviving Tsarist traditions to the political department of the Kronstadt naval base. 
The issues highlighted by the commissars who authored these reports often seem 
pedantic or trivial in their remarks but are in fact highly illustrative of the gap between 
the expectations and ideological outlook of communists and the established norms of 
the institution they were charged with controlling. 
For example, a report penned by the politsostav officer of the cruiser Aurora of 
revolutionary fame, complained that there was a widespread feeling among officers of 
superiority with respect to the army, whose officers were seen as less cultured and of 
                                                 




inferior skill.14 Another commissar wrote in exasperation that whenever large ships are 
visited by the high command, carpets are rolled out and all regular business of the ship 
is disrupted by a rush to make everything “sparkling clean”. He concluded that the 
worst thing about this state of affairs was that “many people find nothing wrong in this 
and think that it is normal”.15 Other reports highlighted as ideologically suspect the 
persistence of pre-revolutionary rank appellations like “captain” or “admiral” instead 
of the more politically appropriate “commander of” and superstitious behaviour like 
not taking women at sea and throwing coins into the water when sailing past Gogland 
Island in the Gulf of Finland. Even the lettering in which ships’ names were written 
proved very troubling for one political officer, who complained about the persistence 
of old Slavonic instead of modern Russian script, arguing that this was a remnant from 
the Tsarist period, when a ship was viewed as “a Church on Water”.16 In his own report 
to PUBalt, the commissar who had collected these reports opined that the only way to 
remedy this situation was to “fight as a single front to replace these [Tsarist traditions] 
with new, revolutionary traditions”.17 
In order to bridge the gap between the actual and the desired ideological state of 
the Fleet, ship commanders were expected to participate in the educational and 
propaganda events organised by political departments for all personnel, in fact sharing 
responsibility for their work regardless of whether or not they were party members.18 
Such events included regular lectures, film screenings and Q&A sessions about 
international events and central political affairs like Party Congresses as well as special 
sessions on the political importance of particular naval exercises before and during 
their execution.  
Thus, in the run up to the naval manoeuvres of autumn 1926, PUBalt produced 
a set of guidelines on the appropriate topics around which political education should 
be based, in preparation for the exercise. These included themes as varied as the role 
of the Fleet in protecting the merchant navy, the rise of the USA in the world economy, 
the English miners’ strike and the future direction of the worker-peasant alliance in the 
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USSR.19 In a model political education session outlined in the guidelines, politsostav 
officers were encouraged to draw upon these and other issues to demonstrate that 
“growing contradictions amongst capitalists” made an attack on the Soviet Union 
“both possible and inevitable”.20 
Expectations notwithstanding however, the participation of commanders in such 
events seems to have remained limited. Their absence is a recurring issue in the 
minutes of commissars’ and party secretaries’ joint meetings from this period. 
Discussing the matter at a meeting of the komsostav and politsostav officers of the 
Leningrad Naval Base (Lenmorbaza) in early 1926, the temporary commissar of the 
M-type submarine Serp i Molot Kudriavtsev gave a glowing report on the leadership 
of commander Tsiplenov, who was absent from the meeting. According to 
Kudriavtsev, Tsiplenov was a brilliant commander who enjoyed very good relations 
with his crew and took a strong interest in their political development, as well as his 
own. Despite not being a party member, the conscientious commander apparently 
attended all political meetings that were open to non-partyists.  
This picture of harmonic collaboration between commanders and political 
officers painted by Kudriavtsev was however undermined by a supplementary report 
delivered by Gor’kov, a member of the organising sector of the political department 
of Lenmorbaza. Gor’kov’s report painted a decidedly less rosy picture, according to 
which Tsiplenov’s “influence on political work [was] negligible” and the “alienation 
of the komsostav from political work” was demonstrated by the absence of links with 
the party group. To further illustrate the extent of the problem, Gor’kov added that 
Tsiplenov had failed to give a report to the party bureau – composed of his subordinates 
– and that it was often the case that Serp i Molot’s komsostav had no political 
assignments.  
In the ensuing discussion, commissars from other vessels weighed in with their 
own experience to further undermine any notion that the two branches of the Fleet’s 
dual hierarchy were working in smooth cooperation. According for example to 
Shcheglov, the commissar of the depot ship Smolny, komsostav officers did not seem 
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to care about political work at all. Seemingly unaware of the fact that the recent party 
congress had abolished the commissars’ right to veto orders, Shcheglov added 
indignantly that commanders were often drawing up orders without consulting their 
politsostav and that the higher military organs signed off on these.21 In his concluding 
speech, the head commissar of Lenmorbaza Davidov remarked that komsostav officers 
seemed to be “scared of the party collective”. To remedy the problem, the meeting 
resolved to organise a monthly base-wide conference of politsostav and komsostav 
officers to discuss issues such as the delineation of responsibilities and share 
experience on the ways to resolve disputes arising therefrom.22 
It is not possible to determine on the basis of the available evidence whether 
Kudriavtsev was indeed covering for Tsiplenov, or if the latter’s overtly keen critics 
were just being plainly unreasonable in terms of their political expectations of an 
officer who was not even in the party. In any case, it does not require a leap of the 
imagination to see why professional officers who were busy commanding warships 
would not want to spend much time discussing issues like a strike in England, let alone 
assume responsibility for such work, especially given the lack of mutual understanding 
between them and the politsostav indicated by the report on traditions cited above. 
There were also other reasons which suggest that commissar Davidov’s description of 
the komsostav attitude towards the party as fearful was not metaphorical. According 
to some of the participants at another meeting at the Leningrad naval base, a lot of 
officers were simply too scared to get involved with party organisations, because of a 
recent wave of arrests conducted by the secret police against officers of all 
backgrounds. According to one speaker, an engineer from Battleship Oktiabr’skaia 
Revoliutsiia had been arrested without the ship’s commissar having even been 
informed.23 Whether then because of excessive workload, fear or simple indifference, 
higher ranking officers remained distant from the party throughout the mid-1920s.  
Things were different however for junior officers and sailors who made up the 
bulk of the rank-and-file membership of the party.24 This was despite the fact that party 
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building activities examined earlier faced considerable difficulties on the Fleet, to the 
extent that the overall impression derived from party minutes from 1926-1929 is one 
of a membership trying with increasing desperation to combat drunkenness and 
rowdiness amongst their comrades and fellow-sailors, while at the same time 
explaining to bewildered peasant seamen the difference between the Tsarist and Red 
Fleets.25 These unattractive aspects of membership notwithstanding, participation in 
party-sponsored activities provided a significant distraction from the tediousness of 
everyday military life for lower ranking personnel, while also acting as a channel of 
influence over their immediate environment. 
This is because, apart from endless meetings about current political affairs, party 
cells organised a number of activity circles and cultural clubs, not unlike those 
established by their industrial counterparts. These included chess, sports and music 
clubs, as well as literacy circles and an extensive system of libraries on ships and units. 
The three libraries of the Battleship Squadron on the Marat, Oktiabr’skaia Revoliutsiia 
and Parizhskaia Kommuna alone contained 19,596 books and served 1,698 readers in 
the second half of 1928.26 Film screenings were also a favourite activity organised by 
the party-led clubs, with PUBalt inspectors regularly noting 100% attendance as a 
major achievement of cultural activism.27 Party activists also led an extensive network 
of military correspondents (voenkori), amateur journalists who like their civilian 
counterparts, the workers’ and peasant’s correspondents, produced single-sheet wall-
newspapers carrying reports on a range of issues of concern to rank-and-file sailors. 
From 1926 to 1928 the number of voenkor circles operating on the Fleet jumped from 
8 to 60, while their total membership increased almost tenfold from 128 to 1137, only 
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38% of who were party members.28 Although of course not a forum for criticism of 
Union-wide policy, voenkor publications seem to have enjoyed considerable freedom 
in discussing problems of everyday life in the navy, as demonstrated by recurring 
complaints by commissars and senior officers that the voenkori and party activists 
more generally were undermining discipline.29 
It seems then that in the second half of the 1920s, attitudes towards the party on 
the Fleet were divided along similar lines to those in industry. Much like engineers 
and specialised technicians in factories, the Fleet’s commanding officers saw political 
work as a more or less pointless distraction from their duties and viewed the ubiquitous 
presence of the ever-meddling party activists with a mixture of feelings ranging from 
resentment to fear. Party activists on their part, especially politsostav officers, viewed 
the military specialists with distrust and expected them to demonstrate their loyalty to 
Soviet power by taking on political assignments which served no military purpose and 
probably only served to further alienate the komsostav. This military version of 
spetseedstvo was among the main problems that the delineation of authority promoted 
by the Frunze reforms had sought to remedy.30 Indeed, the reforms can be seen as a 
military precedent of the decree on edinonachalie that sought to redress the same 
problem in industry.31 In much the same way as in industry, the party’s own presence 
on the Fleet would nullify in practice the effects of the centre’s attempt to distinguish 
between the technical and the political aspects of military activity. 
 
4.3 From activism to repression 
As we have seen in previous chapters, when the party leadership decided to move away 
from the NEP in the late 1920s, it also effectively abandoned any attempt to combat 
spetseedsto. The Shakhty affair signalled this political reorientation and the subsequent 
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samokritika and party purge campaigns became the first political shots fired in the 
“socialist offensive”. Political departments and party cells inevitably brought these 
campaigns onto the Fleet. The relatively subdued meetings of the NEP years thus gave 
way to far more engaged and often heated gatherings, as more abstract topics like the 
class structure of Soviet society and international affairs were replaced by discussions 
about collectivisation and criticisms of personal conduct. The minutes of party 
meetings from this period reveal a strong concern with the personal lives and attitudes 
of all personnel.  
For example, a joint meeting of the commissars, commanders, secretaries and 
party commission members of the submarine squadron held on 3 March 1929 to 
discuss the upcoming party purge resolved that the purge should be postponed until 
such time as the civilian party organisations could share their experience.32 Having 
thus decided, the assembled communists went on to spend a considerable amount of 
time discussing the problem of antisemitism. Gol’dshtein, who led the discussion 
decried this and other instances of great-Russian chauvinism as a counterrevolutionary 
phenomenon, but other speakers went beyond sociological abstractions to criticise the 
specific forms of racial prejudice they had encountered aboard their ships. Tolkachev 
complained that there was no effective struggle against antisemitism and that Great 
Russian chauvinism was left unchecked, with people “saying jokes against Jews and 
national minorities like Tatars and Finns”. Although dangerous jokes did not seem to 
impress Gusev, who suggested that they were reflective of the low cultural level of 
personnel, one Veshchilov went on to demonstrate his revolutionary vigilance by 
stating that Jewish servicemen often spread such jokes themselves and that 
consequently, the party had to “fight against anti-Semitic Jews”. 33  The meeting 
resolved that internationalist agitation should be intensified, and that both the public 
and private attitudes of members to the national question should be amongst the key 
criteria of their evaluation for the purge.34  
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In light of the account of party politics at the height of the socialist offensive 
given in earlier chapters, it seems rather odd to observe communist submarine officers 
fret over inappropriate jokes. This, however, is in line with the observation made 
earlier that in the absence of a production process to troubleshoot, party activists 
directed their efforts to the cultural-ideological aspects of political work. Some of the 
latter nevertheless had a more direct bearing on military matters than bad jokes and 
“anti-Semitic Jews”, chief among them being drunkenness and rowdiness. We have 
already seen how KP/Kirov communists took a low view of alcohol abuse, relating 
such behaviour to poor labour discipline and corruption. None of these problems were 
unknown to the Fleet, with sailors and officers on shore leave often getting lost or in 
fights with civilians, leading to considerable embarrassment for military authorities.35 
Thus, subsequent party meetings that took place during the purge campaign dwelled 
considerably on the problem of the off-duty behaviour of the Fleet’s personnel, with 
speakers at a gathering of the Coastal Defence party group urging that the organisation 
should look more closely into the activities of members on leave, including their 
everyday habits (byt). In line with the general directives on the chistka, some speakers 
called for the involvement of non-party personnel in the purge review process.36  
Interestingly, none of the PUBalt material surveyed indicates that oppositionist 
activity or deviationism featured as a major concern of the Fleet’s communists in 1929, 
with party growth emerging as a more pressing concern than safeguarding against 
nefarious subversion. The resolution taken at the Coastal Defence meeting for example 
admonished members to “never forget about the growth of the party” and not permit 
any personal score-settling during the purge. 37  In a more direct manner, a senior 
PUBalt officer ordered restraint at a December 1929 party meeting of the naval 
hospital. The session had been called to review the tense relations between the head 
doctor Kalnin and the leadership of the organisation, which had been accusing him of 
ignoring samokritika and taking no responsibility for it. Solovev, the ranking 
commissar present, instructed members of the bureau to drop the accusations and work 
closer with Kalnin, adding that there was little to be proud of in samokritika when 
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there was “only 5% of truth in it”.38 In the end, the meeting resolved that “samokritika 
should be directed towards the unity and strengthening of the organisation”.39 
Not unlike their labouring comrades at KP then, the Fleet’s communists were far 
more interested in the problems of their immediate environment than the political 
realignments taking place in the Kremlin. They were thus not too keen to persecute 
colleagues for Bukharinism or opportunism and were more likely to notice the latter 
when it was linked to poor behaviour more generally. As a political campaign of rank-
and-file mobilisation however, samokritika was impossible to script. During this 
period, the party’s open invitation to criticise was taken quite literally by sailors of 
peasant origin who were opposed to collectivisation. Thus, during a discussion aboard 
the battleship Oktiabr’skaia Revoliutsiia on the policy of liquidation of the kulak as a 
class, one participant of peasant origin flatly declared that the party’s policy was wrong 
on this matter as rich peasants simply didn’t exist, receiving vocal support from other 
members of the group.40 Commissars’ reports are replete with descriptions of such 
events, usually followed by some sort of assessment on the response given to such 
‘peasant moods’ by the political instructor leading the discussion and the rest of the 
attendees.41  
The effects of a state of permanent discussion on discipline were, as may be 
expected, far from constructive. Commissar reports from the Battleship Squadron in 
early 1931 reflect a very bleak picture with respect to the state of crew behaviour, 
officer-sailor relations and even basic standards of hygiene. Groups of sailors from the 
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Oktiabr’skaia Revoliutsiia and the Marat engaged in collective drinking bouts, lost 
parts of their uniform and started brawls, on one occasion seriously injuring a worker 
from Baltiiskii factory.42 Oktiabr’skaia Revoliutsiia was also the subject of a number 
of other troubling reports, including one about a lice infestation “of unknown origin” 
and two relating separate occasions when intestines with traces of faeces were 
discovered in the crew’s soup.43  
Possibly prompted by similar issues, a three-day disciplinary review of 
battleship Marat in February 1931 stated that military discipline aboard the ship was 
in complete breakdown (proriv). According to the report, the number of disciplinary 
infractions during the same month had amounted to 17% of the ship’s personnel, with 
a 19.6% of these committed by Party members. 44  The review also noted that the 
attitude of officers to disciplinary infractions was extremely lenient, quoting the ship’s 
commander Bulantsev as saying that ‘sailors are responsible for their own offences, 
not officers. Red sailors are citizens and should take responsibility for their actions’.45 
The ship’s junior commander Garifov expressed a similar attitude towards 
undisciplined sailors, stating that ‘they know what they are doing. They are not 
children’.46 In a manner indicative of the conflicted priorities of the time, the report 
concluded with a positive overall assessment, stating that the political and moral 
moods of the crew were generally healthy.47  
It should be noted here that this state of affairs was not confined to the thousands-
strong crews of battleships, but also plagued less unpleasant environments. Party 
meetings from the Kronstadt-based House of the Red Army and Fleet, the Soviet 
equivalent of an officers’ club, reflect increasing desperation with the state of both 
party and military work. Sore points included the regular problems of low attendance 
and lack of assignments as well as some less familiar issues. On 14 March 1931, the 
theatre director of the House gave a report to the organisation on the progress of 
preparations for the May Day staging of a play titled Before the Storm (Pered 
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Shtormom), during which he demanded a “breakthrough in discipline” (dobitsia 
perelom v distsipline!) to remedy the weak grasp of the “technique of theatre” amongst 
personnel.48 In many of the House’s party meetings, speakers noted that the voenkori 
and other channels by which samokritika was supposed to strengthen the organisation 
were acting in a way that further undermined discipline, without however being able 
to offer any more substantial suggestions than further calls for yet more activism.49 
The fundamentally contradictory demands of basic military discipline and the 
mass discussion required by the party’s activist campaigns were extremely difficult to 
reconcile and many officers failed to navigate through the political complexities of the 
time unscathed. In September 1931, Evdokimov, the commissar of the guard ship 
Taifun, received a reprimand from the political department of the battleship squadron 
for misinterpreting the intent of one of its orders which had demanded improvements 
on battle readiness and the general condition of the ship. According to this report, the 
commissar’s transgression was that instead of mobilising the ship’s party organisation 
‘towards the rapid liquidation of these shortcomings’, he and the Taifun’s party 
secretary asked the ship’s commander to give a report to the organisation’s 
presidium.50 The ensuing resolution criticised the actions of both the commander and 
the political department. What earned the commissar a reprimand, was that he allowed 
a discussion on the ‘correctness’ or orders.51 
About a month later however, Adol’f Yanukovich Keek, a political instructor 
serving on the Marat fell afoul of the ship’s party organisation for bending the stick 
too far in the other direction. Keek, who by that time had served on the Fleet and been 
a member of the party for six years, was expelled from the organisation for ‘allowing 
opportunism in practice’.52 This apparently consisted in refusing to visit crew quarters 
and failing to collaborate with the party secretary to deal with the chronic disciplinary 
problems of the Marat. Keek was summoned to a general meeting (obshee sobranie) 
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of the Marat’s organisation to explain his behaviour. Far from sharing commander 
Bulantsev’s casual disregard for the chaotic state of discipline on the giant battleship, 
the politruk turned out to be a firm believer in rank and to have little patience for non-
military work. During the meeting, it emerged that he was of the view that samokritika 
had no place in the military and that the only way to deal with disciplinary infractions 
was to ‘tighten the screws’ and enforce rules ‘like on German cruisers’.53 Keek further 
went on to express his resentment over the poor living conditions of Soviet officers 
compared to the “komsostav in industry” and the privileges enjoyed by officers “in 
capitalist bourgeois armies”.54 Concluding his defence, Keek expressed his desire to 
remain a member but insisted that the party’s military policy was wrong, warning that 
he would be proven right in the coming war. 55  None of these arguments seemed 
particularly convincing to Keek’s comrades, who promptly voted to expel the politruk, 
himself hardly a shining example of military discipline, having two serious reprimands 
and a week of house arrest for drunkenness on his record.56 
Evdokimov’s and Keek’s similar fates demonstrate the impossible situation 
faced by officers who were expected to issue firm orders while also remaining open to 
criticism from their subordinates. This almost in-built institutional crisis of authority 
was a feature of much of social life in the Soviet Union during the interwar years 
because despite repeated attempts by the party leadership to apply the brakes on the 
activist campaigns it initiated, the same leadership kept coming up with more. Even 
after the wrapping up of the samokritika campaign, other forms of public activism 
aimed at spurring complacent bureaucrats onwards continued to enjoy the support of 
the party leadership. Socialist competition and its more famous successor, 
Stakhanovism, are perhaps the most iconic of these. 
 Party presence in the navy ensured that such activities took place on the Baltic 
Fleet as much as on any factory or kolkhoz in the Soviet Union. In 1932, there were 
5,860 serving personnel taking part in some form of socialist competition in the 
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Coastal Defence Squadron alone. Most of the participants were sailors, but there were 
also 1,000 junior and 350 senior and high ranking officers. The 1,430 Coastal Defence 
voenkori produced 9 regiment and 117 company-level papers as well as 9 radio 
shows.57 The Battleship Squadron, which as we have seen was faring exceptionally 
poorly in terms of military performance, produced equally impressive results in terms 
of activism, with about a third of the 2,203 sotssorevnovanie participants being 
officers.58  
These illustrious achievements in cultural activities of dubious military value are 
best attributed to the communisation of the officer corps. Through a combination of 
co-optation and persecution, the party had by the early 1930s remedied its weak 
presence amongst the komsostav throughout the military achieving over 50% 
saturation.59 In 1931, the replacement rate of commanding officers ranged from 60% 
to 85% on different levels of the Fleet’s hierarchy.60 Unlike the komsostav of the 1920s, 
the new officer hierarchy was thus both better versed in and less hostile to the 
numerous non-military activities organised by the party.  
The upshot of this demographic and ideological transformation in the officer 
corps was that it removed much of the ground for the specialist-baiting of the late 
1920s. The archival records of PUBalt become considerably thinner in the mid-1930s, 
but the party meeting records that do survive suggest that accusations of ignoring 
political work and being distant from the organisation were far less commonly levelled 
against the komsostav.61 The behaviour of commanders is scarcely mentioned in the 
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commissar reports regarding the progress of party elections collected from the whole 
of the Fleet in December 1934. Instead, the reports note a satisfactory pace of work in 
terms of meeting attendance, voenkor newspapers and radio productions. Some ships 
and units were the subject of especially positive comments, like the destroyer Lenin 
for the distinguished work performed by one of its sailors in a kolkhoz while on leave.62 
In terms of weak spots in party work, the reports contain several mentions of the 
perennial problem of idle members (nezagruzennost’), but blamed the bureaus instead 
of the commanders.63 
None of this is to say that the state of military training and discipline improved 
in the mid-1930s, except in so far as the removal of a major cleavage led to less friction 
between serving personnel on the Fleet. In any case, whatever new modus vivendi 
might have been worked out between the overlapping party and military authorities 
was violently shaken when in the summer of 1937, the campaign of repression that 
had been gathering pace since the beginning of the year finally hit the military.64 Just 
as in the civilian party, the Yezhovshchina took place in tandem with the party 
democracy campaign driven by Andrei Zhdanov. As per the instruction of the 
Leningrad party chief, electoral meetings on the Fleet started to be held in mid-April.65 
All procedural formalities were observed, with the Fleet’s organisations electing new 
bureaus in multicandidate elections and the new leadership bodies themselves electing 
a secretary out of at least two candidates.66 Like in the factories, these meetings turned 
into rounds of denunciation after news spread of the NKVD discovery of a conspiracy 
amongst the high command. 
In a report to Kliment Voroshilov and Andrei Zhdanov composed shortly after 
the execution of Mikhail Tukhachevskii and the other top-ranking officers accused of 
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being part of the military plot, the head of PUBalt Iakov Volkov wrote that “in their 
contributions to meetings, the resolutions taken and their expressions, red-sailors and 
commanders expressed their […] burning hatred and contempt for these […] enemies 
of the people and demanded their execution”.67 Not much survives of these meetings 
in PUBalt’s archives, but given the experience of the Kirov works described earlier, 
there is little reason to doubt Volkov’s approving description of the mood of the Fleet’s 
personnel, to which he would himself fall victim two years later.68 Voices of reason – 
and cynicism – did exist, but they stood little chance of being heard in the furore of 
denunciations.69  
The limited information that can be extracted from the protocols of party 
meetings on the Fleet suggests that reasons for expulsion during the military purge 
could be equally flimsy to those in the civilian party, often including the familiar 
transgression of being close to the wrong people. Thus, the party commission of the 
Battleship Squadron expelled one Barchubaev for having “close links” to the “enemy 
of the people Degaziev”, overturning the Komsomol cell’s verdict of a strong 
reprimand.70 The same session of the commission expelled the vice-commander of the 
guard ship Vikhr’ A. B. Sey on the grounds that he had links with the “Japanese spy 
Kozlov” through his wife, who also had “relatives in Poland”. A boatswain at the 
Marat, M. K. Zakhavrov was also deprived of party membership on account of his 
wife, who had “links abroad” and conducted “counterrevolutionary conversations 
about Stalin”.71  
The tradition of activism on the Fleet thus contributed to the hunt for enemies, 
helping the repression spread through the ranks in a way not unlike the earlier, more 
benign party campaigns. In fact, by the time the Yezhovshchina was in full swing in 
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late 1937, “unmasking” and exposure of enemies had become integrated into the 
broader curriculum of activities expected of and promoted by conscientious party 
members. Reports on the content of political agitation conducted during the 
manoeuvers of October 1937, which were observed by no less prominent a personality 
than Klim Voroshilov himself, are particularly illuminating in that respect.  
Lists of political materials made available to the sailors of the battleship Marat 
included several copies of a pamphlet titled The Cause of Spain is not the Cause of 
Spain Alone, by José Díaz, then general secretary of the Communist Party of Spain. 
Such materials on the international antifascist struggle sat on the Marat’s library selves 
alongside Stalin’s report to the infamous February-March 1937 Central Committee 
plenum and literature on the recruitment tactics of foreign intelligence services. 72 On 
the Oktiabr’skaia Revoliutsiia, the manoeuvres were preceded by a “thorough 
examination of all personnel” and purging of “the politically and morally unreliable” 
from the ranks. 73  Having fulfilled their duty of ensuring maximum revolutionary 
vigilance amongst the crew, communists and commissars went on to organise even 
more ambitious competitions than before. Oktiabr’skii Luch, the daily newspaper of 
the Oktiabr’skaia Revoliutsiia, announced a competition with the Marat over, among 
other things, which of the two battleships could operate while producing the least 
visible smoke.74 On the Marat, the boiler and engine department crews challenged each 
other to a competition which, in addition to technical aspects like reducing steam-
power losses, included terms like being ‘cultured’ and ‘well-mannered’ in one’s 
behaviour towards fellow sailors.75 
One may well wonder about the possibility of determining a victor in a collective 
competition of well-manneredness, all the more so when this concerns a battleship 
crew in exercise. Such almost comical examples of socialist competition however 
demonstrate the extent to which the activist culture that was such an integral part of 
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the way the interwar USSR was governed had penetrated into the military. The 
existence of specialised political structures within military organisations made even 
the slightest degree of insulation from civilian affairs impossible. While some of these 
may have been funny, others were lethal. 
 
4.4 On course to war 
By the time the military purge was over, some 22,705 of a total of 206,000 officers 
(komsostav and politsostav) throughout the USSR had been discharged from all 
branches of the military, of whom 9,506 were arrested.76 The Fleet experienced similar 
personnel losses, with 444 of its 5,320 officers being arrested by April 1938. The 
quantitatively limited impact of the purge was further reduced by the subsequent 
expansion of the officer corps throughout the USSR, which brought the Fleet’s total to 
over 8,000 officers.77  
Nevertheless, the greater incidence of expulsion and demobilisation amongst the 
higher ranks resulted in significant deskilling of the officer corps.78 Combined with the 
overdrive of political mobilisation and the reinstitution of dual komsostav-politsostav 
command, officer skill degradation had a strongly disorganising impact on 
performance and most aspects of military discipline. This was both because the 
authority of officers amongst their subordinates declined rapidly as a result of the 
pervasive atmosphere of suspicion and due to officers themselves being reluctant to 
issue and enforce orders. Thus, in the last two years of the 1930s, the traditionally 
complicated relationship of Fleet personnel with alcohol led to new levels of 
embarrassment for the military leadership, forcing the People’s Commissar of the Fleet 
Mikhail Frinovskii to address the issue in a special decree in which he described 
drunkenness as the “scourge of the Fleet”. Baltic Fleet personnel were amongst the 
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leading offenders with more than 3,000 recorded drunkenness related incidents, 
including 201 involving officers.79 
In the first two months of 1939 alone there were recorded 5,573 disciplinary 
infractions, corresponding to roughly 10% of the Fleet’s personnel. These were not 
confined to alcohol abuse and included sleeping at watch, abandonment of post and 
direct refusal to obey orders. Perhaps more worryingly for PUBalt, over half of the 
transgressors were party or Komsomol affiliated.80 None of these pieces of information 
induced the party leadership or its military branch to reconsider the value of political 
agitation in military life. On the contrary, as shown earlier, the party democracy 
campaign outlived the Yezhovschina so that even though the most disruptive – because 
lethal – aspect of political mobilisation came to an end after 1938, the Fleet’s officers 
and sailors still spent considerable time engaged in activities that had little to do with 
military tasks. 
Party organisations on the Fleet continued to hold electoral meetings to elect 
bureaus and party commissions from multiple candidates, during which they were 
expected and encouraged to criticise their superiors even after the hunt for enemies 
had fallen off the agenda. Meetings of communists serving in the Battleship Squadron 
from mid-1938 provide a good example of this. Commissars reporting on the meetings 
praised the Squadron’s organisations for their observation of procedural forms, the 
lack of unexcused absences and the good preparation of all attendees. However, the 
same reports highlighted the absence of “sufficient criticism” of commanders and 
politruki as being amongst the major weaknesses (nedostatki) of the meetings.81 This 
was despite the fact that several speakers did criticise the substandard performance of 
some of their comrades. Astakhov from the Marat’s propulsion department attacked 
the ship’s partorg Gorokhov for ignoring the crew to such an extent that he was 
virtually unknown among them. Gorokhov was also criticised by Glazkov, also from 
propulsion, who accused the partorg of being responsible for the dying out of socialist 
emulation on the Marat.82 On Oktiabr’skaia Revoliutsiia, the politruk Zinov’ev stated 
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that bureau members had been neglecting their duties, with some of them even playing 
chess during educational activities. Zinov’ev himself came under attack, when 
Zubor’ev accused all politruki of being entirely clueless regarding in military affairs 
and Zinov’ev in particular of not knowing anything about the ship.83 
As samokritika and mutual scrutiny were thus alive and well, it seems that it was 
the lack of application of these to matters of military work that troubled the reporting 
commissars. The protocols themselves do not offer any clues as to why Battleship 
communists were not volunteering their views on the performance of the komsostav, 
but it seems plausible that generalised confusion was amongst the main causes of the 
problem. By the time the Yezhovshchina was over, the party leadership had spent more 
than a decade sending mixed signals over the proper place of each part of a uniquely 
complicated military structure. Komsostav officers had gone from being suspect 
elements to authoritative edinonachalniki, while at the same time the politsostav had 
seen its status reduced from that of supreme party representative to that of a 
subordinate structure responsible for political education. Communist party members, 
who could belong to either or neither of these hierarchies had been expected to promote 
these alternating military policies, which were in the end topped off with a campaign 
of mass persecution. It is then no wonder that the different constituent parts of the 
party-military complex were out of step with each other as to their relative 
responsibilities.  
No serious efforts were made to remedy this condition as the decade drew to an 
end and the prospect of war loomed closer. Instead, the intensity of political agitation 
received a new boost as the Fleet’s organisations started to prepare for the party’s 18th 
Congress in March 1939, the first to be held after socialism had been declared built in 
its foundations in 1934. With the adoption of a new party Ustav being amongst the 
major items of the Congress agenda, officers and sailors found themselves discussing 
minute details of the draft document in the meetings that preceded the supreme party 
event.84 At the same time, the need to convene district, city and regional conferences 
                                                 
83 Ibid., l. 42. 




before the all-Union Congress led to a new round of party elections and the attendant 
scrutiny of individual candidates’ political and personal past.85 
Not even the actual outbreak of war was strong enough a reason to displace 
political activity from the every-day life of the Fleet. Less than a year after the pre-
Congress electoral campaigns, party activists would have to perform their political 
duties in conditions of prolonged military conflict for the first time since the Civil War, 
as the Fleet’s land forces took an active part in the operations of the Winter War against 
Finland (1939-1940).86  On 5 December 1939, only a few days after the beginning of 
hostilities, a PUBalt representative gave a lecture on the broader international context 
of the war to a meeting of communists and sympathisers serving in the Fleet’s Special 
Naval Infantry Brigade. The commissar report on the meeting provides no clue as to 
the lecture’s content, but contains a list of the questions posed to the speaker by the 
marines present.  
These included several factual inquiries on matters like the status of the Aaland 
Islands and the composition of the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic 
but also reflected considerable interest into the nature of the new regime that would be 
established on the successful conclusion of the war. One marine asked about the views 
of the Communist Party of Finland on the future state, while another wondered if it 
would be possible for the new authority to “develop into Soviet power” or if a new 
revolution would have to take place.87 Similar interests were reported by the same 
unit’s political instructor in a report composed on 31 December, with marines 
apparently being curious as to whether Finland would embark on the construction of 
socialism or become more like the far away People’s Republic of Mongolia.88  
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Besides political education sessions, the party continued to exercise its 
ideological influence over the marines through their training which, even in wartime, 
continued to be conducted in terms of socialist emulation. Thus, the platoon of “second 
lieutenant comrade Zabrazhnii” of the third battalion was praised for its performance 
in skiing, night-time training and orienteering sotssorevnovaniia, while the one led by 
second lieutenant Ivanov was commended for its high participation rates in the 
events.89  In another company, the marines Zvukov, Kuznetsov and Korotkov were 
praised by their politruk for “completing their study of the rifle in less time than stated 
by the terms of the sotssorevnovanie” and moving on to train in the use of machine 
guns.90 
There are limits to the value of these reports as sources on the actual views of 
Baltic Fleet sailors on the Winter War. As these documents are not stenographic 
records or even meeting protocols, it is likely that they are more reflective of the 
intentions of their compilers than the views of the crews. But even on a highly sceptical 
reading, assuming for example that commissars were inventing examples of rank-and-
file interest to make themselves look better in the eyes of their superiors, these reports 
are still consistent with the general argument made throughout this chapter. Political 
agitation and party activism was such an integral part of the way the Soviet leadership 
conceived of the military that they expected it to continue uninterrupted even in 
wartime. The upshot of this was that with military performance finally assuming very 
immediate life and death importance for serving personnel, it also came to acquire the 
status of a marker of political reliability, much like labour performance had been the 
sine qua non of the good party member in industry since the mid-1920s.  
Party commission sessions from the period following the end of the Winter War 
in March 1940 illustrate this point very well. During admission and disciplinary 
reviews, commission members showed little patience for those who were obviously 
ignorant about political affairs or demonstrated careless attitudes, yet they also seem 
to have been willing to be especially lenient with proven soldiers. At a session held on 
3 June, one Pavel Grigor’ev was refused membership by the Naval Infantry Brigade 
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commission on the grounds that he had never heard of the Mensheviks. Two more 
applications were rejected on the grounds of past disciplinary infractions while another 
thirteen cases were not considered because their documents had been formulated 
incorrectly; only one of the applicants was admitted, with the commission noting that 
he had shown exceptional “bravery against the White Finns”.91  
Even more indicative of the changing priorities of the time however was the case 
of Gibat Gabzallilov, a member of the party since 1927 who was serving in the brigade 
with the rank of captain. Gabzallilov’s brother had been expelled from the party 
because during the Civil War he had served in a partisan group that had been under 
“kulak leadership” and had refused to demobilise after the Bolsheviks’ victory, turning 
instead to “banditry”. Gabzallilov’s brother had mentioned this fact in his biographical 
statement, but the captain himself, who had provided one of the recommendations for 
his sibling’s membership application, had concealed it. This had earned Gabzallilov a 
party censure which he was trying to get lifted on the grounds that he had been unaware 
of his brother’s actions. In the end, the commission agreed to strike the censure off 
Gabzallilov’s record, citing the fact that the captain had been awarded the Order of the 
Red Star for his bravery in the war against Finland.92 
Gabzallilov was not only brother to someone who had been involved with kulaks 
and bandits, but had also concealed this information in an attempt to get the party to 
accept his brother as a member. Each of these facts would on its own have been enough 
to raise serious suspicions about his political reliability under different circumstances. 
For the commission’s members however, Gabzallilov’s outstanding performance in 
what had been a poor show for the Red Army took precedence over his party-
disciplinary transgressions.93 Cases like Gabzallilov’s abound in the commission’s 
records after the Winter War, collectively indicating that the Fleet’s engagement in 
real combat finally drove home the importance of actual military skills to party organs, 
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which began to take these into account for their political evaluations.94 In doing so, the 
Fleet’s communists were moving towards a practice that had been the norm amongst 
their civilian comrades in industry since at least the mid-1920s.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Naval infantry barracks, battleships and submarines are all social settings that are very 
different from a giant machine building plant. Yet as this chapter has shown, the 
activities of the Fleet’s communists – and the broader outcomes thereof – did not 
diverge significantly from those of their civilian comrades. In the mid-1920s, the 
political officers who were expected to lend authority to commanders came up instead 
with their own version of spetseedvsto, demonstrating the inherent problems of 
formalised political control over state administration some years before industrial 
party organisations had turned the notion of edinonachalie into a weapon against their 
factory directors. Much like in industry, these tensions subsided as the party saturation 
of the komsostav increased as a result of the rapid promotions of the early 1930s, only 
to return with a vengeance once the mass hunt for enemies of the Yezhovshchina spread 
to the military after the Tukhachevskii affair. Never abandoning their activist duties 
even at the height of mass repression, party members dutifully continued their work 
after the blood-letting was over, continuing their mass meetings and political agitation 
sessions even as they were fighting in the frozen battlefields of the Winter War. 
Party activism on the Fleet was thus of a very similar kind to that which took 
place at KP/Kirov, even though communist officers and sailors were not competing 
for influence over anything as material as production plans. This illustrates a point mad 
earlier in this thesis, namely that the activity of the rank-and-file in industry should not 
be understood as a by-product of the management-labour conflict but rather as a 
channel through which this was expressed. Even though the Fleet’s personnel had no 
equivalent of the Regime of Economy to worry about, the party activists amongst them 
were still suspicious of komsostav officers in the mid-1920s. For the commissars, this 
had been their job since the early days of the Civil War and their attitudes for a while 
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lagged behind those of the party leadership as expressed in the Frunze reforms. For 
lower-ranking communist officers and sailors, the ambiguous political status of 
military specialists may or may not have been much cause for concern, but it was 
certainly a good enough excuse to assume a flexible view of military discipline.  
As the communisation of the komsostav proceeded, tensions between 
commissars and commanders seem to have eased. Discipline however did not improve, 
as a more reliable officer corps was never seen by the party leadership as sufficient 
reason to call for less activism. At the same time, with the distinction between 
politically and military performance remaining unclear, it also became possible for 
officers like Bulantsev of the Marat to deflect criticisms of the state of discipline of 
their ships and units by pointing out that their subordinates were after all politically 
conscious Soviet citizens. As statistical reports reflected ever greater participation in 
clubs, competitions and political circles, all of which were important achievements in 
terms of implementing party policy, such arguments appeared to be backed by solid 
evidence.95 There were also of course those who, like the political instructor Keek, 
found this state of affairs uniquely unsuitable for a military organisation. As with 
purely technocratic views with respect to industry however, the notion of a non-
ideological domain of military activity was entirely at odds with the framework of 
politics that had been established since the Bolsheviks’ victory in the Civil War. 
At the same time, the permanent state of mobilisation engendered by the party’s 
incessant activity brought to the fore deeper tensions which the politically 
inexperienced and greatly outnumbered discussion leaders were ill-equipped to 
contain. Ethnic prejudice, anti-Soviet attitudes and hostility to collectivisation were far 
from uncommon amongst serving personnel and the examples cited above can hardly 
be the only occasions when such views were aired in public. Although then statistical 
reports reflect a steady rise in participation in political activities during the 1930s, it 
cannot be assumed that participants were always positively predisposed towards 
Soviet power. These tensions, along with persistent ideologically-motivated 
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suspiciousness and the fear induced by the threatening international environment, 
helped fuel the campaign of mass repression after the fall of the generals in June 1937.  
In all these ways, the activity of the party rank-and-file developed along much 
the same lines and yielded similar results on the Fleet as it did in industry. Before 
however closing this chapter, it is worth briefly considering the manner in which 
communist activism in uniform differed from that of the factory floor.  As argued 
earlier, the party rank-and-file played an important role in the process of Soviet 
industrialisation in that their activity prevented a catastrophic collapse of industrial 
relations. Primary party organisations allowed a large part of active workers to carve 
out a niche within the system and also made possible the taking of stopgap measures 
to address plan failures, even at the same time as contributing to the generalised chaos 
of the factory floor. It is much harder to make a similar assessment of the effects of 
party work on Soviet military development during the same period. 
For although the energies of industrial party activists were primarily applied to 
the task of devising solutions to problems of production, the aspects of military work 
that could benefit from grassroots input were few and far between. Instead, party 
activism on the Fleet consisted primarily in party building and ideological instruction, 
which were both activities that were very weakly related to military tasks. To the extent 
then that party activism meant that the Fleet’s sailors – and Soviet soldiers more 
broadly – spent time learning about party history and the international situation instead 
of drilling and exercising, it is also likely to have had a detrimental effect on military 
performance. Even for those aspects of activism that were about military skills, like 
for example the organisation of marksmanship competitions, it is unclear that they 
carried any benefits over normal training. In this sense, the account offered in this 
chapter supports Roger Reese’s argument that the regime-sanctioned politicisation of 
the Soviet military contributed to preventing the development of professionalism 
amongst its ranks. 
Professionalism, however, was never a high priority in the party’s military 
policy. For the Bolsheviks, the combat effectiveness of the military had always taken 
second place to its political reliability.96 The party’s ubiquitous presence inside the 
                                                 




USSR’s armed forces was meant to prevent them from developing political ambitions 
that would pose a threat to civilian authority, an insecurity rooted in the Imperial 
origins of the first generation of Soviet officers. What military sociology terms 
“civilianisation”, the breaking down of the boundaries between civilian and military 
life, was an intended objective rather than a failure of party policy.97 This state of 
affairs lead to such bizarre situations as battleship crews competing in politeness while 
seeking to expose enemies of the people and foreign spies. It is no coincidence that, 
with the exception of the similarly insecure republican Spain, no other state in the 
interwar period developed a similar system of civilian control over the military.98  
Nevertheless, there was one way in which the work of commissars and 
communists was intended to positively influence the combat effectiveness of Soviet 
troops. Lectures and activities on imperialism, the world revolution and the 
achievements of the Soviet system were all meant to strengthen the ideological 
commitment of servicemen to the USSR and in that way raise and maintain troop 
morale (boevoi dukh). It is extremely difficult to determine the extent to which party 
activists were successful in this aspect of their mission for among other things morale 
is a very difficult thing to measure. In any case, by most recent accounts of Soviet 
troop performance during the Winter War and WWII, bravery and perseverance were 
not amongst the attributes they lacked, even if basic discipline left much to be desired.99  
Although then it is reasonable to assume that on the whole, party activism had a 
negative effect on the skill level of Soviet sailors and soldiers, the same cannot be said 
in terms of their morale. The significance of this is that from the perspective of the 
leadership, the dual system of political instruction developed by the party had been 
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successful in its own terms. Thus, when the military setbacks of the war against 
Finland and the early stages of the German invasion demonstrated the weaknesses of 
the Soviet military, the only measure taken by the party leadership with respect to the 
system of political instruction was to make politsostav officers once again subordinate 
to their commanders, in a manner similar to staff-officers.100 Much like previous efforts 
at reform in both the military and industry, this was an attempt to eliminate competition 
over authority and strengthen edinonachalie. Like all of its predecessors, this initiative 
did not address political activism in the form of samokritika and ideological education 
sessions as an issue because, from the perspective of the leadership and of the Soviet 
political project more broadly, it was an objective rather than a problem.  
To return to Reese’s argument on the lack of professionalism of the Soviet armed 
forces examined in the beginning of this chapter, what the preceding pages have shown 
is that this was a result of the military’s institutional make-up, itself a product of 
Bolshevik political priorities. For as long as the party was more concerned about the 
military’s political reliability than its combat readiness, professionalism in the armed 
forces would always have to suffer due to the myriad non-military tasks required to 
secure and demonstrate political loyalty. As shown in the previous chapters however, 
this hierarchy of priorities was not the product of contingent factors, but was hard-
wired into the political project that was the Soviet state. The Bolsheviks did not want 
a professional military because they had never wanted a professional state in the first 
place. Much as the party’s ubiquitous presence in industry was intended to guarantee 
the economy’s progress towards communism, the dual party control over the military 
apparatus was a means to prevent it from becoming anything other than an armed 
defender of the revolutionary project. What this chapter has shown is that the party 
rank-and-file played a crucial role in putting the leadership’s political vision into 
practice on the Fleet as much as in industry. The ensuing chaos was of course an 
unintended consequence.
                                                 




Conclusion: the vanguard concept as a promising category for 
historical research 
 
This thesis began with a discussion of the problem of state-society relations for 
historical scholarship on the Soviet Union in the Stalin period. The argument made 
was that the issue highlighted by J. Arch Getty in the late 1980s regarding the fuzzy 
boundaries between state and society in the USSR had been obscured by the 
exponential growth of empirical research after the opening of the archives. Remaining 
unaddressed, the binary conception of state and society as distinct and competing 
entities continued to structure the field, broadly dividing research into state-political 
and social-cultural even as the growing popularity of the indeterminate intellectual 
approach known as the “linguistic turn” purported to deconstruct concepts of social 
structure.1  
This did not so much negatively affect the quality of the research outputs 
produced in either category as complicate the task of relating them to each other. If 
pre-1991 totatalitarianism and revisionism had a clear-cut mode of communication in 
often heated disagreement, after the opening of the archives had given both sides cause 
for celebration it became less clear where their successors stood relative to each other. 
How did confirmation of Stalin’s commitment to building a true classless society 
influence the much more detailed picture of everyday life that emerged from the 
archives? What did this new appreciation of the multiplicity of forms of everyday day 
people’s interactions with the state, “the little tactics of the habitat”, have to contribute 
to research about the nature of the ideologically derived “grand strategies of the 
state”?2 
Attempts to classify the Soviet system as a distinctive modernisation project or 
neo-traditional society generated very interesting empirical insights but ultimately 
failed to develop into fully-fledged theoretical frameworks. This was to a large extent 
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due to their mutual compatibility; it was perfectly possible to view the pioneering 
welfare projects of the USSR as modernising policy initiatives, while at the same time 
recognising that the persistence of informal patron-client networks reflected the failure 
of the Bolshevik endeavour to overcome the Russian past. There was thus no obvious 
reason why the concepts of modernity or neo-traditionalism had any particular 
heuristic value beyond serving as descriptors of different features of the Soviet system.  
This prompted some more theoretically inclined researchers to suggest that the 
time of competing and mutually exclusive research frameworks had come to an end. 
The fall of the USSR and the archival revolution had made it possible to treat the 
findings of all scholarly traditions that had been part of the field’s history as having 
mutually contributed to the incremental development of its collective wisdom.  
Scholars like Gábor Rittersporn, Mark Edele and Jean-Paul Depretto argued that this 
made it possible to start the business of theorising from scratch, by deploying the 
resources of different traditions of classical sociology in order to make sense of the 
field’s massively expanded source base and eventually come up with a new theoretical 
understanding of the USSR’s social structure.3 
There is much to agree with in this view; the mutual appreciation of the relative 
merits of formerly competing research agendas has been one of the most positive 
effects of the archival revolution on the field’s development since 1991. Nevertheless, 
several years after this conceptual reboot was first announced, we are still not any 
closer to developing a theory of Soviet social structure or a conceptual framework of 
for the history of the Stalin period. It would seem that the “quicksand society” 
described by Moshe Lewin resists theorisation, if only for the fact that the structures it 
produced were too transient for their conceptualisation to be of any use. 
This thesis has shown that it is possible to side-step this problem in the study of 
Soviet state-society relations by focusing on an institutional feature of the Soviet 
political system, a structure that is that does not need to be theoretically derived. The 
communist party and its primary organisations were stable features of the Soviet 
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system for the duration of its existence and rank-and-file communists are easily 
distinguishable from the rest of society by virtue of their party membership. What 
makes the study of the party especially illuminating with regard to the relationship 
between state and society is that mediating this relationship had been its core task from 
its conception as an institution. If the ultimate goal of the Bolshevik project was to 
create a state in which “every kitchen-hand” could govern, it was the task of the 
vanguard party to make this a reality by getting as many people involved in the 
business of running the state as possible.4  
The way this was to be achieved was leading by example. Communists were 
expected to be the first to take part in both the government’s far-reaching policy 
initiatives and the everyday business of keeping the country running. As mentioned in 
the introduction to this thesis, the role envisaged already in the mid-1920s by the party 
leadership for the organisations of their rank-and-file comrades was that of 
administrative troubleshooter, educator and liaison with the broader public. Party 
activists were thus involved in the minute details of daily administration as much in 
the factories, where they were permanently in search of solutions to problems like 
bottlenecks and faulty output, as in the less obviously proletarian environment of the 
military. They put together literacy circles, organised drama groups and socialist 
emulation campaigns on deck as on the factory floor. In this sense, vanguardism 
consisted in recruiting a section of society to become a non-professional arm of the 
state. On this definition, and based on the evidence presented here, grassroots 
communists certainly lived up to their title in the interwar period. 
This state of affairs differed significantly from that described by the concept of 
political mobilisation, primarily because it was permanent. Certainly, the various 
campaigns initiated by the party leadership can be seen as attempts to mobilise the 
rank-and-file in order to achieve specific objectives. However, the indeterminacy of 
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the tasks set and the ubiquity of everyday crises in the Soviet interwar period meant 
that the rank-and-file was constantly active in some way or other. Unlike specific 
campaigns which the leadership could call off or reverse, the party rank-and-file was 
a permanent structure of the Soviet system. The vanguard could not, or would not be 
switched off as long as the party leadership remained committed to Marxism-Leninism 
and the role it assigned to the party. 
The value of studying the communist rank-and file thus lies in the fact that party 
organisations were the institutional link between the state and society at large, a locus 
in the Soviet system where the two overlapped. They were the site of interaction 
between grand strategies and little tactics. The party organisation as vanguard was an 
ideologically imbued institutional structure, operative for as long as the party 
leadership was committed to the ideological principles that ascribed to it a leadership 
role over its social setting. At the same time, because party organisations were 
composed of ordinary people, their social setting determined the nature and effects of 
their ideologically motivated activities. 
Thus, KP/Kirov communists were industrial workers whose efforts were 
primarily directed towards addressing the issues confronting themselves and their 
colleagues in their giant machinebuilding plant within the context of Soviet 
industrialisation. Their understanding of concepts like class struggle, samokritika and 
ultimately their own vanguard role, were always inflected through the prism of labour-
management conflicts and the permanent pressure exerted on their living standards. 
This is perhaps most clearly reflected in the fate of the party’s ambitious cultural 
enlightenment programmes which the scarcities of time and things largely limited to 
the supervision of the quality of services.  
This notwithstanding, it is neither helpful nor accurate to view the activities of 
the rank-and-file in an instrumentalist manner. The activities of communist workers 
examined in the preceding chapters were not such that could be considered 
disingenuous by either themselves or the party leadership. Their involvement in 
factory affairs was both expected and desirable as far as the leadership was concerned, 
even if the outcome thereof was more often than not at odds with what was sought. As 




letter and spirit of party policy, there is little reason to suggest that they did not do so 
in good faith. The upshot was that, as their party membership inevitably drew them 
into political affairs extending beyond the factory gates, their participation was no less 
keen than it was with respect to the issues of immediate concern to them as workers. 
This also made it possible for the rank-and-filers to view their own concerns through 
the prism of broader political issues, including the ever more threatening security 
environment. Fires, accidents and plain selfishness were thus understood in terms of 
sabotage or “Zinovievism” by some communists, years before the leadership came to 
adopt a similar outlook.  
Meanwhile, party activism on the Baltic Fleet was developing along similar 
lines, though its effects differed in significant respects. Marxist-Leninist inspired 
activism was well suited to the factory floor, where ideas of working class hegemony 
could find ready applicability in institutions like production conferences, making it 
possible to contain the tensions inherent in the uneasy balance of Soviet industrial 
relations.  Conversely, the benefits of party presence in a military organisation like the 
Baltic Fleet were less obvious. To be sure, the cultural activities organised by the 
Fleet’s communists probably went a long way towards making the rough conditions 
of military service more tolerable for both sailors and officers. It is unlikely however, 
that they contributed anything to their combat abilities. When war drove home the real 
value of military skill, the Fleet’s party organs started to regard it as a marker of 
political loyalty, in a manner similar to worker communists’ attribution of political 
value to labour performance. 
Although then the centralist principle on which the party operated meant that 
similar kinds of activities would be attempted wherever there were communists 
present, the outcomes of these would differ depending on the conditions in which they 
took place. It is the ubiquity of the party’s presence combined with the variation of 
Soviet social conditions that makes the appreciation of the PPO as a specific element 
of state-society relations a useful substitute for a theoretical framework of the same. If 
one the purposes of theory is to make the findings of empirical research comparable 
and applicable across research projects, then further study of the party rank-and-file 




Useful insight can be gained by comparing the picture of rank-and-file activism 
emerging from the account offered in this thesis with that of the party grassroots in 
workplaces that were smaller, or less party-saturated, or where women made up a 
greater part of the workforce, or any combination of these conditions. We may further 
expect rank-and-file activism to have had different a different impact in rural areas, 
where the insistence of the party on recruiting chiefly amongst proletarian village 
elements like farmhands and shepperds deprived it of members during the NEP era 
and can hardly have placed it in a strong position to launch its aggressive campaign of 
collectivisation in the late 1920s.5  
The party rank-and-file may also serve as the object of diachronic comparisons. 
This study has traced the contours of party activism in 1926-1941 and argued that these 
remained remarkably stable for the duration of this period. It is unlikely however that 
things continued thus for much longer, as the war killed and displaced significant 
numbers of communists, destroying some party organisations while forcing others to 
operate underground for the first time after two decades of monopolising political 
power. While the activities of party activists during WWII would in themselves be a 
fascinating subject for research, the effects of the war on the place of the rank-and-file 
in the Soviet system after the USSR’s victory are perhaps more relevant to the issues 
that have been examined in this thesis. The available evidence suggests that the party’s 
budgetary expenditures on “ideology”, its privileged activity domain, collapsed during 
the war and, despite a brief revival, declined consistently in the postwar period.6 
Combined with an observed strengthening of the state apparatus vis-à-vis the party in 
the same period, this could have had a significant impact on the activities of primary 
party organisations and their effects on state-society relations.7 This is a question worth 
exploring, as are similar issues emerging with respect to other major milestones in the 
Soviet Union’s history, like the response of the grassroots to destalinisation and 
perestroika.  
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Perhaps more interestingly, the communist rank-and-file can serve as a 
comparative tool for state-society relations between different 20th century socialist 
states. Some version of the vanguard party principle was applied by all states that 
declared themselves on the socialist path. Despite their organisational similarities, 
these parties came to power in very different circumstances and had to “lead” the way 
to socialism in different conditions. Thus, both the Chinese and Cuban communists 
came to power by means of guerrilla warfare in conditions of economic backwardness 
and both developed Marxism-Leninism in ways inspired by their national intellectual 
traditions. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Chinese communists who had spent years 
establishing base areas in the countryside before their victory, a decade after coming 
to power the Cuban communists numbered only 55,000 members, less than half the 
membership of the Leningrad Party Organisation in the period studied in this thesis.8 
In most of Eastern Europe, formerly strong communist parties that had been destroyed 
by Nazism and war were brought to power by the might of Soviet armour and began 
building their links with society in entirely different conditions to those of the 
Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, scholars working on the social history of the East and 
Central European socialist states have highlighted similar patters of grassroots 
activism to the ones examined here.9 The reproduction of the institutional form of the 
Leninist concept of the vanguard party in different historical conditions thus provides 
a promising lead for comparative research in state-society relations, as a component 
part of the emerging historiography of international communism. 
Finally, some concluding remarks. This thesis has been a study of a particular 
source of social support for the Soviet system under Stalin. Its completion comes at a 
time when the figure of Stalin has been undergoing a grassroots rehabilitation of sorts 
in Russia, with busts of the general secretary appearing in provincial cities and polls 
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showing increasingly positive or sympathetic appraisals of his legacy. This 
development has not failed to attract the attention of the academic community of 
historians of the Soviet Union. In Russia, the different academic responses to this trend 
are exemplified in two recent books by the most influential post-Soviet historians. 
Oleg Khlevniuk’s new biography of Stalin was written explicitly as an admonishment 
against what he regards as naïve glorification of the vozhd’.10 By contrast, the last book 
of Viktor Zemskov, published shortly before his death, is essentially a summary of the 
author’s quantitative research over the last three decades aimed primarily as a final 
rebuttal of some of the more imaginative exaggerations of the number of victims of 
repression.11 
If changing Russian views on the legacy of Stalin have had productive effects 
on Russian scholarship, the same cannot be said with respect to English-language 
historiography. For although research on Stalin and his era is as strong as ever, there 
are worrying signs that we may be witnessing a re-emergence of the kind of 
acrimonious invective that was first directed against the revisionists in the 1980s. 
Three separate volumes on Stalin, his allies and the terror have very recently come 
under heavy criticism for being too close to Stalinist apologia. 12  That they are 
obviously nothing of the sort, and that their critics are by no means fringe figures in 
the field, suggests that rising tensions over what is an understandably sensitive 
historical subject may come to pose a challenge to cool-minded scholarly debate in the 
future. This thesis was written on the assumption that scholarship is best suited to the 
business of explanation and understanding, rather than condemnation or admonition. 
Understanding the motivations of the historical supporters of the Soviet state under 
Stalin may go some way towards explaining the roots of the revival of his popularity, 
moreso one suspects than condemnation.
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